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Japanese names follow the standard Japanese convention of having the family name followed 
by the given name (e.g. Miki Kiyoshi, Watsuji Tetsurō). 




















All efforts to escape the grimness of the present 
into nostalgia for a still intact past, or into the 
anticipated oblivion of a better future, are vain.1  
 
This thesis started as an investigation into the ‘how’ and the ‘to what extent’ two 
twentieth-century Japanese philosophers, Miki Kiyoshi (1897-1945) and Watsuji Tetsurō 
(1889-1960), contributed to the ideology of the Japanese wartime regime. Their backgrounds 
were very different; Miki was an intellectual who spent part of his life studying Marxism and 
who took a very innovative approach in the understanding of the concepts of ‘dialectics’ and 
‘class’. Watsuji was a conservative intellectual who strove to design a new national character 
in the face of the crisis that he perceived ‘Western modernity’ had brought to Japan. In a 
sudden turn of faith, in the 1940s, Miki and Watsuji’s philosophical systems eventually 
coincided, when they both came to support Japan’s imperialist enterprise. The main questions 
therefore were how it was possible that two such different standpoints could philosophically 
and politically merge in such a fashion and to what extent they were bankrupted when Japan 
was defeated in August 1945. On a methodological level, this question was reflected in the 
enigma of whether philosophy and intellectual history were too intertwined to be clearly 
separated or whether, on the other hand, there was a need for a new methodological tool that 
could have overcome them both. 
I will therefore argue that the answer to these questions has to be found in how the 
concept of the ‘human being’ (ningen) was theorized and developed by Miki and Watsuji 
throughout their careers. I will argue that their idea of ‘medianity’ that underpins their 
elaboration of ningen is the most profound and fundamental flaw that brought their systems to 
collapse together with the regime in 1945. 2 I will also demonstrate that victory did not only 
fail to militarily and historically concretize, but also philosophically. The ‘faith’ that Miki and 
Watsuji showed in the moral destiny of Japan and that was embodied in the idea of the 
escaton qua victory in the Second World War did not materialize in the way they had 
envisioned it. Thus, their philosophical systems were destined to failure for two reasons: the 
human being they created was a representation of what the Japanese nation meant to them and, 
                                                 
1 Arendt 2004: xxvii. 
2 I have coined the neologism ‘medianity’ since I could not find any other word that could convey the same 
meaning. Medianity is not strictly a ‘medium’ or a ‘milieu’ but it rather describes the condition by means of 
which the human being finds himself in ‘between’ totality and infinity, as in Miki, or totality and particularity as 
in Watsuji. Since it is a precise ontological location that I have not found expressed in any other thinkers, I had 




furthermore, it was spatially and temporally grounded in a Japanese locus projected towards a 
visionary future of victory. The Second World War, with the atmosphere of crisis that it 
brought along, bankrupted Miki and Watsuji’s expectations and ideas.  
Politically, this Japanese human being was reflected in the Japanese imperial 
enterprise and, in Watsuji’s case, even in the political environment of the postwar period. 
Despite Miki and Watsuji’s personal and intellectual differences, their theorization of ningen, 
their faith in the escaton and their idea of medianity made them to politically come together. I 
will demonstrate that what they failed to do was to stop their systems from going down the 
road of ultranationalism and imperialism. Instead, they simply went along with it.  
In order to support my hypothesis on a methodological level, I will have to employ 
both intellectual history and philosophy and subsume them in the history of philosophy. As a 
matter of fact, neither of the two will prove to be sufficiently complete for me to argue that 
ideas and history could collapse together. On the one hand, intellectual history, with its thrust 
on the contextualization of the production of a given author, could not fully answer the 
question of whether author and production could collude with historical reality. On the other 
hand, the scope of philosophy does not necessarily include the historical milieu or the 
historical impact certain ideas had. Thus, by sketching the historical and intellectual 
development of the idea of ningen in Miki and Watsuji, I will attempt to address the issue of 
how it is possible to solve the problem of the relationship between philosophy and history. In 
regard to the particular historical circumstances of the Second World War, this issue is even 
more pressing if we want to understand how intellectuals actively participated in the creation 






State of the Field 
In 1994, Pierre Lavelle’s published an article on the political thought of the father of 
modern Japanese philosophy and founder of the Kyōto School, Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945) 
(Lavelle 1994). The article sparked quite a debate amongst scholars around the extent to 
which Nishida’s thought, and that of his students, Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) and Nishitani 
Keiji (1900-1990), could have contributed to the ideology of the Japanese wartime regime. A 




supported the government, whilst others proposed the thesis that his religious thought and his 
philosophical contribution were more important than his politics. The focus gradually shifted 
from an analysis of the most theoretical and philosophical aspects of the Kyōto School that 
dealt with the influence of Buddhism towards a more political interpretation of their ideas. 
Maraldo calls this divide a one ‘between intellectual historians (nearly all denouncing the 
school) and mostly appreciative theologians and philosophers of religion’ (Maraldo 2006: 
376). Only recently, Goto-Jones has taken a difference stand and sought to demonstrate that 
Nishida’s philosophy was a political one from the start of his career in 1911 (Goto-Jones 
2005a).  
My choice of focusing on Miki and Watsuji, rather than on Nishida or his two most 
famous followers, was dictated by the fact that Miki and Watsuji’s concept of the human 
being presented some striking similarities that were not evident in the production of the other 
Kyōto School philosophers. In addition, the scholarship on Miki and Watsuji is not as 
extensive as that on the other members, especially in languages other than Japanese. 
Methodologically, the few scholars who have studied Miki and Watsuji have usually 
followed the divide described above. Thus, Miki’s involvement with the Shōwa Research 
Association (Shōwa Kenkyūkai) a government think-tank led by the then Prime Minister 
Prince Konoe Fumimaro, was, until recently, confined to research which specifically dealt 
with the history of the braintrust. Since Watsuji’s conservative political orientation was 
never put into question, the discussion gravitated around the ‘extent’ to which Watsuji 
contributed to the nationalist ideology of the Japanese government. 
Only recently, in Japan, there has been a revival of ‘Miki studies’, with three 
monographs and one edited volume published in four years (Uchida 2004; Machiguchi 2004; 
Tsuda 2007; Kiyoshi et al. 2008). If compared to the few books that appeared in the 1960s 
and 1970s, these ones, with the exception of Uchida, engage more thoroughly with Miki’s 
involvement with the Shōwa Research Association. It might be a sign of the changing 
political climate in Japan, where Miki’s support for the wartime nationalist regime is not 
seen anymore as a ‘stain’ in his intellectual career, but rather as an issue that needs to be 
dealt with. Different from Japan, in Europe and America only a handful of scholars have 
dedicated parts of their works to Miki. A few examples are Harootunian, Goto-Jones and, to 
a limited extent, Fletcher (Harootunian 2000a: 293-357; Goto-Jones 2005a: 104-9; Goto-
Jones 2006; Fletcher 1979 and 1982). Watsuji’s case is somewhat more nuanced, since some 
scholars see him as a fervent supporter of the regime (Bellah 1965; Harootunian and Najita 




in the light of his overall production (Kosaka 1997b; Mine 1998; Arisaka 1996b), whilst 
others have been quite apologetic (Kōsaka 1962; Yuasa 1981; Berque 1994; LaFleur 2001).  
Many issues arise when dealing with political philosophy, in particular when 
produced in such a context as the one of the Second World War. Notwithstanding, I believe 
that there has been a major problem in the way the philosophy of the Kyōto School has been 
approached so far. All the studies mentioned above mainly focus on the question of 
‘collaborationism’. Nonetheless, the relationship between intellectual history, philosophy 
and the production of ideas has yet to be properly problematized. Even a very recent 
publication from Nanzan University that specifically engaged with Miki and Watsuji did not 
address this problem at all (Sōgen Hori and Curley 2008). Instead, this volume’s contributors 
continued along the lines of the ‘philosophers of religion’.  
Thus, especially in the cases of these two thinkers, the issue should not reside in their 
alleged collaboration, their alleged tenkō or their alleged political innocence (and, I would 
argue, naïveté). 3 Rather, the issue should be how they both shifted in the direction the 
Japanese government was heading towards. The ‘divide between intellectual historians and 
philosophers of religion’ will never be bridged if research will continue to stubbornly 
entrench itself on these two polarizing positions. Furthermore, not asking the fundamental 
question of how a given idea in a given philosophical system can transform itself into a 
political weapon disregards the important role intellectuals had in shaping the ultranationalist 








In order to solve this enigma, I have decided to approach the study of the concept of 
the human being in Miki and Watsuji both from the standpoint of intellectual history and 
philosophy. By tracing the internal development of three fundamental elements, medianity, 
                                                 
3 Tenkō is a word that denotes the abjuring of one’s own faith in favor of another one. It was first used to 
describe the Japanese Christian who, in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, were forced by the Tokugawa 
government to abjure their faith by stepping on sacred images (fumie). In the interwar period it was used to 





Angst and religion, which are the theoretical underpinning of the concept of ningen, I will 
show that my approach has more to do with history of philosophy than with intellectual 
history or philosophy alike.  
To Miki and Watsuji ‘medianity’ represents the ontological as well historical location 
of the human being, where the ningen finds itself clustered between totality and infinity in 
Miki and totality and particularity in Watsuji. The theorization of an all-encompassing human 
being as ‘median’ that represents the unity of subject and object, logos and pathos, body and 
mind, aimed at overcoming the epistemological division between ‘subject’ and ‘object’. This 
human being had the particular characteristic of being underpinned by history and praxis in 
Miki (then poiesis) and history and climate in Watsuji. Nevertheless, it was precisely its 
grounding the particular history and in a particular climate of Japan that prevented it from 
undergoing a complete renovation capable of evolving into another kind of possible ‘history’ 
if not the one of the Japanese nation. 
Secondly, Miki and Watsuji developed medianity as a way to respond to the 
intellectual and spiritual crisis that they perceived as pervasive of Japanese society between 
the 1920s and the 1950s. The historical crisis was sparked by the uncertain political 
atmosphere that followed WWI and that gave way to the rising of ultranationalism in Japan.4 
Miki saw it reflected in the ‘irrational forces’ that took over in the form of fascism (MKZ X: 
400-2). Watsuji considered it in terms of the dangers that ‘Western’ modernity and ‘Western’ 
capitalism presented to the pure and ‘traditional’ Japanese culture. He moreover re-witnessed 
it in the Japanese defeat in 1945 and in the subsequent American occupation that lasted until 
1952. Hence, both thinkers interpreted the crisis (or crises) of their time as a sign of the deep 
and profound historical change that was investing Japan in that period. Thus, medianity not 
only emerged as a mean for renovation on a philosophical level, but also as a product and an 
attempted solution to the historical context in which it was born. Yet, if we have to listen to 
Gramsci who said that, in the time of crisis: ‘the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in 
this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’, then it is clear that medianity 
could have not proven to be a powerful tool in contrasting ultranationalist tendencies 
(Gramsci 1971: 276). As a matter of fact, we could consider medianity as a ‘morbid 
symptom’ of the empire to come. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, there is the element of religion that appears quite 
strongly in Miki and Watsuji’s systems. Miki and Watsuji believed that the Japanese victory 
                                                 
4 In this respect, Japan, Italy and Germany have a lot of history in common, despite the specific characteristic 




in the Second World War would have materialized in the form of an intellectual escaton. At 
the end of the war, a new, renovated, Japanese ningen would have guided the whole of Asia 
vis-à-vis the European and the American one. The faith that they showed in their nation and 
their conviction that this was the destiny that Japan was morally entitled to is precisely what 
caused their idea of the human being to be miserably crushed under the blow of history. It is 
quintessentially a problem of religious faith, albeit not in sense of theology, but rather in the 
sense that Miki and Watsuji believed in a religion of the human being with all that that entails, 
including predestination. Nevertheless, Miki and Watsuji’s escaton slightly differs in its 
historical realization. Miki died in September 1945 and was not able to witness the American 
occupation of Japan and the intellectual and physical reconstruction of his country. His idea 
of the renovated human being thus died with him and remained, in its characterization, a 
religious escaton.5 Watsuji, on the other hand, survived the war and went on writing until his 
death in 1960. Since his ideals were defeated together with Japan in August 1945, he had to 
propose another model of ningen that could face the new challenges of the postwar period. He 
thus decided to cling to the idea of betweeness (aidagara) or inter-relationality of human 
beings. The failure of his escaton in 1945 subsequently gave birth to another form of escaton 
that should have seen Japan rising in the new geo-political environment of the Cold War. 
Watsuji’s escaton took a political form as well as a religious one, further hampering the 
possibility of acknowledging the mistakes of the past. 
These three elements form the kernel of Miki and Watsuji’s philosophical innovations 
and, together, they reduced their systems to rubbles. I will hence demonstrate how their 
internal interplay, together with the external force of the historical context, doomed Miki and 
Watsuji’s entire philosophical enterprises to a destiny of bankruptcy. In this way, I attempt to 








                                                 
5 I am not aware of any Japanese intellectual who, in the postwar period, continued the work that Miki had 




Structure of the Work 
The work is divided in six main chapters. Chapter 1 deals with methodology and 
contextualizes the production of Miki and Watsuji both historically as well as philosophically. 
I will show, in more detail, why the methodological approaches that have been so far 
employed in the scholarship on the Kyōto School refrain from addressing the most important 
questions that should be asked when dealing with these Japanese intellectuals.  
Chapter 2, ‘The Birth of Ningen’, traces the origin of the concept of ningen in Miki 
and Watsuji in the late 1920s. In this part, I will show how the influence of Pascal set the 
standard for Miki’s elaboration of the human being and the extent to which Heideggerian 
philosophy contributed to the creation of such an idea. I will furthermore take into 
consideration Watsuji’s human being in the context of two of his prewar major books: 
Climate and the first volume of Study of Ethics. The aim of this chapter is thus to demonstrate 
that, in the first part of their careers, Miki and Watsuji elaborated a similar concept of the 
human being that took the shape of medianity.  
Chapter 3, ‘Ningen and Society’, mainly focuses on the relationship between the 
philosophy of the ningen and Marxism. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the thrust of Miki 
and Watsuji’s systems became ‘society’, in particular in the way it had been theorized in 
Marx’s writings. Here I will reflect on Miki’s original understanding of Marxist philosophy, 
his idea of the basic experience (kiso keiken) and the first creation of a societal human being 
that eschews the concept of ‘class’. I will moreover compare the work of the Hungarian 
Marxist intellectual Georg Lukács with Miki’s writings. I will thus demonstrate that Miki’s 
‘humanistic Marxism’ already contained the seeds of his national human being to come. As 
for Watsuji, I will analyze his intellectual debate with the Japanese Marxist philosopher 
Kawakami Hajime on the subject of violence and one of his major pieces on Marxism. Since 
Watsuji’s human being had, by this time, already been described as Japanese society, I will 
reveal how Watsuji’s dismissal of Marxism was dictated by his conservative orientation and, 
at the same time, by the threat that Marxism posed to his ningen. In addition, I will engage 
with the criticism that the Marxist intellectual Tosaka Jun addressed to both Miki and Watsuji.  
Chapter 4, ‘Ningen and the National Character’, brings together Miki and Watsuji on 
the subject of the formation of a Japanese national character in mid-1930s and at the 
beginning of the 1950s. I will show that Miki’s concept of ningen transformed itself from 
‘society’ to the ‘Japanese nation’ similtaneously with his interest in philosophy of history. In 
this respect, I will investigate Miki’s attempt to deal with the problem of national temporality 




with Walter Benjamin and Ernst Bloch’s critiques of fascist time. In the case of Watsuji, I will 
consider two of his postwar works, one on philosophy of history and the other on Japanese 
history, where Watsuji searched for the causes of the defeat in WWII. In the postwar period 
Watsuji did not essentially modify his thought. He strove to redefine a new Japanese national 
character that could have faced the challenges of the post-1945 world. Despite the political 
bankruptcy of his idea prewar idea of his ningen, he still had faith in his vision for a succeful 
and powerful Japan in the postwar historical context. 
Chapter 5, ‘Ningen and Modernity’, contextualizes the works of Miki and Watsuji in 
the framework of modernity through the concepts of technology and of the ‘reverence to the 
emperor’ in the late 1930s and in the 1950s. Miki further expanded his concept of the human 
being by transforming it into the homo faber, or the active, technological ningen that 
coincides with militarized Japan in the midst of the war. He elaborated a theory of technology 
characterized by the idea that Western, ‘mechanical’ technology needed to be sublated with 
the Eastern technology of the ‘spirit’. I will show how the renovation of the ningen in such a 
context pushed Miki to grant to the Japanese human being a position of superiority towards 
the rest of the world. I will draw a parallel between Watsuji’s two works on the Japanese 
ethical thought, one written in 1944 and the second one 1948. In both pieces Watsuji 
tangently deals with the problem of ningen in the form of the reverence to the emperor as the 
embodiment of the betweeness between the emperor and his subjects and, subsequently, the 
emperor and its citizens. Similar to Miki, Watsuji was highly critical of the decay that he saw 
Western modernity contaminating Japan. I will demonstrate that Watsuji, by resorting to the 
idea of reverence, sought to preserve the alleged ‘cultural tradition’ of his country. Both in the 
prewar and postwar period, Watsuji equated the figure of the emperor with the Japanese 
nation and he constructed his human being as the realization of the betweeness between the 
emperor with his subjects or citizens.  
Chapter 6, ‘Ningen and Ideology’, focuses on Miki’s contribution to the Shōwa 
Research Association and Watsuji’s most highly political works The Way of the Japanese 
Subject and The American National Character. In the effort of tracing back Miki and 
Watsuji’s political ideas to the philosophical core of their production, the ningen, I will show 
how Miki and Watsuji came together and how their philosophies conflated with the ideology 
of their time by means of the framework of the escaton. I will demonstrate that the complete 
faith that Miki and Watsuji had in the Japanese nation resulted in the bankruptcy of the idea 




In the conclusion, I will argue that the systems that Miki and Watsuji created could 
have not being modified in the course of their careers, since they were already doomed from 
their early stages. The nexus between society, nation and empire entrapped in the human 
being was therefore predestined to blossom in this fashion. In this context, I will propose 




































I. NEW CHALLENGES FOR OLD DISCIPLINES 
      
 
Die Arbeit an der Philosophie ist eigentlich 
mehr die Arbeit an Einem selbst.6 
  
Is scholarship still an ecclesiastic practice?7 
    
        
Intellectual History and Philosophy  
Methodologically, this thesis aims at bridging intellectual history and philosophy by 
means of a return to history of philosophy. My objective is to show that the idea of ningen, as 
elaborated in the philosophy of Miki Kiyoshi and Watsuji Tetsurō, colluded with the 
historical period of the Second World War. In other words, by following the unfolding of a 
philosophical system both synchronically as well as diachronically, I will show that the 
interplay between history and philosophy is crucial in the understanding of the development 
of a given idea. Thus, rather then being interested in the ‘what’, as a philosopher would be, or 
in the ‘why’, as an intellectual historian would say, I am more concerned with the ‘how’.  
History of ideas, intellectual history and history of philosophy are like three faces of 
the same dice. The subtleties that separate them are often very volatile and it is without doubt 
that these three disciplines share more than what divides them. Nevertheless, the discipline of 
the history of ideas seems to have replaced the classic ‘history of philosophy’, on the basis 
that its eclecticism enables the historian or the interpreter to study different subjects with a 
synergic approach. Yet again, nowadays the definition of ‘history of ideas’ is challenged on 
the ground that ideas could be interpreted as atoms capable of an independent life, leaving 
little room to the interpretation of the context that surrounds them.  
 It is perhaps for this reason that the term ‘intellectual history’ is sometimes preferred 
to ‘history of ideas’. The former could avoid the problem of a ‘personalization’ of ideas by 
making intellectuals and their historical context the object of study. Kelley explains the recent 
shift in these terms: ‘The history of ideas may seem to bridge the gap between the ideal and 
the real, but this is an illusion to the extent that these ideas are already (‘always already’) 
incarnate in conventional language’ (Kelley 2002: 2). There is therefore uneasiness towards 
what these methodologies are concern with and what is, in reality, their object of study.  
                                                 
6 Wittgenstein 1996: 5.  




After the publication of the works of Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin on the philosophy 
of language and on the ‘performativity of language’, after Foucault has called for an 
‘abandonment of the history of ideas’ in favour of his archaeological description and after 
Derrida’s ‘absolute readability’ that gives the text its own autonomy through the medium of 
writing, it appears that the three disciplines mentioned above are losing ground (Foucault 
1972: 138).8  This has also been noted in a recent article by Parsons, who expresses his 
dissatisfaction with the current state of the history of ideas as a discipline per se as well as in 
its academic manifestations (Parsons 2007: 698). He calls for a more ‘inclusive’ approach on 
a theoretical, methodological and cross-cultural level (Parsons 2007: 698). As much as I 
sympathize with Parsons’ woes, I think that if we were able to find a comprehensive method 
that could analyze certain historical phenomena that happened in different geographical 
locations, there would be no need for ‘inclusivity’. 9 In this case, the answer might come from 
a return to the history of philosophy, since its attention to the historical unfolding of 
philosophical concepts serves the function of geographically and temporally encompassing 
their internal and external aspects.  
In the particular case of Miki and Watsuji, their theorization of the human being was a 
child of their time. As explained in the introduction, the spark came from dissatisfaction with 
the status of European epistemology on the one hand, and, on the other, in reaction to the 
Angst that Miki and Watsuji felt towards the historical crisis that had invested Japan in those 
years. I believe that, if it had not been for the ‘crisis’, their human being would have never 
taken the form of ‘medianity’. Medianity has to be here understood as a condition of ‘median’ 
or ‘betweeness’, where the ningen finds itself trapped between two existential poles that do 
not allow for it to free itself and to develop in a different fashion than a ‘Japanese’ one. The 
human being is historically and ontologically trapped in this way of existence. Thus, it 
appears that the ningen cannot blossom as a ‘universal’ category, but that it is blocked in its 
                                                 
8 See the works of the ‘second’ Wittgenstein, e.g. the Big Typescript (1969) on the role of philosophy and the 
Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953) for his theories on the linguistic games and on philosophy as a ‘non-
foundational science’. Austin published his How to do things with words in 1962, where he elaborated the 
concept of performative sentences and of their illocutionary forces, in which language is described as ‘action’ 
and not only as ‘utterance’. Derrida’s innovative theory on deconstructionism and on ‘grammatology’ as the new 
transcendental philosophy is developed in De la grammatologie (1967). Foucault developed the idea of the 
‘achaeology’ in his L’anchéologie du savoir (1969), where he states that ‘discontinuity’ becomes the operational 
concept of history. Thanks to this, the subject loses his fundamental role as founder of knowledge.  
9 I am here leaving aside questions of ‘canon’ formation on purpose. Whether Japanese, Chinese, Korean and 
Indian philosophies should be included in the canon of Euro-American philosophy is a compelling issue that, 
nevertheless, cannot be directly addressed in the course of this study. For an example on the ‘location’ of 




particular historicity. 10  Historically, this particularity is the one of the Japanese nation. 
Intellectually, it is mirrored in the quasi-religious faith that Miki and Watsuji showed towards 
the destiny they thought Japan was entitled to. As a consequence, the history of WWII and the 
history of ningen became sealed and subsequently bankrupted together. Miki and Watsuji 
failed their human being in the moment they created it and in the moment they showed their 
faith towards the escaton of victory in the Second World War. There was no other path to 
follow if not the one of support for the ultra-nationalist government, since, philosophically as 
well as historically, the very same ontological condition of ningen predestined it to 
imperialism.  
This issue is even more pressing when thinking that in the fields of Area or Asian 
studies post-colonialism, post-modernism, gender studies and all the other Derridean spin-offs, 
in conjunction with the breakthrough opened up by Edward Said and his Orientalism (1978), 
have become mainstream. The validity of these approaches, which have the great merit of 
having shaken academia of its old Euro-American centric way of doing scholarship, is not in 
question here; rather there is room for doubt about whether it is possible to employ them 
‘universally’. For example, it is difficult to see how they would function in the context of 
Miki and Watsuji’s philosophies without these being fundamentally manipulated in their 
original meaning and intent. Indeed, there has been an attempt of employing feminist theory 
to Watsuji’s idea of betweeness in order to transform it into a global principle of ‘ethics of 
care’ (see McCarthy 2008). In this case, the fact that betweeness was the product of a 
conservative intellectual who was prone to racist remarks towards the Jews and the Chinese 
and who supported the Japanese imperial enterprise in East and South-East Asia is almost 
completely disregarded. What is left of Watsuji’s system is solely the idea that human beings 
are ontologically constituted by a net of ethical relations that supposedly abide to a moral 
prescription of caring for others.  
In another instance, since Miki’s critique of Western capitalism and modernity could 
function as an act of resistance towards Western imperialism, it has been proposed that Miki 
was a post-colonial intellectual ante litteram (Uchida in Miki 2007: 243). Yet again, such a 
statement jettisons Miki’s active participation in the government think-tank that provided the 
intellectual backdrop for the Japanese military campaigns during WWII. It is true that Miki 
was highly critical of European and American imperialism, but what he did was to theorize 
the creation of another kind of colonial empire under the Japanese leadership. Philosophical 
                                                 
10 In this case I believe that Miki and Watsuji’s historicity could be compared to Heidegger’s historicity or the 




works need to be contextualized in their own historical, political and intellectual period and in 
light of the given author’s overall production if we want to assess their real, rather than 
imagined, contributions to various fields.  
In this way, by including the philosophy of the ‘human being’ into the history of 
philosophy, it would be possible to shed at least some light on the thorny question of how 
intellectuals contributed to the creation of nationalist ideologies. Nevertheless, I believe that 
such an analysis could only be employed in periods of so-called ‘historical crisis’, because it 
is in this historical convergence that the conditions for philosophy and history to be united are 






Methodology before  
Some of the works published on the Kyōto School over the years have, to some extent, 
fallen into what Skinner’s calls mythologies (Skinner 1969). Skinner and Dunn have affirmed 
that the problem of the interpretation of a given text is always a matter of context and that 
certain historians try to explain past histories by means of present paradigms and categories 
(Dunn 1968: 98; Skinner 1969: 7). Despite the fact that Skinner and Dunn’s approach has 
been criticized for being a kind of ‘reductionism’ where ideas come to constitute their own 
context rather than being part of a wider one, their approach proves to be a useful insight into 
the analysis of how scholarship has been undertaken with regard to Japanese philosophy.11  
Following the distinction between philosophers of religions and intellectual historians 
outlined in the introduction of this work, the former group of scholars have, to some extent, 
recreated the myth of ‘coherence’ in their studies. In other words, they have conceived their 
task as ‘to supply or find in each of these texts the coherence which they may appear to lack’ 
(Skinner 1969: 7-16). Such an approach risks to disregard the role of the given author as the 
performer of his own ‘speech-acts’, as well as to remit the exegesis of the text to a future 
interpreter.  
In the specific case of Nishida, Yusa Michiko and Ueda Shizuteru have claimed that 
he was a firm opponent of the Japanese military expansion in Asia during the Second World 
                                                 




War (Yusa 1995; Ueda 1995). Their argumentation is mainly based on Nishida’s personal 
correspondence and not on documents that were published for a public audience. From the 
standpoint of a methodological critique, this is the major problem of Yusa and Ueda’s works. 
They have selected their sources on the basis of what they thought Nishida’s overall religious 
philosophy should have consisted of and they have come to the conclusion that he could have 
never been ‘downgraded’ to the level of ultranationalist ideologue. The same has happened in 
Watsuji’s case, in regard to which scholars such as Yuasa, Nagami, Dilworth and LaFleur 
have argued that Watsuji’s idea of kū (vacuity), since it is a Buddhist principle, eschews 
problem of political collaborationism (Yuasa 1981; Nagami 1981; Dilworth 1974; LaFleur 
1978). Yet again, they strove to find coherence in certain parts of Watsuji’s production and 
overlooked the most politically charged ones. In the name of a Buddhist idea that is, in their 
eyes, inherently benevolent, they sought to demonstrate that Watsuji could have never taken 
part in the ‘evil’ of the Japanese empire. The fundamental problem with these analyses is that 
they overlook the overall productions of both philosophers and, in some cases, they fail to 
contextualize them. As we shall see in the course of this work, the elaboration of the concept 
of vacuity in Watsuji is not as ‘Buddhist’ as some would like it to be. Rather, Watsuji himself, 
in the course of his career, put forward contrasting views on the political and religious 
function that Buddhism should have played in Japan.  
In the case of Miki, the best example of the mythology of coherence is the condoning 
of his participation in the Shōwa Research Association in favour of a positive assessment of 
his Marxist ideas or his theorization of ‘anthropology’ (Shimizu 1976; Arakawa 1968; Uchida 
2004). Despite the fact that Uchida does extensively contextualize Miki’s thought in the 
framework of the development of the ‘rentier-state capitalism’ in Japan and in Miki’s internal 
struggle for a definition of the relationship between individual freedom and coercion, he fails 
to touch upon the phase of the Shōwa group.12 In this instance, the effort to provide coherence 
to Miki’s work is based on the idea that his intellectual speculations of Marxism overshadow 
his political contributions to the ideology of the Japanese regime.  
                                                 
12 I still consider Uchida’s book as the most comprehensive and sophisticated study of Miki Kiyoshi that has so 
far appeared, both in Japanese and other languages. Nevertheless, towards the end of the book, Uchida appears to 
be quite torn between Miki’s philosophy and Miki’s politics and he opts for not covering the Shōwa Research 
Association period. Instead, he directly jumps to Shinran, a book that Miki started writing during his time in 
prison between 1943 and 1945 and that remained unfinished. Only in the collection of pieces that he curated in 
2007 and that specifically deals with Miki’s involvement with the think-tank, he proposes the theory of the ‘post-




The mythology of parochialism represents another conventional feature in the study of 
the Kyōto School.13 Scholars such as Peter Dale, Pierre Lavelle and Bernard Faure argue that 
Nishida and his disciples not only were complicit with the Japanese ultra-nationalist regime 
during the wartime period, but also that they philosophically and ideologically justified its 
military enterprises. In their analyses, words such as ‘imperialist’, ‘ultra-nationalist’, ‘fascist’ 
are often found (Dale 1986, Lavelle 1994, Faure 1995). The fundamental problem is that 
these scholars confide in the assumption that every kind of fascism or imperialism has the 
same historical and intellectual characteristics. Thus, they fail to problematize ‘imperialism’ 
and ‘fascism’ in the first place. It follows that they never put into question the intellectual 
specificity of the Kyōto School either and it could be argued that the criteria that they apply 
perpetuate Said’s dichotomy between ‘pure knowledge’ and ‘political knowledge’ (Said 1995: 
9).14  
Finally we have a third trend that, in one way or the other, manages to overcome the 
mythologies that Skinner described. Goto-Jones, Harootunian and Sakai have approached the 
Kyōto School in different ways and with different results (Goto-Jones 2005a; Harootunian 
2008; Harootunian 2000a; Sakai 1997). In his study of Nishida, Goto-Jones argues that 
Nishida’s attempt to ‘speak the truth to power’ ultimately failed. He does not consider him an 
ultra-nationalist; rather he contextualizes Nishida’s production from its early stages until 
                                                 
13 The third kind of mythology, the one of parochialism, arises especially in the case of the encounter with an 
‘alien’ text (Skinner 1969: 24). It is certainly true and hermeneutically obvious that in the interpretation of a 
piece of work the interpreter approaches the text with a baggage of familiar criteria and paradigms which are 
provided by his own culture. Skinner affirms that, in applying those paradigms, the interpreter might ‘see’ 
familiar discourses where there are not. In this way, the historian may find an ‘apparent reference of some given 
statement in the classic text’ or, on the other side, he might ‘unconsciously misuse his vantage-point in 
describing the sense of a given point’ (Skinner 1969: 24-27, emphasis in the original). 
In this respect, Skinner is in stark contrast to the hermenentics, such as Gadamer and Ricoer, who argue that the 
interpreter approaches the text with a certain amount of ‘prejudices’ that are necessary to the process of 
understanding (see Gadamer 2004: 269). The core question is how we can understand and interpret a text 
without letting these prejudices bias our understanding. To Gadamer, the interpreter needs to appropriate them in 
order to restore the alterity of the text (Gadamer 2004: 271). The focal point is the role of the reader, because it is 
the reader that can understand a text other than what the author meant at the time he wrote it. Gadamer describes 
the process of ‘fusion of horizons’ as the one that occurs in a historical or culture encounter, and he argues that 
the same happens in the encounter between the reader and the text. The process of understanding is therefore a 
‘productive activity’ (Gadamer 2004: 296). Ricoeur re-interprets this concept in light of his description of the 
idea of tradition. According to Ricoeur we, as human beings, aspire to the fusion between the ‘horizon of 
expectations’ and ‘space of the existence’ (a theory developed by Reinhart Koselleck and similar to Gadamer’s 
Horizontverschmelzung), since our ontology is described as ‘l’être-affecté-par-l’histoire’. In this projection 
towards the horizon of the future we feel the efficacy of the past and our ‘being affected’ by it in the circle of 
hermeneutical understanding (Ricoeur 1985: 320).  
14 Said highlighted the political implications that a research, for example, on the literature of the Soviet period 
might have had on the scholarship itself and defined it ‘politicla knowledge’. On the other hand, a study of 






Nishida’s death by using Skinner and Austin’s theory of the ‘speech-acts’. Nishida thus 
becomes an ineffective intellectual of dissent, whose words were either manipulated by the 
Right or failed to reach their designated interlocutors. Harootunian, on the other hand, is quite 
critical of the Kyōto School as a whole, and especially of Watsuji. He locates the cause of the 
ideological impasse between the school and the Japanese government in the Kyōto School’s 
failed attempt to ‘overcome modernity’. Instead, he argues that they were ‘overcome by 
modernity’. Sakai, on the other hand, analyses Watsuji and Tanabe’s productions in the 
framework of comparative philosophy and post-modernism, stressing in particular the parallel 
and relationship between Heidegger and Japanese philosophy. What these three works 
manage to achieve is to apply a ‘method’ to the study of the Kyōto School. 
Nevertheless, in the case of this thesis, none of these approaches could fully answer 








As explained in the introduction, the current status of the scholarship on the Kyōto 
School is staged in the rift between philosophers of religion and intellectual historians. In 
terms of methodology, we have seen how parts of this production have fallen into the 
categories of the Skinnerean mythologies and how others have managed to avoid them. Thus, 
what is the most suitable method that can be employed in addressing the question of ‘how’ 
these Japanese intellectuals contributed to the ideology of the wartime regime?  
The heart of the matter could not be fully addressed through a Marxist critique of 
capitalist modernity. As a matter of fact, such a critique would eschew the link between 
Miki’s first elaboration of the ningen, influenced by Pascal and Heidegger, and his subsequent 
Marxist production of the ‘basic experience’ and of a Japanese philosophy of history. 
Moreover, an explanation would need to be found for the how Miki ended up joining the 
Shōwa Research Association and creating an imperial human being. Yet, from the standpoint 
of a Marxist critique, Miki failed. He failed to put forward a coherent critique of capitalism, 




Miki failed in his Marxist enterprise because he created a concept of ‘ningen-class’ 
that did not comply with the standard elaboration of ‘class’ as in Lukács or Marx. His ningen-
class was a societal element that was based on the idea that the solution of the reification 
(butsuka) of consciousness did not come from the element of ‘totality’ in the form of the 
proletariat, as in Lukács, but rather from society as a whole. He linked the idea of reification 
to the one of ‘authentic existence’ of the Heideggerian Dasein thus undermining one of the 
basic principles of Marxism that is class struggle. 15  Yet, this ningen-class functioned 
organically in the grand scheme of his overall production. It represented the development of 
the idea of the human being from a very theoretical elaboration towards philosophy of praxis. 
Marxism provided Miki with the practical side of the ningen that he was in need for. The 
failure of Miki’s philosophy resides precisely in having bound the human being to the 
specificity of Japanese society and then to the Japanese empire. Thus, if every philosophical 
phase is contextualized in light of the whole of Miki’s production, the Marxist phase 
functions as a piece of the puzzle. Marxist ideological critique could help in understanding 
‘what’ went missing Miki’s system, but it would not expose ‘how’ that could be functional in 
the framework of the collusion of philosophy with history. In particular, it would not address 
the issue of whether Miki’s philosophy was defeated together with his country in 1945.  
Secondly, the intellectual historians’ approach that analyzes the intention of the author 
presents a valuable mean to describe the ‘why’. In this instance it could be argued that the 
‘illocutionary force’ that is present in Watsuji’s speech-acts brought him to be critical of the 
regime, whilst remaining a mainstream conservative intellectual. 16  One suitable example 
might be the lectures that Watsuji delivered to the Navy Academy in 1943. The former, The 
Way of the Japanese Subject, gravitated around the idea that sacrificing one’s own existence 
in the name of the emperor represented the most sublime act of loyalty and reverence.17 
Watsuji writes that ‘to happily die for the emperor’ and ‘not to die until the enemy is 
defeated’ are two expressions that indicate that one is still being attached to his own life 
(WTZ XIV: 296-7). Instead, he says, in order to get rid of one’s own ‘ego’, the standpoint 
                                                 
15 For a discussion of Miki’s ‘humanistic Marxism’ see Chap. 3 and for analysis of Miki’s link between capital 
and the masses as a cause of imperialist expansion see Chap. 6.  
16 The concept of ‘illocutionary force’ is used by Skinner in studies of political theories and history of ideas 
(Skinner 1969: 49). Skinner tries to propose a ‘return’ to the author rather than focussing on the ‘text’ itself. 
Skinner strongly advocates for a shift from the problem of ‘perennial questions’ and ‘universal truth’ that have to 
be found in the classic texts, towards what that author meant at that time, what he meant by saying that and what 
were the conditions of that performance. It is not possible to learn from a classic author because ‘there are no 
perennial problems in philosophy’ (Collingwood, quoted in Skinner 1969: 50). 
17 Nihon no shindō and America no kokuminsei. In 1944 they were published together as a pamphlet for the 




must be the one of ‘transcending life and death’ (WTZ XIV: 297). The latter, The American 
National Character, is a discussion of what Watsuji thought being the main features of the 
Anglo-American national characters. He describes them as being ‘machine civilizations’ that 
were on the verge of a ‘nervous breakdown’ because of their alleged lack of moral strength 
(WTZ XVII: 455-81). Watsuji’s critics have seen these passages as his ultimate endorsement 
of the ultra-nationalist ideology, when he called for young marines to go and die in the name 
of their sacred emperor and when he harshly criticized the Anglo-American powers. 
Nevertheless, according to the illucotionary force of his uttered-actions, we might argue that 
Watsuji’s words might be judged according to another parameter. In other words, it might 
have been the case where he was actually warning the top-brass of the Navy that the war was 
lost and that these cadets should have not been sacrificed. 18  His speech-acts, therefore, were 
not flawed but they failed to provide a meaningful contribution to the political situation he 
was then facing.19  
Nonetheless, even if we had to consider this method, it would still not clarify how 
Watsuji’s system came to conflate with the ideology of the wartime period. Instead, it 
suggests that Watsuji accepted to deliver a speech to the Navy Academy, instead of the Army, 
because he was possibly attempting to save Japan from total destruction.20 It is quite obvious 
that Watsuji failed, regardless his real intent. He failed because his idea of the ultimate 
sacrifice in the name of the emperor was tied to the way his ningen had been created. To die 
for the emperor, in the scheme of Watsuji’s political philosophy, meant to die for a sacred and 
divine ruler who represented an ‘empty’ Absolute Totality. The human being, in a dialectical 
relationship with this totality, was genuinely pushed to obedience thanks to a noematic 
resedue that totality had maintained in the particular. The ningen qua aidagara embodied this 
ethical principle of betweeness where society was harmoniously regulated and normatized. 
There was therefore no need for coercion. Thus, the standpoint of the ‘transcendence of life 
and death’ has to be seen in this context where absolute devotion represents a cultural as well 
as political characterization of the Japanese human being. On the other hand, the criticism of 
Great Britain and the United States is simply a perpetuation of Watsuji’s idea that ‘Western’ 
modernity was inherently immoral and that it had contaminated the ‘purity’ of Japan. As in 
                                                 
18  LaFleur argues along these lines, arguing that ‘Watsuji’s intentionality may have been much less the 
prediction of Anglo-American “breakdown” than a necessary veiled disclosure of flawed thinking on the part of 
Japanese policy makers and a warning to those who would be able to grasp the subtlety of what Watsuji meant’ 
(LaFleur 2001: 7). 
19 A similar kind of argument is found in Goto-Jones’ analysis of Nishida’s speech-acts (Goto-Jones 2005a). 
20 It is commonly believed that Army was the most aggressive and vocal instigator of the creation of the 




the case of Miki, here the lectures to the Navy represent another piece of the puzzle that is 
necessary to understand to which extent Watsuji’s system was bankrupted by the war. 
A third, philosophical approach, would simply reiterate the kind of issues that we have 
explored above in the analysis of the fallacies of the philosophers of religion. First of all, their 
approach side-steps the problem of political responsibility since it affirms that the 
philosophical contribution of these Japanese philosophers greatly outdoes their political roles. 
As a consequence, the production of the Kyōto School is interpreted in a-historical 
perspective, where the abstraction of concepts enables scholars to overlook the political and 
historical context in which they were produced. It is the ‘text’ only approach that baulks the 
process of contextualization. Needless to say, it is important to assess the major intellectual 
and philosophical innovations that these thinkers introduced, but it does not entail that it could 
explain how, yet again, intellectuals ended up joining governmental think-tanks, associations 
and brain trusts. 
Even Sakai’s post-modern, comparative approach that attempts to sketch influences, 
similarities and differences between the Kyōto School thinkers and its European counterparts 
in conjunction with the study of issues of ‘translation’, could not fully satisfy our need of 
understanding this history-philosophy relationship (Sakai 1997: 40-71). The influence that 
European philosophy exercised on Miki and Watsuji’s intellectual formation is undeniable.21 
It nonetheless could not stand as a possible methodological answer to the issue we are here 
taking into consideration. 
Thus, the questions that have been so far asked to the philosophy of the Kyōto School 
have not sufficiently problematized the interplay between history and philosophy, which is 
the reason behind the bankruptcy of Miki and Watsuji’s thought. In this case, history of 
philosophy might represent the most suitable method that we have left to properly and 







                                                 
21 I agree with Sakai when he writes that it is almost impossible to understand the Kyōto School without being 




History of Philosophy 
If this thesis wants to demonstrate that history and philosophy colluded in Miki and 
Watsuji’s thought, it needs to explain how their idea of medianity was doomed from the start. 
We have previously given three reasons for the failure of their human being; here we will 
address this problem from a methodological standpoint. 
Miki and Watsuji created a human being that was ontologically a median. This 
position of the human being, in the 1940s, became mirrored in the geo-political situation of 
WWII. Miki and Watsuji felt that Japan covered a ‘median’ position between the colonial 
powers and the colonized countries and that its mission would have been to adibe to its ‘moral 
destiny’ of victory in the Second World War. This represents the escaton that Miki and 
Watsuji firmy believed in and were waiting for. Miki defined it in terms of Japan ‘attaining 
self-awareness’ of its own condition and Watsuji in terms of Japan fulfilling its role of 
liberator of ‘ten million Asians’ (MKZ XVII: 533; WTZ XVII: 442). Their semi-religious 
belief in the escaton of the war, that should have been historically concretized in a Japanese 
victory, stands as the ‘how’ they contributed to the wartime ideology. The ningen they had 
elaborated, from its early stages, had been temporally and spatially trapped in the particularity 
in a Japan in crisis that was struggling to ‘overcome’ modernity by means of technological 
and mechanical development. 
In this case, the philosophy they theorized was already historical in the sense of 
historicity but un-historical from the standpoint of historical reality. Miki and Watsuji 
meditations on the human being lost touch with the reality of history in the moment they 
abandoned themselves to the theological principle of the escaton. The various stages of the 
development of the ningen, between the 1920s and the 1950s, expose this conceptual and 
theoretical flaw. In other words, by creating an idea of the human being that was already 
grounded in the historical specificity of a real, but imagined, nation-state, Miki and Watsuji 
could do nothing else but to harvest it in the completion of the history of this state. The 
escaton qua victory in the war is what bankrupted history as well as philosophy because, in its 
unfolding, it abided to an internal logic of success that was divorced from the real and 
external logic of failure. The disconnection between these two necessary factors caused for 
both to be united in the judgement of history. Miki and Watsuji refused to recognize historical 
reality and refused to interrupt the course of their philosophies. This must be regarded as their 
greatest philosophical and political failure. 
In terms of philosophy of history, this process is, internally, mirrored in the logical 




it but that, at the same time, was uncritically excluded from its development. History and 
philosophy touch in the moment when Miki and Watsuji declared their faith in the historical 
mission Japan was entitled to. They called it the ‘destiny’ of Japan. By pronouncing and 
believing in this mission, they certainly merged with the imperial ideology that was then 
calling for the occupation of Asia in the name of a divine figure. Thus, the atmosphere of 
Angst that pervaded Japan in the interwar and postwar period is the background that must be 
taken into account. The ‘human being’ as an idea was born, lived and crushed together with 
Japanese history. These two elements are the condition sine qua non for each other to exist. 
There would have not have been a medianity if it had not been for the historical context and 
another historical context would have probably not given birth to such an idea.  
This is the ‘how’ Miki and Watsuji ended up being failed by their own philosophies. 
And it is also the ‘how’ Watsuji continued to believe in the same kind of political escaton in 
the postwar period. To him the post-1945 years were felt as another time of anxiety and 
uncertainty because the role that Japan should have played was not clear yet. He therefore 
hung to betweeness and convinced himself that the emperor had transformed himself into a 
symbolic figure that, nevertheless, still retained that sacred allure towards its citizens. Until 
now, nobody had interrogated the texts or the contexts or the authors in order to understand 
how such a process could have been possible. Probably because the instances where history 
and philosophy come together are few and difficult to interpret. The historical context of the 
Second World War is highly unmatchable, both for the horrors it witnessed as well as for the 
outcomes it had. Thus, the history of philosophy could help in contemplating how 
intellectuals could have gone as far as creating systems that were so symbiotically tied to their 
context that it baulked a process of their critical engagement with it. It does not mean that 
philosophical ideas are not the products of their own historical contexts; rather it points at the 
fact that the collusion between the two cannot be always convenient for those interpreters who 












II. THE BIRTH OF NINGEN 
Founding the Human Being in the 1920s-1930s 
 
Toutre notre dignité consiste donc en la pensée.22 
     
In no other place in philosophy but with the 
awakeners [Pascal, Lessing, Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche] is the mystery of man, the wealth of 
his possibilities, the manifold nature of his 
particular secrets, brought into focus.23 
     
 
This first chapter focuses on the genesis of the concept of the ‘human being’ in Miki 
Kiyoshi and Watsuji Tetsurō’s philosophies. The introductory part concentrates on the very 
first stages of Miki and Watsuji’s careers, before and after they embarked on their journeys to 
Europe in the mid-1920s. In the context of our research on medianity, this historical period is 
crucial since it here that both intellectuals provide the first definition of what the ningen is and  
what its characteristics are. Thus, if a thorough analysis of the concept of ningen is to be 
provided, its birth and early development need not to be overlooked. The encounter with 
European philosophy sparked a deep reflection from Miki and Watsuji’s side on the subject of 
human existence and on its possible manifestations. Therefore, they were both pushed to 
revisit their previous meditations of German and French philosophy as they had elaborated 
them in Japan towards what they felt were their manifestations in their European context. The 
outcome of this exercise of contextualization of foreign intellectual influences gave birth to 
the concept of ningen in the form of medianity.   
In the early 1920s, during his sojourn in Germany, Miki noticed the climate of Angst 
that was pervading German society after WWI. He realized that the main philosophical school 
of Neo-Kantianism was being overshadowed by the existential philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger (1889-1976). As a consequence, history was beginning to be analyzed not only as a 
category for historiography, but, most of all, as the embodiment of the reality of human 
existence. These two concepts of history qua historicity of existence and Angst are 
cornerstones of Miki’s philosophy that will remain constant throughout his career. The seeds 
of their theoretical development have to be found in Miki’s first major book: The Concept of 
                                                 
22 Pascal: 209. 




the Human Being in Pascal (Pasukaru ni okeru ningen no kenkyū, 1926).24 Yet, there are 
other themes here expressed that will be developed and refined in the course of Miki’s life. 
The topics of consciousness, time and dialectics as the methodology of human existence are 
all here mentioned for the first time. They will later reach full bloom in the mid and late 
1930s, when the human being will become historicized and contextualized in relation to 
philosophy of history and philosophy of technology.  
On the other hand, Watsuji reached notoriety in Japan for his studies on Western 
philosophy, such as A Study of Nietzsche (Niichie kenkyū 1913) and Søren Kierkegaard 
(Zēren Kierukegōru 1915).25 These two works were the first ones to provide a full and deep 
understanding of both thinkers in Japan (LaFleur 1990: 236). Therefore, he differentiated 
himself from Nishida Kitarō, Tanabe Hajime and Miki himself, who were influenced by the 
works of Rickert (Yuasa 1981: 40). 26  Nevertheless, it is in his work Climate: An 
Anthropological Study (Fūdo: ningengakuteki kōsatsu), published in 1935, that Watsuji first 
elaborated his concept of the human being as being underpinned by both history and climate 
in its fundamental structure. This trend continues in the first volume of Study of Ethics 
(Rinrigaku, 1937), where the ‘betweeness’ of the human being is posited at the centre of 
human existence, giving more relevance to the social structure of a community rather than to 
its relationship with nature and climate. 
At this stage, the chapter will take two different trajectories. On one hand, it will show 
the affinities between Miki and Watsuji’s concept of the human being in the theoretical 
elaboration of medianity. On the other hand, the second part of the chapter will reveal how, in 
a later phase, Watsuji’s elaborations start taking a direction towards political philosophy, 
whilst Miki appears to focus on the more philosophical and theoretical aspects of his theory of 
human existence. It will be important to consider the influence Heideggerian philosophy had 
on both thinkers, since they openly acknowledge the importance his thought had in the 
formation of their systems. By analyzing The Concept of the Human Being in Pascal, Climate, 
and Study of Ethics together with other works, I therefore attempt to sketch the genesis and 
the subsequent development of the concept of ningen.  
 
 
                                                 
24Now in MKZ I: 1-191. 
25 Now respectively in WTZ I: 1-391 and WTZ I: 393-679.   
26 The translation of Rickert’s Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (The Object of Cognition) appeared in 1916 and 





Miki Kiyoshi’s interest in the concept of the human being started during his sojourn in 
Germany between 1922 and 1924 and continued in Paris during 1925. Nevertheless, his 
encounter with European philosophy happened much earlier. Miki enrolled at Kyoto 
University in 1917 in order to study philosophy under Nishida Kitarō, who at that time was 
considered the most important philosopher in Japan (Yusa 1998: 49). He graduated in 1920 
with a thesis on Kant’s critical philosophy and its relationship with philosophy of history 
(Hihan tetsugaku to rekishi tetsugaku, Uchida 2004: 170)27. According to Uchida, Miki’s 
interest in the formation of the categorical imperative in Kantian philosophy is a sign of his 
early engagement with philosophy. Concepts such as ‘individual freedom’ and ‘historical 
formation’ of the human being appear here for the first time and they will remain a constant 
motive until his death in 1945 (Uchida 2004: 170 ff). To Miki, individual freedom as 
historical freedom takes place in the process of socialization with other human beings in 
history (Uchida 2004: 171-2). History is therefore an essential component of existence and 
freedom is defined as: ‘a concrete concept […] that I call real freedom. Real freedom is, most 
of all, human freedom’ (MKZ II: 44). The concreteness of the human being and its historicity 
are therefore already present in Miki’s first philosophical piece.  
The historical context might even have contributed in shaping the underlying motive 
of this text. The Taishō period (1912-1926) was certainly a period of lively intellectual 
debates and relative freedom although, as many have suggested, it also laid the foundation of 
the subsequent Shōwa absolutism (1926-1989).28 Katō underlines the fact that intellectuals in 
this period were working under enormous pressure from the system itself and that, therefore, 
they cannot be labelled as ‘real’ liberals. 29  The only liberals were thus Marxist and 
Communist thinkers, who called for a total abolishment of the imperial system (Katō 1974: 
224). Uchida describes this period as a period of vitality but also of political turmoil that 
might have contributed to the development of Miki’s ideas on the questions of freedom and 
on the relationship between state and individual. 
The uncertainties of the Taishō period were mirrored in the debate on minponshugi or 
‘democracy’ that sparked after different political demonstrations took place in Tokyo between 
                                                 
27 Now in MKZ II: 7-68. 
28 On the so-called ‘Taishō demokurashi’ see Harima 1969, Duus 1982 and Hoston 1992. 
29 In 1925 the government promulgated the Peace Preservation Law. This law aimed at targeting every individual, 
political party or intellectual who was speaking out again the emperor system. This is the first sign of the decline 




1905 and 1914 (Duus 1982: 415).30 Although calling for a society of ‘consensus’, the liberal 
intellectuals were never able to provide a suitable solution for the political and social 
problems Japan underwent in that decade. It is in this political and intellectual environment 
that Watsuji wrote Two Ways of Breeding Democracy (Minponshugi oiku no nihō), an article 
that deals with the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the overthrown of the Tsarist regime.31  
According to Watsuji, democratic ideas are not at all a threat to the kokutai, as some 
politicians would like people to think (WTZ XX: 344).32 Instead: ‘The danger is the lack of 
understanding (murikai) and intemperance (musessei)’ (WTZ XX: 344, emphasis in the 
original) in addition to the fact that the isms (shugi) are often subjected to radicalization 
(WTZ XX: 347). Watsuji is bringing Great Britain as an example of a democratic system with 
a monarchy. Nonetheless, Watsuji also argues that Japan and Britain are not the same case 
study. For example, the Japanese Imperial family is of an unbroken descent (bansei ikkei) that 
realizes its unique history in the spirit of the Japanese democracy (WTZ XX: 344).  
On a more political level, Watsuji argues that the suffrage, even as a difficult concept 
to understand, has to be awarded to the people. Furthermore, the reforms of the capitalist and 
the union systems have to be put forward together with a massive campaign of education 
focussed on the welfare of ‘public life’ (kōkyō seikatsu) that would prevent society from 
retreating back to ‘egotism’ (rikoshugi)  (WTZ XX: 348-9). Surprisingly, Watsuji thinks that 
the conservatives pose a real threat because their refusal of accepting political and social 
reforms could cause ‘explosions’ (bakuhatsu) and ‘riots’ (konran). This is the reason why 
they should be banned (tsuibō serarenebanaranu) (WTZ XX: 349).   
As it is possible to see here, Watsuji is not opposing the implementation of European-
style democratic reforms in Japan. He is stressing the fact that ‘educating’ the masses could 
be a valuable solution for the imperial family to safeguard the kokutai and to prevent a violent 
revolution. This represents another characteristic of the Taishō period, when intellectuals were 
engaging in a debate with the masses over the role of socialism and democratic rights. 
                                                 
30 Minponshugi literally means ‘government for the people’ and it is usually distinguished from minshūshugi 
(sovereignty of the people). Yoshino Sakuzō (1878-1933), one of the leading ‘Taishō liberals’, often uses the 
term minponshugi when calling for an improvement of the democratic policies in Japan (Katō 1974: 223). 
31 Originally published in the journal Shin Jidai. Now in WTZ XX: 344-350. Quotations are from the Collected 
Works. In the same year, Watsuji wrote other two articles on the question of democratic reforms in Japan. They 
are: Construction and Distruction. [An Answer] To Morita Sōhei (Kensetsu to hakai. Morita Sōhei kun ni atau) 
published in the November issue of the journal Shinchō, and A Rejection of the Idea of Danger (Kiken shisō wo 
haisu), published in January 1919 in Taiyō. They are both included in WTZ XX, respectively in 351-54 and 355-
65.  
32 The term kokutai is of difficult translation. Literarily, it means ‘body of the nation’ or ‘essence of the nation’. 
During the interwar years it became the motto of the imperial official doctrine or tennō ideorogi, characterized 





Moreover, this article addresses the problem of Communism in the aftermath of the October 
Revolution in Russia, when Watsuji feared that such a revolution could have taken place in 
Japan as well. It highlights here, for the first time, the complicated relationship Watsuji had 
with Marxism and with capitalist modernity that will be further explored in the next chapter.  
In what is defined as Watsuji’s tenkō or ‘conversion’, Watsuji ‘rediscovered’ Japan 
between 1918 and 1919, when he published Restoring Idols (Gūzō saikō) and Pilgrimage to 
Ancient Temples (Koji junrei).33 Along this line of ‘rediscovery’, in 1920 appeared Ancient 
Japanese Culture (Nihon kodai bunka).34 In a second preface of Restoring Idols, that Wastuji 
wrote in 1937, he admits that it is easy to see throughout the book the path that took him from 
‘experience and thought’ (taikei to shisaku) towards ‘art and culture’ (geijutsu to bunka) 
passing through ‘thought and art’ (shisaku to geijutsu) (WTZ XVII: 3). With these words 
Watsuji is showing the reader the development of his thoughts, that went from an early 
interest in existential philosophy in the direction of cultural studies with the publication of the 
Idols and the Pilgrimage. 
William LaFleur argues that the sudden turn Watsuji had has to be read in the context 
of the Taishō period. Watsuji was trying to prove that the Taishō should have been an era of 
deep changing if compared to the previous Meiji (1868-1912) and the signs of his ‘belonging’ 
to the Taishō culture must be found in his revaluation of Buddhism as a cohesive factor in 
Asia (LaFleur 1990: 243). To Watsuji, the international spirit of the Nara period (710-794) 
was embodied in the fact that labourers from China, Korea and Japan had come together on 
Japanese soil to build the Buddhist temples that characterize the old imperial capital. This 
point must be considered with a particular eye. In his later works, such as Study of Ethics and 
The Imperial Cult and its Tradition (Sonnō shisō to sono dentō, 1943), Watsuji clearly shows 
his support for the role that Japan should have covered in Asia during the Second World War. 
Here, the idea that Japan had already figured itself as the centre of East Asia in the eighth 
century, albeit only culturally, shows that Watsuji’s thought never came short of supporting 
the exceptionalism of Japan.  
In this phase both Miki Kiyoshi and Watsuji Tetsurō were influenced by the historical 
period they lived in, although in different ways. Watsuji openly spoke about the issue of 
democratic reforms and focused on his ‘native Japan’. Miki, on the other hand, showed his 
early interest in Kantian philosophy and on the relationship between individual freedom and 
                                                 
33 Now respectively in WTZ XVII: 3-284 and WTZ II: 1-192.  




coercion. Miki will have soon abandoned Neo-Kantianism during his trip to Germany, while 






The European trip: Miki Kiyoshi in Marburg (1923-24) 
Miki Kiyoshi arrived in Heidelberg in 1922 in order to study under Heirich Rickert 
(1863-1936) (Yusa 1998: 51). The economic situation in Germany in the interwar period was 
not favourable to Germans but certainly it was to foreigners. In 1923, due to the growing 
inflation, the German mark was worth almost nothing and for Miki and the other Japanese 
students in Germany this meant a huge opportunity to buy books at cheap prices (MKZ I: 
423). The ongoing economic and political instability was also reflected in the philosophical 
and cultural environment Miki encountered in Heidelberg and Marburg.35 Miki describes the 
atmosphere as one of anxiety (fuan) regarding not only ‘existence’ per se, but also related to 
the concept of ‘history’. It is in this respect that Miki notices that many young students were 
reading Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dostoyevsky and that in academia increasing attention was 
dedicated to: ‘Life as historical (rekishiteki) life and not simply as a way of living’ (MKZ I: 
437). The concept of history came to be deeply bound to historical reality as a form of 
existence and Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of Angst and ‘reality’ is probably the best 
example of the cultural situation of those years (Aeba 1990: 209). 
In 1923 Miki decided to move to Marburg, knowing that Heidegger had just been 
appointed there. 36  The decision to move to Marburg signs his abandonment of Neo-
Kantianism and his immersion into existentialism. In a letter to Tanabe Hajime from 1923 
Miki writes: 
It is becoming increasingly important for me now to start my work 
independently. The questions related to the foundations of the 
Geisteswissenschaften (seishinkagaku) that I have been occupied with 
until now have started becoming the focus of my interest from a 
completely different point of view. I will momentarily abandon such 
things as the critic of different epistemological theories and I would 
                                                 
35 In 1922 Walter Rathenau, the German minister of foreign affairs, was assassinated. This was also a concern 
for the political stability of post-WWI Germany.  
36 Miki explains his decision to move to Marburg in these terms: ‘I decided to move from Heidelberg primarily 




like to develop my own questions starting with the study of more 
concrete things 
      (MKZ XIX: 222)  
 
During his two years in Marburg Miki read Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Nicomachean 
Ethics with Hans Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) and he studied the Physics in Heidegger’s 
seminars (MKZ I: 420). Karl Löwith (1897-1973) was also appointed as tutor of Miki. The 
fact that Miki studied Aristotle in depth is very important. As a matter of fact, if we look at 
the genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, namely the seminars held in Marburg on Greek 
philosophy and on medieval Christian theology, we are able to focus on the Heideggerian 
path that could be retraceable in certain passages of Miki’s Pascal.  
Hedegger’s lectures in the winter semester of 1923 dealt with the ‘phenomenological 
research’ and with the beginning of modern philosophy with Descartes (Kisiel 1993: 276). 
During these lectures Heidegger explored the concept of Being in Greek philosophy, with a 
special attention to Aristotle. 37  According to Ardovino, in 1923 Heidegger was already 
talking about ‘hermeneutics of facticity’ as ‘hermeneutics of being’, and terms such as ‘ontic’ 
(factual) and ‘ontological’(existential) had already taken shape as they would have been in 
1927 with the publication of Being and Time (Ardovino 2005: 87-8). Thus, it is possible to 
argue that Miki already came to know those concepts before 1926 and integrate them into his 
study of Pascal.  
In these lectures Heidegger provides a new ‘phenomenological’ interpretation of 
Aristotle.38 In particular, Heidegger is linking the phainomenon (‘that is which is shown per 
se’) to the logos (‘speech’). By doing so he is directly connecting the factuality of the 
phenomenon to its use in the world. Through this direct link, the phenomenon becomes an 
expression of life (Lazzari 2005: 146). Heidegger’s aim here is to reconstruct the word 
‘phenomenology’ from the Greek to the interpretation of Edmond Husserl (1859-1938). As 
explained above, by focusing on the logos or on the ‘speech’ in connection with the 
phenomenon, Heidegger is trying to prove that human beings live and have always lived in 
the realm of speech. Since the word logos, in Aristotle, is comprehensive of both meanings of 
‘covering’ and ‘uncovering’ for Heidegger this is a proof that human beings can be deceived 
by language and live in a world of deception (Kisiel 1993: 279-80). 
                                                 
37 Heidegger was planning a book on Aristotle but the book was never published. Instead, his seminars on Greek 
philosophy are considered the foundation of his existential analytic of Being and Time (Kisiel 1993: 311). 
38 Miki writes in a letter to Hani Gorō in November 1923: ‘Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle is extremely 




Even more importantly, Heidegger discusses the threefold theory of the pseudes (false) 
as expressed in the Metaphysics. According to Heidegger, false-things, false-speech and false-
human are all connected by the falseness of language, in its ‘facticity’ that is constantly 
reiterated by the human beings (Kisiel 1993: 280). This is a crucial point because Miki would 
directly link the Aristotelian concept of the pseudo-human as interpreted by Heidegger to the 
concept of ‘imagination’ as a source for error for the pseudo-human being in Pascal (MKZ I: 
28-9). In addition, Miki the discourse on Aristotle’s pseudes returns with force some years 
later, in relation to Miki’s studies on rhetoric, language and technology.39 
In February 1924 Miki writes to his friend Hani Gorō (1901-1981):  
I would like to reflect on the layered structure of the three phenomena: 
Zeichen, Symbol, Sprache [sign, symbol, language] and on their 
internal relationships. Thus, I want to understand even more the 
Sprache as the original stage of the historisches Dasein [historical 
Being]40 
    (MKZ XIX: 248; German in the original)  
 
Miki continues: 
The core of the philosophy of history is not the theory of values as 
Rickert and others thought. Isn’t it rather a question of “Ich und seine 
Umwelt” [the self and its world-around]? 
    (MKZ XIX: 249; German in the original) 
 
This passage is significant because it shows the real break that happened in Miki’s 
thought when he realized that Neo-Kantianism was not providing the answers he desired to 
the question of the human being and the world and the historicity of existence. The shift is 
from the theory of values towards a ‘human being and the surrounding world’.  
In one of his last letters to Hani from Marburg, from June 1924, Miki describes his 
encounter with Historicism through the reading of Ernst Troeltsch’s (1865-1923) Der 
Historismus und seine Ueberwindung (Historicism and its Overcoming). Miki says: 
I generally think that the focus of the theories on history should not be 
the historical sciences (kagaku) […] In truth history is not the 
historical sciences. What should matter for us the most is the 
historicity of existence (sonzai no rekishisei). Our world carries the 
historical nature in its fundamental structure. In other words, what is 
called historicity is the basic structural category of existence. 
                                                 
39 See Chap. 5. 
40 The word Dasein has a long history in German philosophy. For Hegel the Dasein was the abstract being, ‘the 
being with a determination’, what remains when the becoming is taken out. Therefore the Dasein belongs to the 
doctrine of being. For Heidegger the Dasein is ‘Being-there’ as the ‘possibility’ of enquiry about entities 
regarding their Beings. I believe that, since Miki was studying under Heidegger at that time, when he is 




Therefore, history, before becoming a matter for the epistemology 
(ninshikiron) of the historical sciences, must be nothing else than this 
very same interpretation of existence (sonzai no kaishaku) 
    (MKZ XIX: 275, emphasis in the original) 
 
History is thus, first of all, a history of existence and not a sterile historical science. 
Existence becomes the focus of the interpretation of history as it is best exemplified in the 
following part of the same letter. Here Miki is talking about a third shift in his study that led 
him to read Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Simmel together with Dilthey, and to affirm that their 
spirits were close to the Romantic spirit. It follows: 
My idea of ‘Romanticism’ [Romantik] has dismissed all the heroic 
[heroisch] tendencies and has penetrated into ordinary things 
[alltäglich]. My ‘Romanticism’ [Romantik] descends into the heart 
of things [Sache] leaving the world of ideas [Ideenwelt]. I will start 
from the problem of the interpretation [Auslegung] of the Dasein. 
Thus, historicity becomes my core question. Insofar as I value 
historicity, I am a Romantic too [Romantiker] 
   (MKZ XIX: 276; German in the original)41 
 
The above passages highlight the definite change in Miki’s thought. His research 
seems to have found its natural overcome in the study of history as ‘historicity’, meaning the 
history of the Dasein. The focus shifts towards ordinary things and ordinary life together with 
the historicity of the Dasein. Therefore, Miki appears to have found fertile soil for his 
deepening interest and development of the concept of ningen. The problem of historical 
existence represents a theme that will never abandon Miki’s intellectual life until his death in 
1945. His engagement with such a philosophical theory puts him together with other 
philosophers, both European and Japanese, who were struggling to redefine human existence 









                                                 




The Discovery of Pascal: Miki Kiyoshi in Paris (1924-25) 
Miki moved to Paris in August 1924 and he remained in the city until his return to 
Japan in October 1925 (Yusa 1998: 67). There, he found a copy of Blaise Pascal’s (1623-
1662) Pensées (1657-1662) and he expressed his impression with these words: ‘the 
knowledge that I learnt from Heidegger seemed to take life while reading the Pensées’ (MKZ 
I: 429).42 Again: 
I would read this book in the quietness of the night, in solitude and 
loneliness, hiding from other people, and tears would often flow from 
my eyes without control (hitorideni) 
       (MKZ I: 429) 
 
The reading of the Pensées prompted Miki to write a book on Pascal that was 
subsequently published in 1926 with the title A Study of the Human Being in Pascal.43 In his 
treaty, Miki analyzes not only Pascal’s masterpiece, but also other important pieces, such as 
the Entretien de Pascal avec Saci sur Épictète et Montaigne (1655), the Discours sur les 
passions de l’amour (1653), the Mémorial (1654), Les provinciales (1657) and the Potestatum 
numericarum summa (1654).  
In the introduction Miki explains the most important points of his research and how he 
conducted his analysis. First, he does not want to look at the ‘religious ideas’ (shūkyō shisō) 
explained in the book, but rather at Pascal’s ‘observations on the human being’ (MKZ I:  4). 
Secondly, contesting the idea that Pascal’s book should be read according to psychology, 
Miki affirms that what we encounter in the book is ‘a study of the human being as a concrete 
thing, or, anthropology (antoroporogi) in the literally sense of the word’ (MKZ I: 4). Since 
anthropology is the discipline related to human existence, it follows that it can be interpreted 
as a ‘theory on existence’ (sonzairon) which represents Miki’s project in the reading of the 
Pensées (MKZ I: 4).  
Miki explains that his work of interpretation aims at the clarification of the concept of 
‘basic experience’ (kiso keiken) (MKZ I: 5). His strategy is then the one of a ‘middle path’ 
(chūyō); in other words his strategy relies on: ‘understanding the experience in the concept 
and the concept in the experience’ (MKZ I: 5). Finally, the book is divided in six chapters that, 
as Miki says, stand as independent texts, although they are all functional to the structure of the 
book as a whole (MZK, I: 6). Uchida Hiroshi considers the concept of the ‘basic experience’ 
in Pascal as one of the most fundamental concepts in Miki’s philosophy. He traces it back to 
                                                 
42 Iwasaki says that the special ‘charm’ (miryoku) of Miki’s Pascal relies exactly in ‘exploring Pascal’s thought 
by bringing in the intellectual inspiration acquired under Heidegger’ (Iwasaki 2005: 137). 




the Heideggerian Grunderfahrung as expressed in the paragraph 45 of Being and Time 
(Uchida 2004: 202). 44  Miki consciously employs Heidegger’s concept of ‘interpretation’ 
when explaining the concept of ‘basic experience’ in Pascal, therefore linking his theory of 
existence to Heidegger’s ‘ontological research’.  Nonetheless, what is the ‘basic experience’ 
in Pascal? The original experience in the Pensées is a religious one; it’s a relationship 
between man and God. Yet, this is not the centre of Miki’s inquiry. Miki is actually turning 
Pascal’s theory upside down; he is studying the human being qua human being and not as the 
creation of a divine entity. Here, for the first time, Miki begins to give shape to the ‘religion’ 
of the human being, where the centrality of the relationship between man and God is 
substituted by the centrality of the study of ningen.  
I agree with Uchida when he affirms that Pascal’s ‘human being’ becomes Dasein 
(Uchida 2004: 203). This happens because Miki takes appropriation of the categories of time, 
death, and world as expressed in Being and Time. If, in Heidegger, the Dasein is a ‘being-
towards-death’, in Pascal death is the limitation of the human life but it also represents its 
longing for the infinite (God). Death as negative limitation is therefore turned into a positive 
concept as re-appropriation of our own Being as the Being-towards-death implies. We will 
see in the following paragraphs how the Heideggerian ‘world’ would be combined with the 












                                                 
44 Here Heidegger describes the ontological research as a way of interpreting, having interpretation its own pre-
possession (Vorhabe), its pre-view (Vorsicht) and its pre-conception (Vorgriff) (Heidegger 1962a: 284). These 
preconditions form together the ‘hermeneutical situation’ that needs to be clarified if we want to proceed with 
the ontological research. This process will not take place unless we make clear the basics of the ‘hermeneutical 





An Analysis of the Human Being in Miki: Medianity (1) 
 ‘The study of Pascal really aims at analyzing and interpreting human existence 
(ningenteki sonzai)’ (MKZ I: 11). It follows: 
Roughly, our existence is ‘existence in nature’. In nature, our 
existence is the one of the ‘median’ [milieu] (chūkansha)45 
     (MKZ I: 11, French in the original) 
 
According to Pascal, man finds himself in nature as caught between totality and 
infinity:  
Un néant à l’égard de l’infini, un tout à l’égard de néant, un milieu 
entre rien et tout. […] également incapable de voir le néant d’où il est 
tiré, et l’infini où il est englouti 
      (Pascal 72)46 
 
In his interpretation of Pascal’s passage, Miki argues that the condition of medianity 
does not happen accidentally but that it belongs to the inevitable situation of the human being 
that: ‘carries his destiny on his shoulders as a creature of God’ (MKZ I: 12). The fundamental 
prescription of the human being is to live together with the world and to experience fear, 
sorrow and anxiety related to the limitation of its existence (MKZ I: 13-4).  
Miki argues that the relationship between the existence of the world and the condition 
of the human being is so direct that when we ‘experience’ the world (in the sense of feeling, 
grasping etc.), we feel ourselves. Hence, in the very moment we ‘possess’ (shoyū suru) the 
world, we possess our own self (MKZ I: 15). ‘Existence signifies first and primary a unique 
kind of possessing’ (MKZ I: 15). This passage is highly significant. As a matter of fact, 
Pascal is indeed referring to the world as a world of connections, although he speaks in rather 
different terms. The world is necessary to study the human being because it is impossible to 
study the whole from the point of view of the particular. Men need air to breath, clothes to 
cover them, food to live. Thus, we have to start our inquiry from the question: ‘why do men 
need these things?’ If all things are caused and cause, in order to understand the whole it is 
necessary to study the particular and vice versa (Pascal 72). Pascal does not talk about 
‘possession’. This concept might have been easily mutuated from Heidegger’s ‘readiness-to-
                                                 
45 Karaki affirms that the concept of the ‘median’, although of early elaboration, is at the basis of Miki’s thought 
(Karaki 2002: 42). 
46 There are two different systems for the redaction of the Pensées: the Brunschvicg and the Chevalier. The only 
difference between the two is that the Brunschvicg’s one is not continuous and contains drafts and double 
redactions (Bausola in Pascal 2000: 533). Although the edition I use follows Chevalier’s numeration, in the 




hand’ (Zuhandenheit).47 The concept of appropriation as used by Miki could refer to the 
‘instrumentality’, in the sense that the World is not only a ‘simple presence’, but that things 
are given to us with a certain aim, their functionality. Their ‘readiness-to-hand’ represents 
their true essence. Since the Dasein has a project in the world, things are given to it precisely 
with this function (Heidegger 1962a: 95-8).48 
Miki affirms that the human being is surrounded and limited by the environment and it 
represents a ‘median’ between nature and God. Although it might appear here that this is not 
fundamentally connected to Heidegger’s idea, it is to a certain extent because it is linked to 
the idea of projectuality. Therefore, Being-in-the-World becomes ontological constituency 
and, from my point of view, Miki is adding to the Pascalian idea of ‘nature’ a significance of 
‘possession’ of the self as openness. This does not imply that Miki’s interpretation of Pascal is 
not original. Rather, it is highly interesting that Pascal’s original idea of ‘nature’ and ‘world’ 
becomes a constitutive element of the ontology of human existence. I think this has happened 
because Miki’s interpretation is lacking a religious ground, particularly a Christian one. This 
has allowed Miki to discard the human being from its relationship with God and, instead, to 
focus on the problem of existence per se. The relationship with Heideggerian philosophy is, 
by all means, very important. By saying this I do not mean that Miki simply took 
Heideggerian concepts and applied them to Pascal. There is a process of contextualization 
from Miki’s side. As Miki himself specified (see quote above), he felt he could have used all 
that he had learnt from Heidegger in his reading of the French philosopher. Therefore, the 
absence of a Christian perspective and the influence of Heideggerian philosophy have 
produced an original and unusual view of Pascal’s ideas.  
Later on Miki defines existence (sonzai) as ‘real existence’ seen in the context of 
material existence. On the other hand, existentiality (sonzaisei) is ‘the mode of existence in 
the sense that this existence has been emphasized or in a superior sense […] Pascal calls the 
latter ‘soul’ [âme]’ (MZK, I: 16).49 The formal determination of the soul is to be a ‘median’ 
                                                 
47 In Heidegger, the Dasein’s authenticity relies on leaving the realm of They (Man) that is representative of the 
falling (Verfallenheit) into the realm of inauthenticity (Heidegger 1962a: § 38). Moreover, Being as Being-in-
the-world is the fundamental state of the Being. Being-in-the-world means that the Daseinconcretely lives in a 
world that opens a certain amount of possibility the Dasein has to relate to. Given this assumption, man lives in 
the world as a ‘can-be’ (Seinkönnen) because of the amount of openness that is being disclosed to him by the 
world (Heidegger 1962a: 76-9).  
48 This passage is taken from the final edition of Being and Time. Although not available to Miki in this format, 
the idea of Zuhandenheit was already present in Heidegger’s thought, although in a prototype form, from 1923 
(Kiesel 1993: 330).    
49 V.H. Viglielmo translates sonzaisei as ‘manner of existence’ (Dilworth et al. 1998: 301). I believe that ‘mode 





therefore implying that medianity permeates both existence as well as existentiality (MZK, I: 
16-7). To Pascal, if the human being had to leave its condition of ‘median’ then it would 
depart from humanity, and since this would represent an ontological contradiction Miki 
affirms that medianity could only be an ontological and not an epistemological concept 
(Pascal 378; MKZ I: 17).  
The innermost determination of human existence finds its location in the condition of 
fear (kyōfu) and trembling (senritsu) where infinite and nothingness merge together in an 
unsolvable enigma (MKZ I: 18). Thus, the task is for the human being as median to find the 
‘tadashiki chūkan’ or ‘le juste mileu’ (MKZ I: 18; Pascal 82). ‘Every existence is existence in 
the middle. This [median] is the infinitely vast and the infinitely small in every degree of 
existence (in every degree there are two infinities: the small and the vast)’ (MKZ I: 103). 50  
The infinite is therefore what causes the movement of anxiety that Miki defines the 
fundamental experience (konpon keiken) of the human being (MKZ I: 104). By feeling the 
vastness of its own existence the human being feels the trembling and the anxiety of its 
condition. ‘Even the human being is a median existence (chūkanteki sonzai) between totality 
and nothingness’ (MKZ I: 109). The human intellect is not capable of understanding the 
beginning and the end of things. Due to this fact, God must be seen as all-comprehensive and 
all-embracing entity (MKZ I: 109). The most important part here is the impossibility of the 
human being to understand the mystery of its existence. In Miki, as explained above, this 
should not be seen as a reference to Christianity. On the contrary, it is a way for him to 
undertake the major enterprise of philosophically clarifying the causes of the pervasive 
presence of Angst. As we shall see in the following sections, Miki will find the Pascalian 









                                                 
50 Miki reckons that Pascal’s mathematical studies on the infinite developed in Potestatum numericarum summa 




An Analysis of the Human Being in Watsuji: Medianity (2) 
Watsuji developed a similar idea of the human being as a ‘median’ in his Climate. The 
book was first serialized in Shisō between 1928 and 1934 and then published as a volume in 
1935.51 Climate was written as a reaction to Heidegger’s Being and Time that Watsuji had 
read during his sojourn in Berlin in 1927. In the introduction Watsuji writes: 
A temporality that is not grounded in spatiality is not yet a real 
temporality. This is where Heidegger stops because his Dasein is 
nothing else than a simple individual. He understood human existence 
as being the existence of a single human being. […] When human 
existence is grasped in its concrete duplicity, temporality and 
spatiality eventually are in their reciprocal unity. Even historicity, 
which is not concretely expressed in Heidegger, reveals its truth. At 
the same time, this historicity is clarified in its reciprocal union with 
climate 
       (WTZ VIII: 1-2) 
 
The main critique that Watsuji addresses to Heidegger is the focus on the temporality 
of the Dasein that does not take into consideration the spatiality of the human being.52  
Watsuji starts his analysis by defining the concept of ‘cold’. He argues that, if we feel 
cold, it is because this is an ‘intentional experience’ (shikōteki taiken). We, as subjects, 
already possess this structure in ourselves (WTZ VIII: 8). ‘Feeling the cold’ and ‘the cold air’ 
exist as transcendental existences already inside the intentional relation that it is established 
between us and the environment. Watsuji says: 
We ourselves are already in the cold. In this respect, our mode of 
existence is ‘ex-sistere’ (soto ni dete iru), as Heidegger emphasizes, 
and in this case it becomes intentionality 
       (WTZ VIII: 9) 
 
In Heidegger the term intentionality takes the meaning of transcendence and it points 
at the relationship between the human being and the world. As it is clear here, Watsuji agrees 
with Heidegger when he defines the basic structure of existence as already ‘being-outside’ 
(soto ni deru) or ‘Being-in-the-world’. Nevertheless, Watsuji goes a step further. He argues 
that the ontological structure of the soto ni deru already exists as being-with-others, before 
being an existence within things (WTZ VIII: 10). Since we all share the same existential 
structure, we are able to experience the ‘cold’ together.  
                                                 
51 The book was actually written between 1928 and 1929. 
52 Martin Heidegger subsequently found the analysis of the Dasein that he had provided in Being and Time 
incomplete. The texts published in the following years focus on a discourse that tries to comprehend the Being as 





At this point Watsuji’s concept of betweeness is finally explained: 
The [being-with-the-others] is not an intentional relationship, it is the 
betweeness. Therefore, the fact of discovering ourselves in the cold 
principally means discovering ourselves as betweeness 
    (WTZ VIII: 10; emphasis in the original) 
 
Yuasa Yasuo, Mine Hideki and Kaneko Takezō have pointed at the relationship 
between Husserl’s concept of ‘intentionality’ and Watsuji’s (Yuasa 1970: 113-5; Mine 2002: 
49-55; Kaneko 1966: 453-5). Kaneko says that, if we look at Watsuji’s The Philosophy of 
Practice in Early Buddhism (Genshi bukkyō no jissen tetsugaku; 1927), we could already find 
the concept of intentionality.53 In the book Watsuji focuses on the ‘silence of the Buddha’ and 
what this implies for the practice of Buddhism.54 He sees in all the answers given by the 
different Buddhist sects still an opposition between subject and object, between the self and 
the outside world (Yuasa 1970: 114). According to Watsuji, the path towards the knowledge 
of truth is to grasp this experience by getting rid of these oppositions and comprehend the 
‘law’ (dharma) in the no-self (muga) (Yuasa 1970: 114). As Yuasa points out, the problem 
relies in the fact that Watsuji interprets the theory of the five skanda (the five elements that 
constitute the being) as ‘categories’ in the Kantian sense. In fact, Watsuji even argues that the 
non-self is the unifying transcendental conscience to which the categories correspond (Yuasa 
1970: 114). Besides, Watsuji identifies the self (keiga) as the point of view of ‘nature’, and 
the no-self as the ‘point of view of the intrinsic intuition’, because, as Watsuji says, the 
experience of feeling the beauty of a flower is the same as the way of existence of the flower 
itself (WTZ V: 123-4). Moreover: ‘for the first time the feeling as an existing psychological 
thing is understood’ (WTZ V: 124). It is in this passage, Kaneko says, that Husserl’s 
‘phenomenological reduction’ appears (Kaneko 1966: 453).  
The important thing to notice here is that Watsuji interprets a Buddhist concept such as 
the ‘no-self’ by means of a philosophical theory. Although considered a work in between 
Climate and Study of Ethics, The Philosophy of Practice in Early Buddhism reflects some of 
the issues present in the other books as well. I believe that there is one important question that 
remains unsolved even in Climate. It is the fact Watsuji wanted to overcome Husserl’s 
phenomenological method on an inter-subjective level. Mine argues that the intentionality in 
Watsuji should not be regarded as a phenomenological concept. He talks about a ‘common 
                                                 
53 Now in WTZ V: 1-293. 
54 The ‘silence of the Buddha’ refers to the fact that Shakyamuni, the historical Buddha, never replied to 
metaphysical questions. In the history of Buddhism, different schools have interpreted the silence in different 




intention’ (kyōdō shikō) or as a concept alien to the ‘individual conscience’ of a 
phenomenological theory (Mine 2002: 51). Since it is ‘common’ it cannot be ‘individual’. 
The point is that Watsuji, by talking about intentional relationship between man and nature, is 
somehow still implying a differentiation between subject and object related to the 
intentionality of the conscience. As a matter of fact, by assuming an existing psychological 
entity, Watsuji is implying an eidetic reduction as in Husserl’s phenomenology.  
Nevertheless, in order to avoid this problem on an inter-subjective level, Watsuji states 
that the betweeness is not an intentional relation, but rather a kind of ontology. By making the 
aidagara ontology Watsuji falls into a critical error that he will not be able to solve even in 
Study of Ethics. In fact, the movement of the Absolute Negativity (zettaiteki hiteisei), first 
expressed in Climate and then fully developed in Study of Ethics, is three fold. The double 
negation of the ‘individual’ and ‘totality’ takes place as the starting point. Then, it is followed 
by the third movement of the Absolute Negativity (like the Hegelian Aufhebung) in which the 
individual is subsumed in the total. This implies, as Kosaka Kunitsugu has extensively argued, 
an ontologization of the Absolute as ‘totality’ that represents the condition qua non for the 
existence of the individual as it is (Kosaka 1997: 258-9). Therefore, the aidagara is the basic 
ontological structure of the human being prior to the human being itself. As it will be further 
analyzed, the Absolute will be individuated in the state.  
In Climate, nature is intrinsically linked to the concept of climate, since climate aims 
at making the human being understand how to protect itself from the ‘tyranny of nature’ 
(shizen no bōi; WTZ VIII: 12). Man self-understands in climate, because through the 
experience our ancestors have left us we are today capable of dealing with the environment 
surrounding us (WTZ VIII: 13). Thus, it is not possible to separate climate from history on the 
basis of the fact that the climatic phenomenon appears in the historical self-comprehension of 
the human being. ‘History apart from climate does not exist as much as climate does not exist 
apart from history’ (WTZ VIII: 14). Kōsaka Masaaki has tried to link Watsuji’s hermeneutical 
spatiality to the one of Heidegger. He affirms that Watsuji created a hermeneutic of a ‘cultural 
space’ (bunkatekina kūkan) from the hermeneutics of time in Heidegger (Kōsaka 1964: 20). 
Watsuji’s attempt was to overcome Heidegger. At the same time, Watsuji was not moved by a 
logical motive; what lead him to criticize Heidegger’s temporality was the ‘experiences’ he 
made in his journey throughout Europe (Kōsaka 1964: 19). The effects that climate concretely 
has on human being made Watsuji realize that temporality was not important unless 
subsumed in spatiality. The critique of Heidegger is therefore addressed not only on an 




Betweeness as Innovation 
Watsuji looks at the human being as a concept related to both the ‘individual’ 
(kojinteki) and the ‘social’ (shakaiteki) (WTZ VIII: 15) and specifies that his concept of the 
‘human being’ does not correspond to the English ‘man’, the German ‘Mensch’, or the Greek 
‘anthrōpos’. All these terms presuppose the individuality of man, while, in his view there is 
also: ‘the union of the human beings or society as community’ (WTZ VIII: 14-5). Human 
existence is the realization of the movement of ‘absolute negativity’ (zettaiteki hitesei) (WTZ 
VIII: 15). Spatiality and temporality represent the two elements of the fundamental structure 
of human existence by means of their undividable unity (sōsoku furi) and cannot be analyzed 
separately.55 Hence, when they are both understood in their basic structure, the structure of 
the human relationality becomes clear (WTZ VIII: 15). The communities of human beings are 
not static in their social structures, they are the realization of the movement of negation that 
has made history possible. The spatial-temporal structure of human existence appears to us in 
its unity of ‘historicity and climate’ (rekishisei, fūdosei) (WTZ VIII: 15). There is no 
community which is not based on the spatial structure of the subjective human existence and, 
on the other hand, temporality would not become historicity unless it is grounded in the social 
existence (WTZ VIII: 16). The double structure of finitude and infinitude is directly linked to 
history and climate; history in its infinite past and the climate as limitation of the potentiality 
of human beings. It follows that: ‘history is climatic history and climate is historical climate’ 
(WTZ VIII: 16).  
Betweeness is situated in the transcendental dimension of the ex-sistere as a ‘climatic’ 
being-outside. Since the ‘climate’ is part of our essential structure, it follows that our 
understanding of it relies in its ‘concreteness’. In other words, we see the world as being ‘in 
front of us’ with a certain range of possibilities given to us in the ‘tools’ (dōgu) that are 
outside (WTZ VIII:  19). According to this interpretation, the ‘finalistic relationship’ (tame no 
kankei) between man and tools defines what is the ‘first moment of the objective existence’.  
As it has been underlined in Miki, in Watsuji there is a direct connection to Heidegger 
as well. The projectuality of the Dasein is in relation to the tools that are in the world with a 
certain finalistic existence. The Dasein as Seinkönnen makes use of the ‘in-order-to’ 
significance of the equipment to realize its authentic existence. The difference between 
Heidegger and Watsuji relies on this basic theoretical shift. In Heidegger, even if the 
equipment is apt to our aim, the most important point remains its ‘readiness-to-hand’. The 
                                                 
55 The term sōsoku is the unity between elements that are sharing the same essence or nature. I translate sōsoku 




equipment opens the totality of meanings that the Dasein will then decide to disclose in its 
project of authenticity (Heidegger 1962a: 95-6). In Watsuji the theoretical level is somehow 
substituted by a degree of concreteness. In line to what he had previously stated in the 
introduction, the aim of his critique to Heidegger is to show how ‘abstractedness’ cannot 
concern any discourse on the human being. ‘Tools’ are being used by human beings not 
because of an abstraction of their ontology, rather because they are concretely being used as 
methods of survival. The question of the concreteness of the Heideggerian Dasein here 
remains unsolved. The facticity of the Dasein is, in Heidegger’s view, concrete. Nonetheless, 
in Watsuji’s analysis, it represents solely another effort to alienate the human being from its 
material and corporeal existence.  
In Study of Ethics the analysis of human existence is further developed. It has to be 
specified that Study of Ethics does not focus anymore on the relationship between the human 
being and its environment but rather on the relationships and interactions between men. Study 
of Ethics is a philosophical research in the realm of ethics, which for Watsuji is at the basis of 
society. It was published in two volumes, respectively in 1937 and 1949. 56 The book still 
stands as a critique of what Watsuji defines the subject-object dichotomy of European 
philosophy and this critique is, yet again, mostly directed towards Heidegger. The criticisms 
of ‘individualism’ gains more strength in this later book. Concepts such as ‘totality’ and 
‘family’ are further elaborated, although they do not conceptually differ from their version in 
Climate.  
Watsuji states that his concept of the human being already owns in its structure the 
character of ‘publicity’. In fact, ningen, in Japanese, is formed by two ideograms meaning 
‘man’ (hito) and ‘between’ (aida) (WTZ X: 16-8). The aidagara or ‘betweeness’ therefore 
becomes the determination of human beings in the sense that in their relationship the societal 
‘relationality’ is created (WTZ X: 17). Ethics (rinri) is therefore the whole net of relations. 
The system of the rin dictates all the forms of practical interactions that are immanent in the 
human beings. According to Watsuji, the ‘way of the rin’ can be inferred by experience and 
thus it assumes noematic significance (WTZ X: 12-4). Since ethics regards the relationships 
between people, studying ethics would mean studying human beings and their relations. 
Ethics represents, for Watsuji, the ruling of social existence (WTZ X: 13). Most importantly, 
                                                 
56  Some critics consider another edition from 1942 as a third or ‘middle’ volume. In reality, in 1942 
Watsujirewrote the last two parts, the ones on the community and the state, of the first volume from 1937. These 
parts are all included in his Collected Works. The first volume of Study of Ethics (Rinrigaku jō) is in volume 10. 
The second volume (Rinrigaku ge) is included in volume 11. The parts rewritten in 1942 are in WTZ XI: 415-
434. Watsuji had already published his first study of ethics in 1934, although under the title of The Study of 




Watsuji defines this particular relationality as ‘practical’ or, better, as ‘practical, active 
relationality’ (jissenteki, kōiteki kanren) which is directly bound to the concept of ‘world’ (yo 
no naka). Watsuji translates Heidegger’s in-der-Welt-Sein with yo no naka or seken. Since 
this world is a communal world, it follows that it takes the meaning of a common existence or 
a society as subject (shutai), as Yoshizawa points out (Yoshizawa 1994: 151). Additionally, 
world is defined as ‘the human existence as historical, climatical and social’ (WTZ X: 22).57 
As we can see here, the ideas come directly from Climate and further developed.  
In a second philological attempt, Watsuji explains that his concept of ningen sonzai 
means grasping the self as betweeness, since son qualifies as ‘intentional object’ and zai as 
‘the social locus of the world’ (WTZ X: 24-5). Sonzai is hence the equivalent of a communal 
existence. Human existence tucks in itself two moments, as described above. They are the 
‘public’ and the ‘individual’ moments, which belong to a single, eternal dialectical movement. 
Individuality negates totality and vice-versa. The dynamic feature of this movement is the 
‘mode of existence’ of the particular as well as its ‘becoming’ (WTZ X: 22). The movement 
of negation pushes the individual’s egotic aspect to self-negate and to return to the original 
principle of humanity, which is the ‘Absolute Negativity’ (zettaiteki hiteisei) or ‘absolute 
totality’(zettaiteki zentaisei) (WTZ X: 26-7). 
The principle of the human existence is negation in itself, in other 
words, it is precisely the absolute negativity. Both the individual and 
the totality are ‘emptiness’ in their true reality, therefore emptiness is 
the absolute totality. From this principle, namely from the emptiness 
self-emptying [kū ga kūzuru], human existence develops as the 
movement of negation. The negation of the negation stands as the real 
movement of the absolute totality that returns to itself. Hence, it 
indeed represents morality 
    (WTZ X: 26; emphasis in the original) 
 
 The dialectical movement is, in itself, the negation of the negation by means of which 
the unity of the totality is restored. Watsuji argues that the Absolute Negativity is absolute 
because it is grounded in ‘vacuity’ (kū) (see WTZ X: 106-25).58 As already mentioned above, 
Kosaka has challenged this view on the basis that the totality is the basis for the emergency of 
                                                 
57 Earlier in the book, Watsuji explains that his idea of the ‘world’ as inter-relational was inspired by Karl 
Löwith and by his definition of the German word Welt (WTZ X: 19). In fact, Löwith’s critique of his teacher 
Heidegger was directed towards the concept of ‘tools’. In contrast to the Heideggerian idea of Welt as ‘readiness 
to hand’, Löwith juxtaposed a Welt as constitutive of ‘human relations’.   
58 Kū is a concept originated in Buddhism. It is fully developed in the philosophy of Nāgārjuna, the founder of 
the ‘Middle School’ or Mādhyāmika. According to Nāgārjuna, everything is originated from the ‘conditioned 
coproduction’, by means of which all things are the cause and the effect of the other. Since they do not constitute 
independent ontological entities and they are grounded in vacuity, Nāgārjuna reaches the conclusion that even 




the individuality. In fact, if absolute totality and vacuity were to be equal, none of the two 
should posses its own ontology. Nevertheless, in Watsuji the totality is the ground from where 
individuality emerges and returns; totality is the condition sine qua non for the individual to 
exist.  
Watsuji conflates the vacuity as expressed in the Buddhist tradition with the Hegelian 
sublation. If he had employed vacuity in the Buddhist acceptation of the word, he would have 
referred to the ‘conditioned coproducted’. Instead, in his system totality is the cause and the 
aim of the individual. The method is Hegelian, with the Absolute dividing in ‘in-Itself’, 
‘other-than-Itself’ and ‘for-Self’. As Satō said, the fact that Watsuji could not have 
accomplished certain results without having used Hegel’s methodology or phenomenology, 
should not be seen in derogative terms. On the contrary, it could be said that: ‘Open up still 
another range of issues […] [the fact that Watsuji used them] relates to the new way of 
understanding space, time, and matter in the 20th century science’ (Satō 1996: 8). The 
individual goes back to the totality that, in Watsuji’s political philosophy, is embedded in the 
state. Furthermore, as already elaborated in Climate, the human being is a historical-climatic 
shaped human being. History represents the characteristic of infinitude and the human being 
self-realizes in it because it represents its past that underpins its present existence. 
‘Everydayness’ is therefore the point of departure for the analysis of the human being. The 
aidagara exists as an a priori and it is the locus of the everyday where the relationality 
between men takes place. As it happened in for the Absolute Negativity, even the betweeness 
becomes ontologically shaped here, being the fundamental structure of the human being.  
The everyday was also the point of departure of Heidegger’s existential hermeneutics. 
Nevertheless, the two philosophers conceptually parted on the interpretation of death in 
relation to the human being. By making the betweeness the locus of existence, Watsuji 
implies an ontologization of the relationality per se. This move does not permit a being-
between but rather, it forces an ontological system of relations upon the human being. This 
leads to further developments in his philosophy that are controversial. For example, as he 
already stated in the introduction of the Climate, Watsuji reiterates his critique that Heidegger 
had focussed only on Dasein as representative of one individual. Therefore, even the 
Heideggerian notion of the Being-towards-death is criticized on the basis of individuality. 




only a temporal possibility in the future (WTZ X: 232-3). 59  Since temporality is also 
understood as ‘self-detachment’ in Heidegger, for Watsuji this means that: ‘The essence of 
temporality is a temporalization (Zeitigung) in the unity of self-detachment’ (WTZ X: 232; 
emphasis and German in the text). This furthermore means that it can bring about the 
distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity of the Dasein. According to Watsuji, this 
is precisely the point where temporality reaches its peak, meaning when it becomes a 
fundamental part of the ‘individual’ that goes even deeper than its consciousness. Since 
temporality is in relation to the individual ‘time’, it means that the totality of the human 
beings has been left out (WTZ X: 233-4).60 
Watsuji argues that Heidegger has not taken into consideration the death rituals. They 
are not only a part of the everydayness of the Dasein, albeit they are fundamental in the 
totality of society. For example, the Buddhist rites that are celebrated forty-nine days after the 
death are an attempt by the community to keep its structure united. Even with the death of one 
of their members, the roles inside society should remain eternal. This represents the vitality 
and force of the totality, which, with its supra-individual force, comprises the whole 
community together (WTZ X: 234). Practical rites serve the function of uniting the 
community in order for the individuals to overcome the sorrow of a loss. Whilst Heidegger 
was focussing on the Dasein on a transcendental-philosophical level, Watsuji was interested 
in a concrete, I would say, ‘cultural’ human being. This discrepancy represents the basis for 
any of Watsuji’s critique of Heidegger and European philosophy. 
Miki and Watsuji therefore developed a very similar concept of the human being in the 
first part of their intellectual lives. Both defined it as a ‘median’ or as a ‘betweeness’ and both 
related it to the concept of ‘nature’. The accent is on the ‘concreteness’ of this human being. 
In Miki’s view, the discourse started from a material human being seen in a religious 
perspective. Watsuji looked at the Heideggerian Dasein from a ‘historical-climatic’ point of 
view. The central characteristic of their ‘human being’ was its relationship with the world and 
with the environment. 61 Nevertheless, there are some differences between Miki and Watsuji’s 
                                                 
59 Watsuji starts his analysis by considering three moments: ‘being ahead of oneself’, ‘already being in’, and ‘to 
be by the side of’, which are the three moments of the ‘care’ (Sorge) in Heidegger. They are all linked to the 
concept of temporality of the Dasein that for Watsujirepresents, as already mentioned above, Heidegger’s 
mistake par excellence (WTZ X: 232).   
60  The critique to the individual temporality is directed to the whole phenomenology, from Brentano on. 
Nevertheless, Watsuji considers Heideggerian philosophy the one that finalizes the connubium individual-time.  
61 Sakai Naoki argues that Miki Kiyoshi was the first Japanese intellectual to redefine the concept of the ‘human 
being’ in a Heideggerian perspective. He affirms that the ‘betweeness’ of the human being is a derivate from the 





human being. For example, the basic experience of Miki’s man is a condition of Angst and 
uncertainty that marks its fundamental condition. In this respect, Miki is very close to the 
Heideggerian idea of the Geworfenheit. On the other hand, Watsuji’s human being is seen in 
its societal aspect and in its ‘inter-relationality’ both with the environment and the other 
human beings. Thus, Watsuji’s idea is very close to Löwith’s idea of the ‘World’.  
It could be possible to argue that the anxiety Miki found in the human being described 
by Pascal is mirrored in his own interpretation of him. Watsuji, on the contrary, as a reaction 
to the condition of anxiety found in Heidegger, elaborated a system that could have been 






Miki Kiyoshi: a New Human Being 
The ‘wager’ is without doubt the core of Pascal’s methodology and Miki almost 
entirely devotes the second part of Pascal to the analysis of this concept. Pascal used the 
wager to address the sceptics and those who could not believe in the existence of God because 
it could not be materially proven. He argued that, despite the fact that it is not possible to 
prove neither not to prove God, we are already embarked in the process of ‘choosing’. The 
wager leverages on the idea that the choice of the Christian God will automatically promise 
eternal life, otherwise the loss will be none (Pascal 233). Miki is keen to stress the concept of 
the human ‘will’ in the wager argument. For this reason, he is able to describe it as an 
‘ontological’ (hontaironteki) one, due to the fact that it becomes deeply entangled with the 
human aspect of religion (MKZ I: 66). Miki argues: 
The shift from an ontological argument as a formal argument in 
favour of the wager as a proof of will leads to the reality of God from 
the idea of God. Thus, the wager is a practical (jissenteki) argument 
     (MKZ I: 66; emphasis in the original) 62 
 
Miki explains why he considers it as a ‘practical argument’. First of all, because the 
person who knows the anxiety and lives self-consciously cannot be ‘indifferent’ 
(mutonchaku) or ‘neutral’ (chūritsuteki) to the wager, since the wager is rooted in the 
                                                 





religious anxiety that represents the impossibility of demonstrating God rationally and 
theoretically (MKZ I: 66-7). The anxiety becomes then the basic experience Miki is seeing in 
Pascal.63 Since Miki was not a Christian, his interpretation of the wager has to eschew the 
centrality of the theological argument regarding the existence of God. Rather, what interested 
him the most was to demonstrate that it is the human will that chooses to bet regardless 
whether there is a God or not. Secondly, Miki’s proposal that the argument of the wager is a 
practical one further stresses the importance and the centrality the human being had in his 
system. In this context, ‘the reality of God’ could be substituted with the ‘reality of the human 
being’.   
In addition, the wager is directly connected to the concept of death, which is 
necessarily interwoven with the basic determination of the human being (MKZ I: 49). Man 
cannot rationally explain it, but death is perceived in its ‘absoluteness’ (zentaisei) and, 
because of this, man has no control over it (MKZ I: 52). The significance of death is related to 
its capacity to shake all the ‘evidences’ that we have and to make the human being inquiry 
even more on the question of its existence (MKZ I: 52). According to Miki: 
Our life, in concrete, does not possess an equal necessity. On the 
contrary, the wisdom (chie) of death resides in the ability to teach that 
each one of us is nothing more than another ‘possible’ mode of 
existence 
        (MKZ I: 53) 
 
Yet, if we doubt the necessity of life in itself, at that point its ‘possibility’ is made 
clear. Hence, the awareness of death has to be understood in the contest of life being aware of 
its own existentiality (MKZ I: 53). Specifically: ‘death does not manifest its significance 
simply by being relative to life; rather, its significance lies in making [life] possible’ (MKZ I: 
53). Death is also linked to the concept of the divertissement (igi) and to the condition of 
misery of the human being (MKZ I: 123). In Pascal, misery and grandeur represent the two 
opposite poles of the Christian existence that are underpinned by the dooming presence of the 
original sin. Originally, grandeur was part of man’s nature, but after the decadence what is left 
                                                 
63 Not accidentally, Miki quotes Nietzsche in saying that Pascal was ‘the first of all Christians’ (‘der erste aller 
Christen’, MKZ I: 70). It would be interesting to compare Miki’s idea of the basic experience qua anxiety to 
Lucien Goldmann’s philosophy of tragedy, since both thinkers centred their analyses on the concept of the wager. 
Nevertheless, if Goldmann’s Pascal appears in his Le die caché (1959) in the framework of the ‘genetic 
structuralism’ (a combiantion of Lukács and Piaget), in Miki Pascal is rather considered in an existentialist 
fashion. Cohen argues that Goldmann saw Marxism as resembling religion as that his concept of ‘totality’ might 
stand as figurative of a ‘hidden God’ (Cohen 1994: 280). I think that, in this instance, Miki and Goldmann are 
not that far apart, since they both created systems that were very close to theology, and they both substitued God 
with the human being. In addition, they were both trapped in the paradoxes such philosophical speculations 




to him is the mere aspiration to eternal life (Bausola 2003: 44). In Pascal, Miki says, the 
divertissement plays a key role since it represents the ‘technique’ of life and the fundamental 
phenomenon of human condition, beyond representing a self-evasion of life itself (MKZ I: 
23-4). Nevertheless, there is an internal contradiction lying behind the concept of 
divertissement. On one hand, it has to help human beings divert from their life and keep them 
reflecting on their own insecurity. On the other hand, it creates a vicious circle of insecurity 
by constantly stimulating a desire for fame and affirmation. Hence, it underpins the 
movement of life that becomes ‘evilly eternal’ (MKZ I: 24). In addition to that, since the 
divertissement is a self-escape from life, in turns life becomes a phenomenon of desperate 
escape from the idea of death (MKZ I: 55). ‘Le divertissement nous amuse, et nous faits 
arriver insensiblement à la mort’ (Pascal 171).  
In a comparison between Heidegger and Pascal’s ideas of death and their relation to 
Miki’s theorization, Akamatsu states that they are conceptually apart (Akamatsu 1994a: 108). 
In Pascal, the human being as a Christian believer lives and dies in Jesus Christ, in 
remembrance of the experience of the martyrs (Akamatsu 1994a: 108-9). In Heidegger, death 
is a solitary event that solely regards the Dasein. On the base of this distinction, Akamatsu 
argues that Miki grasped Pascal’s concept of death according to Heidegger’s existentialism 
and that this limited his understanding of Pascal’s thought (Akamatsu 1994a: 109). Miki 
poses the accent on ‘death’ as the ‘possibility’ of life. In Heidegger, the concept of the 
‘Being-towards-Death’ means that the Dasein anticipates the possibility of its own death as a 
possibility. The Dasein as Geworfenheit lives its existence in the realm of the ‘They’ as an 
inauthentic life. The possibility of the authenticity is given by the Dasein realizing that its 
existence is impossibility because of its finitude. Death is discovered in the moment when the 
Dasein understands that this is the possibility of every impossibility of ‘being-towards-
something’. It represents the total ‘can-be’. The possibility of nothingness (Nichtigkeit) is ‘the 
existential anticipation of the total Being’ (Heidegger 1962a: 321).  
In Miki, the accent is posed on the ‘possibility’ of death as the realization of life rather 
than as the end of it. I argue that precisely because Miki’s interpretation of Pascal is a non-
religious one, the Christian part of Pascal’s book is left out. This does not constitute a 
limitation or a mistake. It rather represents a conscious choice. It is a choice in favour of 
concreteness and ‘contextualization’. As it has happened before with the concept of the 
‘grasping’ of nature, I believe it is the same with the concept of death. It provides the 
Christian, hopeless human being in this world and awaiting for the afterlife, a possibility of 




The degree of hope that Miki offers to his ningen is part of his scheme of the creation of a 
religion of the human being. By overlooking the theological implications of Pascal’s 
meditations, Miki set the standard for his anthropological understanding of the human 
condition. Rather than being ‘theo-centric’, Miki’s philosophy was ‘anthropo-centric’, always 
in relation to the contextualization of Pascal’s thought in his intellectual milieu64. The same 
conflation of Heidegger and Pascal is restated in the discussion of the concept of ‘error’ 
(gobyū).  
In Pascal, error is ‘that condition by means of which things are veiled’ (MKZ I: 29).65 
This condition is not only related to the material world, but it also concerns human existence. 
In fact, it is a mode of existence peculiar to existence itself. Human beings have to deceive 
and cover the misery of their existence, therefore they are united on the base of mutual deceit 
(Pascal 100). Nevertheless, Miki establishes a link between Pascal and Aristotle when he 
argues: ‘The human being not only exists as an easy source of errors, it is also an existence of 
self-deception. This might remind us of the Aristotelian concept of ‘false man’’ (MKZ I: 29). 
Along this line, truth (shinri) represents the mode of existence where everything is unveiled 
and unmasked. Moreover, it is that situation where ‘the self reveals itself as it is’, meaning a 
‘discovery’ in the French sense of ‘decouvrir’ (miidasu koto) (MKZ I: 30).66 The honnête 
homme is thus the man that can openly talk about his true mode of existence. He sees and tells 
correctly the condition of misery of human life (MKZ I: 30). 67 Although it is Pascal who says 
that the honnête home is the one that is not deceived by the divertissement, in Miki the 
attention is focused on the possibility of ‘communicating’ to others this state of human 
existence.  
                                                 
64 Despite the fact that Pascal’s theology is focused on the relationship between man and God from a very human 
perspective, it is still elaborated within the grand scheme of Christianity. This is the reason why I describe 
Pascal’s oevre as ‘theo-centric’.  
65 The divertissement represents the degradation in the world of ‘imagination’ (sōzō). Pascal describes 
imagination in these terms: ‘Cést cette partie dominant de l’homme, cette maîtresse d’erreur et de fausseté, et 
d’autant plus fourbe qu’elle ne l’est pas toujour; car elle serait règle infaillible de vérité, si elle l’était infaillible 
du mensogne’ (Pascal 82). 
66 The discourse on ‘discovery the self’ in these terms is very important in Miki’s production. As a matter of fact, 
this theme will return in the mid-1930s, when Miki writes on Nietzsche’s Super-human and on Shestov’s 
‘eccentric’. It has to be underlined that Shestov was also a great admirer of Pascal’s Penseés. On this subject see 
Chap.  4.  
67 I decided to leave honnête homme in French, since there is no real equivalent in English. ‘Honest man’ would 
not fully account for the French word. The idea of the honnête homme is an old Renaissance concept. It indicates 
the man who is not focused on a single discipline but that can openly talk on every subject, being morally honest, 
without imposing his ideas on others. It is widely acknowledged the indebtedness of Pascal to his friend 
Chevalier de Méré (1607-1684) for the elaboration of the concept he uses, although Pascal left out the ‘libertin’ 




In Miki, the possibility of communication is inherently bound to the use of language. 
By merging the Pascalian ‘decouvrir’ to the Greek alethein that originally means ‘unveiling’ 
or ‘uncovering’, Miki critically establishes a connection between the Aristotelian-
Heideggerian ‘false man’ to Pascal’s honnête home. In this respect, what in Pascal was the 
characteristic of a certain condition of existence, in Miki it becomes an ontological 
prescription. In this sense, the ‘facticity’ of language is reiterated constantly by the human 
beings that continues living in falsehood. In Pascal, man’s acceptance of his state of misery 
was already a step ahead towards the possibility of the true envisioning of the self in God. In 
Miki, as in Heidegger, it is language that deceives the human being since language is 
deception in se.68 
Pascal affirmed that in order to overcome the vicious return to deception, the human 
being had to be able to distinguish the ‘nature’ of life from its ‘naturality’ that took place in 
the third moment of the movement of life: ‘consciousness’ (ishiki, in French pensée; MKZ I: 
32). In Pascal consciousness referred to the positive movement of life that Miki also defines 
as ‘self-consciousness’ (jikakuteki ishiki) or the ‘rescuer’ of the self from the degradation into 
the world (MKZ I: 34). Consciousness and thinking are the two advantage points that man 
possesses as tools in contrasting the universe that is constantly trying to crush him. ‘Toute 
notre dignité consiste donc en la pensée’ Pascal says (Pascal 347). The discourse on thinking 
is crucial in Pascal’s argument against the ‘philosophers’. Philosophizing is, according to 
Pascal: ‘se moquer de la philosophie’ (Pascal 4), because ‘philosophy’ has to be understood 
as the fundamental activity of human life. In Miki, this is translated into: ‘thinking self-
consciously […] as the ‘mode of existence’’ (MKZ I: 35). Questioning as a form of 
philosophizing comes down to the uncertainty of human life, therefore the activity starts 
within life itself. The foundation of this research has to be found in the concreteness of human 
life, not in the transcendental ego (MKZ I: 39-40).69  
The ideas of the ‘thinking self-consciously’ and of ‘fundamental experience’ share 
some common ground with Nishida’s concept of the ‘active self-awareness’ and ‘pure 
experience’. Nishida started his career with An Inquiry into the Good (Zen no kenkyū) 
published in 1911. In this work, he introduced the concept of ‘pure experience’ (junsui 
keiken) in which experience was considered as the only existing reality that preceded and 
transcended the ‘subject-object’ dichotomy as well as human consciousness. It thus became a 
                                                 
68 On this subject see also Uchida 2004: 203-4.  
69  Jacinto Zavala is right in seeing the stage of self and active-consciousness as a reminder of Nishida’s 
philosophy. The concreteness of human existence could be compared to Nishida’s concept of the concrete reality 




sort of all-encompassing reality that realized the unity between the thought and the thinking, 
the knowing subject and the known object (Cestari 1998: 181). Everything, even 
consciousness, was subsumed and contained in the framework of experience. Nevertheless, 
probably not satisfied with this idea and, at the same time, after having been accused of 
‘emanational Plotinism’ by his student Tanabe Hajime, Nishida revisited his theories in the 
years between 1924 and 1930 (Cestari 1997: 109-10). In his From the Acting to the Seeing 
(Hataraku mono kara miru mono he, 1927), Nishida proposed the concept of the ‘logic of 
place’ (basho no ronri). This locus was the one where the individual was described as the end 
of the universal and the universal as the self-negation that let the particular emerge. It is also 
called the place of the Absolute Nothingness (zettai mu) where all contradictions ceased to 
exist. In this locus, the absolute becomes real and all the difference resolve themselves in an 
identity-differentiation (itsu soku ta, ta soku itsu)  (Kosaka 1997: 274). Furthermore, in this 
precise moment consciousness reaches its ultimate stage which is defined as the mirror where 
consciousness ‘reflects itself within itself’ (Kosaka 1991: 203). This is the essence of the 
thinking self-consciously, where nothing else but the Absolute Nothingness can become 
‘existence’ through an active act of self-negation. Nishida’s aim was to create a new paradigm 
where the Aristotelian vision of the hypokeimenon would be reversed. The new paradigm 
would have hence been ‘a predicate that cannot become a subject’. To Nishida, therefore, the 
basho is an ‘active universal’ (nōdōteki ippansha) (Cestari in Arisaka et al.: 2).  
Miki re-elaborates these theories in his idea that ‘self-consciousness’ is the act that 
saves the human being from the degradation into the world and, on the other hand, as a self-
contained activity that could be perpetrated solely within existence itself. Negating the 
existence of a transcendental ego is thus specular to Nishida’s idea that the unity of the 
identity-differentiation takes place in the topos of the Absolute Nothingess. Both Miki and 
Nishida, in this respect, attempted to negate the presence of two elements that stand in 
opposition to each other in the epistemological process. As said in the introduction, the 
dissatisfaction with the status of epistemology in European philosophy pushed not only Miki 
and Watsuji, but also Nishida to try to overcome it through different philosophical means. 
This discourse on the activity of thinking is clearly expressed in another part of the 
book, when Miki expands his analysis on Pascal by including the Discours sur le Passions de 




ésprit de finesse (sensai no kokoro) and the ésprit géométrique (kikagakutekinaru kokoro). 70  
In the same fragment of the ‘philosophy’ Pascal links the fineness to the judgement and the 
judgement to the ‘feeling’. Next, he juxtaposes the morality of the judgement to the morality 
of the intellect that, for him, is not subjected to any rules. Sciences belong to the intellect as 
feelings belong to the judgement (Pascal 4). Miki explains that in the Discours the ésprit de 
finesse belongs to the feelings and that, for this reason, it has its own logic that is alien to 
reason (MKZ I: 81). At this point Miki confronts it with the ‘faculty of judgement’ as 
expressed in Kant. Since also in Kant the reflective judgment belongs to the transcendental 
structure of the self, it therefore allows an understanding of individuality as concrete existence 
(MKZ I: 81). In Pascal, l’ésprit de finesse represents the feelings understanding individuality 
according to its own reasons and, as said before, the finesse is a characteristic of judgement 
(MKZ I: 81).  
Bausola explains that, although it is true that in modern philosophy there are analogue 
studies into the faculty judgement, for example in Kant, in Pascal the object of this faculty is 
not specified (Bausola 2003: 68). What Pascal is talking about are the characteristics of the 
ésprit de finesse as an alternative cognitive capability beyond the rational one. It is flexible 
and it is concerned with human existence (Bausola 2003: 68). Nevertheless, a specific object 
is never mentioned. Miki, in an attempt of solving this obscure point, assigns to concrete 
human existence the role of being the object of the faculty of judgement. Apparently for Miki 
the answer to the question of judgement is not implicit in the ‘object’ but rather in the 
‘faculty’. Since the faculty belongs to the transcendental structure of the human being, it 
naturally follows that its object should be its own existence.71  
On the one hand, Miki describes the ésprit de finesse as ‘intuition’ which is necessary 
to understand existence in relation to its value (MKZ I: 144). On the other, the analysis of the 
human being should progress ‘analytically’ (bunsekiteki) in the sense of proceeding by 
‘discerning’ (shikibetsu suru) or ‘distinguishing’ (miwakeru) not in a logical or scientific way 
(MKZ I: 145). In this way, the mutual relationships in life that ends in a hermeneutical 
description of the reason of effects (genjitsu no riyū) of existence would be complete (MKZ I: 
147-9). Dialectics thus become the methodology employed even in the case of the apparently 
                                                 
70 For Pascal in the ésprit géométrique the principles are clear and visible, although they are far from the 
common use, while the principles of the ésprit de finesse are of common use and ‘in front of everybody’s eyes’. 
You are only required to have ‘bonne vue’ and you will see them (Pascal 1). Pascal further specifies that usually 
fine spirits are not good with the geometric principles, because they require imagination and a certain degree of 
speculation. On the other hand, geometric spirits miss the whole picture and loose themselves when it is not 
possible for them to apply their geometrical method on the fine spirits (Pascal 1). 




contrasting mutual relationship between the misery and the grandeur of the human being that 
could be solved by subsuming it in the dialectical method (MKZ I: 150-3). Since truth is not 
immediately available we have to develop a new method as a self-conscious one in order to 
attain the real truth that is God. Nevertheless, in Pascal such an objective could be only 
fulfilled in the order of charity which represents the divine mode of existence and thus 
precluded to the human beings. 72 In fact, it is the order of the saints, like Saint Augustine and 
Saint Paul. In a reverse course, Miki affirms that, in order to gain to the order of charity, we 
have to start from the dialectics of our antinomies which are torn between the thesis of ‘logic’ 
and the antithesis of ‘reality’ (MKZ I: 160). Thus, he does not only hint at the fact that the 
order is possibly open to non-divine creatures, but he also explains that the divine grace 
(onchō) would not be attainable unless the human will is involved (MKZ I: 112).   
Between logic and reality, idea and existence, we always have to 
choose for the latter. The reason is because God, the soul, the creation 
and the genesis have to be acknowledged. Reason is dependent on its 
submission to reality and there must be given the possibility of 
understanding the antinomies that arise in the self  
    (MKZ I: 162; emphasis in the original) 
 
The second antinomy is that reality is connected to the order of charity, which is 
unreachable with our reason. The possibility is not factuality realizable (MKZ I: 162; 
emphasis in the original). Hence, religion is the only way to solve the antinomies. Pascal 
affirms that the strength of reason resides in knowing when to doubt, when to affirm and 
when to submit itself (Pascal 268). The certainty of the existence of God is by all means only 
an instinct (hontai). Despite this, the instinct of the coeur belongs to the order of charity 
(MKZ I: 166). How is this problem solved? 
Miki addresses this question by means of the ‘love of God’. Love is the unity between 
action and understanding. Since, as already mentioned before, the knowledge of God is a 
‘practical’ matter, it follows that our concrete life must become a conversion in the direction 
of God. In order to grasp Him, we have to live according to his preaching because: ‘the 
recognition of the religious truth is an intellectual action, it is an active knowledge (chiteki 
tabi, kōteki chi dearu; MKZ I: 167).  
The problem of life has to be solved by living this problem in a 
superior meaning. This is Pascal’s faith 
    (MKZ I: 167; emphasis in the original) 
 
                                                 





Miki, by recognizing that religious truth is ‘active knowledge’, turns Pascal upside 
down and allows for man to reach the stage of the completion of its human existence. By 
having faith in human reason, Miki is making a powerful statement in overcoming the 
religious ground Pascal had based his analysis on. Once again, Miki shows the 
anthropocentrism of his philosophy.  
Miki then adds that a more profound explanation of Pascal’s faith has to be found in 
the Entretien de Pascal avec Saci sur Épictète et Montaigne.73 De Sacy says to Pascal that the 
source of error of both the Stoics and the Sceptics is the fact that they did not recognize that 
the actual state of the human being is different from what it originally was (Pascal 1914: 52). 
On the one hand the Stoics ignore the corruption of human nature and, by ignoring its 
impotence, fall into conceit; on the other hand the Sceptics, by ignoring the original dignity of 
man and by knowing its impotence by not its duties, fall into laziness (Pascal 1914: 52-3). 
They both strengthen their falsity without reaching the real truth. The only truth, says de Sacy, 
is the one of the Christian God who has taught us that what is infirm belongs to the nature, 
what is valid belongs to the divine grace (Pascal 1914: 54). Therefore, the union of these two 
natures has to be found in the figure of the ‘Homme-Dieu’, namely Jesus Christ (Pascal 1914: 
54).  
The coeur, which is the only understanding of God, is represented in the symbol as the 
particular concept that stands for the material understanding. According to this it follows that 
man cannot love what is outside himself because that would mean negating God’s love (MKZ 
I: 97-8). The double-folded structure of love goes from man to God and from God to man, 
being ‘figurative’ (shōchō) of the divine love (MKZ I: 99).74 
The substance of human love is not simply inside ourselves as the 
happiness we aspire to. And it is not even outside ourselves. On the 
contrary, it is in ourselves as much as it is inside us. That is to say: it 
is the figure of the great truth that resides in God 
     (MKZ I: 99; emphasis in the original) 
 
The original sin (genzai) is the origin of the corruption of the nature of the human 
being and, according to Pascal, Jesus Christ is our sole redemption, because he subsumes the 
                                                 
73 The Entretien is a transcription of a dialogue between Pascal and de Sacy redacted by the secretary of de Sacy, 
Fontaine, in 1655 (Bausola 2003: 25). The dialogue confronts Stoicism, portrayed in the figure of Epictetus, and 
Scepticism, personified by Montaigne, and tries to overcome both in a Christian perspective (Bausola 2003: 25). 
74  There are two meanings: the figure in the the sens literal (hyōmenteki imi) and in the sense mystique 
(shinpiteki imi). The access to the sense mystique is precluded to the order of charity and, therefore, for the other 
orders, the figure becomes an obstacle in reaching the truth (MKZ I: 175). Pascal says that it is not possible to 
understand how God operates unless we understand that he decided to illuminate some and to make some blind 




misery of the original sin through his incarnation as a human being. On the other hand, he is 
uncorrupted, because of the fact that he was born without it. Therefore, religion is the only 
method capable of understanding the totality of life in its reality (MKZ I: 190). Jesus Christ 
must therefore be the centrality of the Christian faith because of his embodiment of the 
contradictions present in the concreteness of the life of the human being.  
Despite the seemingly religious interpretation that Miki proposes, the fact that he 
states that the substance of human love is the ‘figure’ of the great truth that resides in God 
goes in stark contrast to the dichotomy of the senses that in Pascal set the fundamental 
distinction between the orders. If the figure is an obstacle for all the orders except for the one 
of charity, it signifies that man cannot understand it. On the contrary, Miki appears to affirm 
that, regardless the order, the figure functions as God’s truth. In this sense, Miki is very close 
to one of Pascal’s interpreters, Alexandre Vinet, who wrote that ‘in order to attain God we 
have to start from the human being’ (even quoted MKZ I: 40). Vinet never saw Pascal as a 
full Christian, rather he defined him: ‘a desperate atheist’ (Vinet 1936: 133).75 He added that, 
according to the theology of Pascal, Christianity would be a ‘practice’ in the sense that man 
could reach God by practicing it (Vinet 1936: 139). This could happen because Pascal was 
emphasizing the ‘heart’ (coeur) of the knowledge of the Christian faith. As a consequence, the 
reason was ‘humiliated’ (s’humilie) in front of the things God had prepared for us in order to 
elevate our spirits (Vinet 1936: 139-40).  
Vinet’s central concern was to interpret Pascal in terms of ‘the man’ that came before 
the ‘the believer’. He provided a valid support to Miki’s idea that man comes before God, in 
the sense that the engagement with theological reasoning should begin with man. The 
centrality of the misery of the condition of the human being in Pascal’s thought resembles, 
although in a complete different context, the anxiety related to Heideggerian and existential 
thought in general in the 1920s-1930s.  As a result, Miki might have seen Pascal as a lay man, 
and not as a religious figure writing an apology of Christianity. The apology is, as a matter of 
fact, a true one but based on a human perspective. Pascal found the answer to his thoughts in 
the misery of the human being, and Miki saw in this ‘human’ answer a valid response to the 




                                                 
75Atheism is understood by Vinet as the impossibility of knowing God without ‘possessing’, ‘living’ God. 




Watsuji Tetsurō: the Human Being as a ‘Political Being’ 
In Climate, Watsuji treats the Japanese case in the chapter dedicated to the monsoonal 
regions.76 Japan is special thanks to the complexity of its climate that Watsuji defines as being 
‘monsoonal’ and ‘temperate’. Because of this, Japanese people share two different 
‘behavioural’ characteristics: they are ‘receptive’ (juyō) and, at the same time, ‘submissive’ 
(ninjū) (WTZ VIII: 134). The mixed characteristics of Japanese climate are compared to a 
bamboo: 
The shape of the tropical plant of the bamboo covered with snow is 
often given as a typical Japanese natural feature. Nevertheless, the 
bamboo, accustomed to the weight of the snow, differentiates itself 
from the tropical bamboo, being able to draw a flexible curve, 
becoming a Japanese bamboo 
      (WTZ VIII: 135) 
 
Watsuji describes the particular Japanese mode of existence as the one being ‘silently 
passionate’ (shimeyakana gekijō) and ‘aggressive disinterest’ (sentōtekina tentan). This 
combination is due to the fact that Japanese people have to fight against the destruction 
brought by the seasonal monsoons but, that, on the other hand, has pushed them to become  
‘submissive’ (WTZ VIII: 134-8). The bamboo represents this particular Japanese trait. It 
represents the ability of Japanese people of having been able to adapt to every culture that has 
been introduced in Japan over the centuries and to make it ‘Japanese’. Watsuji calls it 
‘stratification’ (jūsōsei).77 
Secondly, Watsuji sees the Japanese family system as the most outstanding 
characteristic of Japanese culture. Basing his analysis on the concept of ie, that in Japanese 
has the double meaning of both the ‘nuclear family’ as well as the ‘household’, Watsuji 
argues that ie takes the significance of ‘totality’ of the family (in this case he uses kazoku) that 
assumes historical value thanks to the legitimacy guaranteed by the ancestors (WTZ VIII: 
141). For this reason: ‘the fundamental characteristic of the ‘ie’ is the fact that it is the place 
where totality can be historically grasped’ (WTZ VIII: 142). In the Japanese concept of the 
                                                 
76 Watsuji assumes that different communities reacted in different ways to the climate they live in. It is the case 
of the monsoonal regions, where people are constantly struggling with the fury of the torrential rains that shapes 
them as a combatant and passionate. The inhabitants of the desert regions are instead nomadic and characterized 
by a certain degree of laziness. Last, people living in the temperate climates have learnt how to develop a florid 
agriculture and to raise cattle, thanks to the favourable climate and are therefore more active (see WTZ VIII: 24 
ff).   
77 The concept of ‘stratification’ had already been expressed by Watsuji in his Pilgrimage to Ancient Temples 
and Restoring Idols. In these two books Watsuji writes that Japan, in the Nara period, was the centre of Asia 
thanks to the immigration of Chinese and Korean labour in order to build the Nara temples. The different 




family parents are ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their own children realizing 
the concept of ‘non-divisibility between the self and the other’ (jita fuji no rinen) (WTZ VIII: 
142-3). The passion and the aggressiveness mentioned above are therefore described in these 
terms: 
The ‘ie’ as the mode of existence of the Japanese human being 
realizes, on a family level, the Japanese ‘betweeness’ as the passionate, 
aggressive disinterest 
       (WTZ VIII: 142) 
 
Watsuji argues that the Japanese are aware of the ‘totality’ of the ‘human beings’ 
through the notion of the ‘kami of the Japanese spirit’ (WTZ VIII: 147). The totality of the 
nation is thus embodied in the ‘god of the ancestors’ (sosen kami) (WTZ VIII: 147).  
Watsuji subsequently traces back in history the idea of a god of the Japanese nation. 
He believes that if the Meiji Restoration happened, it is because the all-embracing principle of 
the ‘family’ and of the ‘household’ had been recognized by the people in Amaterasu Ōmikami, 
the female founder of the Japanese nation. The Restoration is considered by Watsuji as a 
moment of ‘popular self-awareness’ (kokuminteki jikaku) that restored the power in the hands 
of the emperor (WTZ VIII: 147). In Japan, the totality of the nation had been already grasped 
on a religious level, because of the taxonomic categories of ‘microcosmic family’ and 
‘macrocosmic household’ that are mirrored in each other. The Japanese emperor is like the 
Confucian benevolent father and the benevolent ruler (WTZ VIII: 148). In Watsuji’s words: 
We acknowledge the full historical significance [of the imperial 
household] in the doctrine of the loyalty and filial piety that strives to 
awake the totality of the people on the basis of the analogy with the 
family. That is just the peculiar mode in which the Japanese grasp the 
totality of the human beings through this distinctive mode of existence 
    (WTZ VIII: 148; emphasis in the original) 
 
Watsuji thinks that in Japan the religious principle and the political principle were able 
to be combined in an ‘inseparable union’ (kyote naki ketsugō) in the figure of the emperor. 
This did not happen in Europe where, for example, there was a clear separation between the 
two with the king on one hand and the Pope on the other (WTZ VIII: 150).78 The emperor 
embodied the unity of the Japanese nation, thanks to the fact that the leitmotiv that ran 
throughout Japanese history is the ‘feeling of reverence to the emperor’ (sonnō shin) (WTZ 
VIII: 150). 79  Related to this discourse is the assertion that before a real ethical system 
                                                 
78 Watsuji refers to the matsurigoto as this union between religious and political spheres (WTZ VIII: 150). 




developed in Japan, the category of ‘pure’, ‘impure’ and ‘vile’ subsumed in themselves both a 
religious and political meaning. In the double value of these categories Watsuji sees the 
‘distinctiveness of the [Japanese] people’ (WTZ VIII: 151).  
In the chapter dedicated to the ‘singularity of Japan’ (nihon no mezurashisa), Watsuji 
affirms that the Japanese would not be interested in the res publica, but that they would rather 
react if a damage is caused to them. The roots of this attitude towards politics are to be found 
in the peculiarity of the Japanese people not to be in conflict with others, since they live their 
lives in a ‘communal’ way (WTZ VIII: 157). According to Watsuji, a democratic 
parliamentary system can be implemented only in societies where there is a strong emphasis 
on individualism (WTZ VIII: 168). Even the Japanese Communist party does not represent 
the proletariat but solely its leaders’ views (WTZ VIII: 168).  
Watsuji defines the ‘political rarity’ of Japan this unsuitable-ness of both the 
Communist and democratic models. Unfortunately, Watsuji does not specify which model 
would be most opportune for the Japanese case. If compared to his previous articles written in 
1919, it is clear that some things have changed in Watsuji’s political views. For example, if 
before democratic ideas were considered ‘functional’ to strengthen the welfare of the people, 
here democracy is seen as an inappropriate model for the Japanese nation. The loyalty to the 
imperial family is underlined even more in the passages mentioned above. This shift might 
have been triggered by Watsuji experiences in Europe during 1926-27. Watsuji suffered from 
depression while he was in Germany and, apparently, this ‘distance’ from Japan lead him to 
reflect on the political and cultural status of his country that developed in a harsh critique of 
the European model that finds its climax in the last chapter of Climate. This last part is 
dedicated to the history of the studies on climatology in the works of Johann Gottfried Herder 
(1744-1803) and Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831).80 
In a first passage, Watsuji finds common ground with Herder in affirming that 
language is a characteristic of the human being that differentiates the people of the world. In 
his Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Mankind (Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit, 
1784) Herder said that language was the distinctive character of our reason. Through a 
process of interpretation (Auslegung) language was created as the external ‘sign’ (Zeichen) of 
the internal sign that is reason itself. Language was therefore aimed at relating us to the 
outside world, which was the manifestation of God. In this respect, Watsuji says that God in 
Herder is ‘the nature and the profound mystery eternally manifested in mankind’s destiny’ 
                                                 
80 This part of Climate has not yet been translated. As a matter of fact, the English translation stops at the fourth 




(WTZ VIII: 210). Nevertheless, Watsuji criticizes Herder for having applied the method of 
interpretation to nature, as if nature were the object of natural sciences, and for having failed 
to recognize that natural sciences and the Geisteswissenschaften need to be combined (WTZ 
VIII: 215). Watsuji argues that the ‘secret’ of nature lies in ‘living’ in nature without actually 
knowing why certain phenomena happen in different climates. Hence, nature is not an 
abstract object different from our consciousness, it is a concrete part of human existence.  
[for example] The fact that air is a living thing is because the human 
being discovers its own life within air. The secret of air is the secret of 
human life 
      (WTZ VIII: 216) 
 
The abstraction of nature and climate as exemplified in Herder is not acceptable from 
Watsuji’s point of view. As long as nature will remain an object of knowledge, it will be 
impossible to consider it as a concrete part of the structure of human existence.  
In Hegel’s case, the critique is pointed at his theory of world history. Watsuji therefore 
focuses only on the second moment of the Idea, or the objective Spirit. 81 Hegel saw nature as 
the ‘outgoing’ of the Idea from itself. Nature was the antithesis or the self-negation of the Idea. 
Nevertheless, nature is still a ‘subjective’ thing. Watsuji writes that nature is opposed to the 
human beings and the difference between the particular natural spirit and the human beings 
has to be found in its ‘contingency’ (gūzensei). History, on the other hand, was the moment of 
self-consciousness of the objective Spirit. Watsuji says that the self-revelation (jiko keiji) of 
the Spirit is the thesis of the objectivity of the Spirit itself (WTZ VIII: 228). The third moment 
of the objective Spirit was concretized in the ‘volk spirit’. According to Watsuji, it realizes 
itself in the multitude of the various people.  
At this point Watsuji argues that this ‘particularity’ can be seen as a ‘geographical and 
climatic prescription’ (chiriteki oyobi fūdoteki kitei) where the people’s spirit manifests itself 
in different individualities (WTZ VIII: 229). Due to this fact, Watsuji argues that human 
reality is one moment in the movement in the emancipation of the world Spirit (WTZ VIII: 
229). If the Spirit has to set itself free, then the moment of particularity is the conditio sine 
qua non (hitsusu) for it to reach the higher stage (WTZ VIII: 230). Watsuji links this 
particularity, as mentioned above, to the climatic particularity. Hegel had divided history in 
                                                 
81 The Spirit in Hegel is three-folded. The subjective spirit is still related to the finitude because finitude appears 
inside the Spirit. The objective Spirit is the spirit realized in the institutions, such as the family, society and the 
state. The objective spirit is itself divided in three moments (right, morality, ethics). The third Spirit is the 
Absolute Spirit which is the Idea that self-recognizes in an absolute manner. Related to this last stage are art, 




three periods. Asia had been relegated to the first form, while the last one was dedicated to the 
German state, the only one, in Hegel’s eyes, that had understood that human freedom relied in 
its subsumption in the state as the telos of history. On a religious level, Asian civilizations 
stopped on a ‘mythical’ level and were excluded by the Christian revelation. Watsuji takes up 
this point, arguing that this is not only a stage to the self-consciousness of the Spirit, but that 
this is also related to a climatic condition (WTZ VIII: 231). Thus, he criticizes Hegel for not 
having correctly provided a coherent theory on the significance of nature. Rather: ‘on a 
theoretical level, he strongly grasped the significance of the geographical roots. Nonetheless, 
he could not sufficiently concretize it’ (WTZ VIII: 232). It follows: 
We cannot approve a world history as the one of Hegel that makes 
Europeans the ‘chosen people’ (senmin). The fact that outside Europe 
many people are made slaves does not represent the realization of 
man’s freedom. World history has to award to every people a place for 
itself according to their climatic differences  
       (WTZ VIII: 232) 
 
Since climate is ontologically related to history, Watsuji could not understand why in 
Hegel nature had a secondary position in shaping the different people Spirits. The climate 
thus became a political statement in Watsuji’s hands.  
In Study of Ethics the discourse on politics takes a more radical path. For Watsuji, the 
concept of ie is the emblem of the dynamic movement of negativity. The family is the mirror 
of society, since the totality of the family is the force that prescribes the role to each member, 
by negating the possibility of taking up another one (WTZ X: 95). Therefore, the individuals 
live according to the ‘community’ and this is the ‘familiar community’ of the human beings. 
Watsuji thinks that the ‘state’ (kokka) represents the totality of all totalities, the supreme 
totality that corresponds to the sovereignty of all sovereignties (tōchiken no shukensei) (WTZ 
X: 605). In the totality of human existence, every individuality is seen as a self-determination 
of the absolute totality (WTZ X: 605). To Watsuji the state represents, most of all, the union 
of all the communities that are included in it. The state, by being self-conscious and by 
prescribing all these particularities, is therefore the conditio sine qua non of all various 
relations that run throughout the moral structures. ‘The state is the ethical, self-conscious, 
synthetic structure’ (WTZ X: 595).  
As it happens in the family system, where to take up the role of parents it is not 
necessary to renounce to the role of the ‘married couple’, so in the community the same 
process has taken place. Every community is subsumed in the bigger one (family-geographic, 




The state is therefore the ethical structure of all ethical structures that assigns to every 
particularity its own place (WTZ X: 596). The movement of negation mentioned above is 
thereby applied even to the activity of the state, which for Watsuji is an ethical activity aimed 
at regulating human ‘communitarian’ existence. The state is capable of doing it by relying on 
its own ‘force’ that does not need be to be too coercive since the individual, thanks to the 
noematic residue of the totality that still lingers in itself, will naturally go back to the state, 
namely the Absolute Good.82 
These considerations on the state as the Absolute Good and supreme ethical system 
will be further developed in other works written between 1942 and 1944. These pieces will be 
the subject of this enquiry in the next chapters. Needless to say, there is a clear radicalization 
of Watsuji’s thought in these years. As Satō has pointed out, this shift will comprise Watsuji’s 
position in the postwar period (Satō 1996: 8). In fact, after 1945 Watsuji was included in the 
discourse on sengo sekinin or ‘(post)war responsibility’ and he was accused of having been a 
supporter of the Japanese imperialism. It is left to see how Watsuji re-emerged from the 







Miki and Watsuji started their careers by elaborating a very similar concept of the 
human being. They both stressed the ‘concreteness’ of human life and the ‘median’ situation 
in which the human being found itself positioned. 
Heidegger influenced their philosophical speculations in different, although similar, 
ways. In Miki, Heidegger’s existential analytic was used as a tool in analyzing Pascal. In 
Watsuji, on the other hand, Heidegger triggered a deep reflection on the status of the Japanese 
state and culture after the Restoration and after the encounter with European philosophy. 
In Miki the concept of the human being slowly progresses towards a ‘religious’ man. 
By saying ‘religious’ I do not mean that there was a sudden conversion to Christianity on 
Miki’s side. On the contrary, religion has to be interpreted here as the ‘religion of the human  
                                                 
82 In the 1942 edition some considerations are more explicitly nationalistic. For example, the accent is posed in 
the ‘sacredness’ of the state thanks to the figure of the emperor who embodies the union between religious and 




being’, because it is precisely the human being that becomes the focus and the solution to 
religious and existential problems. In Watsuji, on the other hand, the path towards the 
definition of human existence becomes more tortuous and compromised. It could be argued 
that even Watsuji created a ‘religion of the human being’, although some might accuse him of 
having rather shaped a ‘Japanese human being’. Watsuji transforms his human being in a 
political human being that, to some extent, could be effectively recognized in a particular 
‘Japanese’ one. Climate, in fact, represents Watsuji’s first political attempt. His refusal of 
Herder, Hegel and Heidegger is justified on the basis of the difference between the European 
‘human being’ and the Japanese one. In Study of Ethics the state reaches the level and 
assumes the role of the absolute totality, in line with what Hegel had prefigured for the 
Prussian state. The Japanese state becomes ‘sacred’ and ‘particular’ and therefore ‘supreme’. 
What it is of most interest will be to confront them with what Watsuji wrote in the following 
years and see, if possible, whether the Japanese defeat in the Second World War affected his 
political views or, on the other hand, whether he steadily believed in the ‘particularism’ of the 
Japanese nation. 
In Miki’s Pascal there is no indication of a political engagement in this first stage. The 
concepts he expressed in this book will be subsequently developed in a more ‘political’ 
philosophy. In fact, just the year after the publication of Pascal, Miki begins his relationship 
with Marxist philosophy. 
What is central in Miki and Watsuji is the concreteness of human life and its relation 
to the surrounding environment understood as an ‘ontological experience’. Their research 
focuses not on an epistemological subject-object distinction but, rather, on an ontological-
existential hermeneutics. The accent is posed on a return to the ‘human being’ in itself within 
itself. Ergo, everything, including climate, becomes part of the essential structure of the 













III. NINGEN AND SOCIETY 
The Influence of Marxism in the 1930s  
 
Le scientisme est un cas particulier de l’aliénation 
ou de l’objectivation qui prive l’homme de sa 
réalité humaine et fait qu’il se confond avec les 
choses.83 
      
 
The 1920s were the period when Marxism philosophically and politically flourished in 
Japan. Philosophically, its influence was felt in the numerous ronsō, or ‘intellectual debates’, 
that were being published in different journals. Politically, it was concretized in the advent of 
a new wave of Marxist followers affiliated with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), first 
under the leadership of Yamakawa Hitoshi (1880-1958) and then Fukumoto Kazuo (1894-
1983). 
The role of Marxist philosophy is particularly important in the development of the 
concept of the human being both for Miki and Watsuji. As a matter of fact, it is with the 
introduction of Marxism that the shift from the historicizing of the mere human existence 
towards a historicizing of ‘society’ as a whole took place. Moreover, the teleological view of 
history that underpins Marxist philosophy had a great impact on the Japanese intellectuals of 
the time, since it provided a new theoretical framework for the writing of Japanese history. 
Thus, the topics of capitalist modernity, modernization and ‘Westernization’ began to be 
interpreted in different ways. For the Marxists, Marxism represented a tangible gateway from 
the conundrum ‘feudalism-capitalist development’ Japanese society was struggling with. The 
conservatives, on the other hand, saw Marxism as a real danger to the status quo that needed 
to be suppressed.  
Miki and Watsuji reacted to these new intellectual trends in opposite ways. Miki 
remained fascinated with the ideas of ‘historical materialism’, ‘class struggle’, and ‘ideology’ 
and he made an attempt to create a Marxist ‘third way’, which synthesised existentialism and 
materialism together. Watsuji engaged in a philosophical discussion with the intellectual 
Kawakami Hajime (1879-1946) over the significance of historical and dialectical materialism 
and denied the social and political value of Marxist ideas.84  
In this chapter I will show how Miki tried to create his ‘third way’ by conflating the 
philosophy of Pascal and Heidegger with Marxist materialism and how Miki’s theory of the 
                                                 
83 Merleau-Ponty 1963: 224.  




human being as median prevented him from thoroughly understanding the concept of ‘class’ 
in Marxist philosophy. As a matter of fact, Miki still defines his ningen as ‘medianic 
existence’, where the totality and infinity of the Pascalian period will be substituted by logos 
and ideology. The human being, constrained between these two polarizing elements, will not 
be able to overcome them even in the context of the Marxist teleology of history. In addition, 
Miki’s effort to reconcile religion and Marxism will naturally continue the discourse on the 
‘religion of the human being’ begun in Pascal. Thus, medianity and religion will be 
considered as the two major factors that, on the one hand, produced a highly original 
interpretation of Marxism but that, on the other, practically baulked the creation of a Marxist 
theory tout court. As for Watsuji, Marxism could not but represent a threat to his definition of 
the human being as betweeness in his Japanese, harmonious society. As we shall see, Watsuji 
widely criticized the Marxist economic outlook on society because it eschewed the problems 
of societal ethics and morality. Furthermore, since in Watsuji the state represents the highest 
ethical and social structure, it was impossible for him to accept Marxism as a feasible political 
and social theory.  
 Although it might seem that Miki and Watsuji parted completely at this point in time, 
which partially corresponds to the truth, I attempt to show how this phase prepares the ground 
for the next stage of their careers. As a matter of fact, the leap from human existence to 
historical society ties the previous elaborations on the mere human being to its ‘historical’ 
role in society. In the next stage, with the introduction of philosophy of history, this society 
will become the nation and, in particular, the Japanese nation. Miki and Watsuji’s constant 
concern in their entire philosophical systems remains the human being and its historical 














Marxism in Japan 
Miki Kiyoshi, Tosaka Jun, Fukumoto Kazuo, Hani Gorō and others all belonged to the 
second generation of Japanese Marxists. The first generation, embodied in the figures of 
Yamakawa Hitoshi, Ōsugi Sakae (1885-1923), Arahata Kanson (1887-1981) and, to some 
extent, Kawakami Hajime, was still bound to the Taishō liberals’ idea of minponshugi. These 
latter intellectuals were more oriented towards socialism and liberalism and they were not 
acquainted with the writings of Lenin, which were translated in Japanese only in 1921 (Duus 
and Schneider 1998: 182-3).  As we shall see later, Kawakami represents an exception since 
his views on Marxism underwent a deep rethinking after 1924, when Fukumoto harshly 
criticized his theories on economics.  
The JCP was funded in 1922 under the leadership of Yamakawa and his ideas of the 
‘change in direction’ (hōhō tenkan) (Miyakawa 1976: 55).85 The change towards a more 
radical proletarian revolution by the socialist-oriented intelligentsia signalled Yamakawa’s 
own shift from a Meiji-style liberalism towards a clear Marxist revolutionary attitude (Duus 
and Schneider 1998: 195-6). The ‘draft plan’ (kōryō sōan) of Yamakawaism aimed at 
criticizing the anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists for having departed from the masses and to 
return, by means of the ‘change in direction’, to a ‘massification’ of the Japanese 
revolutionary movement (Miyakawa 1976: 57). Under the leadership of Yamakawa, the JCP 
found itself under attack from the Soviet Comintern later in 1922, which judged Japan as still 
backward and in need of a two-stage revolution due to the residuum of feudal elements 
lingering in its system (Hoston 1986: 65).  
In 1926, Fukumoto Kazuo, upon his return from Germany, addressed a number of 
attacks at Yamakawa’s Change in Direction. In Germany, Fukumoto had studied Marx and 
Lenin and had become acquainted with the recently published works of Georg Lukács (1885-
1971), Karl Korsch (1886-1961) and Rosa Luxemburg (1870-1919) (Duus and Schneider 
1998: 198-205). He had built his theoretical basis directly on Lenin’s writings and he was at 
that time considered the most prominent intellectual in dialectical materialism, having 
introduced in Japan the difference between historical and dialectical materialism (Bernstein 
1976: 135). His critique of Yamakawa was Lenin-oriented and aimed at stressing the role of 
the vanguard as an elite capable of guiding the proletarian revolution (Hoston 1986: 49).86 
Through this vanguard, the proletariat would have gained a sufficient class consciousness 
                                                 
85 The full title of Yamakawa’s article is: ‘The Change in Direction of the Proletarian Movement’ (Musan kaikyū 
undō no hōhō tenkan), written in 1922 (Iwasaki 1971: 30). 
86 Yamakawa had rejected the idea of an intellectual leadership of the proletariat and he had theorized that some 




capable of fulfilling the tasks of the revolution. 87 Unfortunately, in 1927, the Comintern 
published the infamous ‘Theses on the Japan problem’, where it judged Japan as still a semi-
feudal state and called for the abolition of the emperor system in order to start the revolution 
against the bourgeois state (Hoston 1986: 61). Both Fukumotism and Yamakawism were 
condemned on the basis of a lack of action, abstractness and for being over-theoretical 
(Miyakawa 1976: 60). Fukumoto was subsequently expelled from the JCP and replaced by 
Watanabe Masanosuke. 
Despite his expulsion from the party, the influence of Fukumoto Kazuo on the next 
generations of Japanese Marxists should not be underestimated. As Duus and Schneider point 
out, Fukumoto had the merit of having taken the JCP to a theoretical level that was one of the 
highest at that time (Duus and Schneider 1998: 201). He thus introduced ‘Marxist philosophy’ 
to the Japanese intelligentsia, forcing leading intellectuals such as Kawakami to revise their 
previous ideas regarding Marxism (Iwasaki 1971: 12-3). The new ‘humanistic’ side of 
Marxism introduced by Fukumoto through the readings of Lukács, Korsch and Luxemburg 
strongly appealed to the sensibility of the young Marxists such as Miki Kiyoshi and Tosaka 
Jun.  
It is in this historical situation of ‘love and hate’ of Marxism that Miki and Watsuji’s 
works have to be read. From my point of view, the new ‘humanistic’ trend in Marxist 
philosophy proved to be a powerful tool in Miki’s hands. It allowed him to bridge his 
previous existentialist and religious writings, such as Pascal, with his new fascination with 
historical materialism and class struggle. This lead to a new interpretation of Marxism which, 
I believe, it is still not fully appreciated today. On the contrary, the depth of Marxist 
theorizations and the scarecrow of a Communist revolution prompted Watsuji to take action 







                                                 
87 The term ‘intellectual’ in Lenin’s thought does not have a positive connotation. It should be substituted by the 
expression ‘hegemony of the party’, since it is the party that represents the class consciousnessof the proletariat 
even if completely detached from what the actual proletarian class is. The party functions as a sovra-
consciousness that knows what the future of the proletarians ought to be and in which direction it should be 
pointed at. In his view of the party, intellectuals and workers would have formed a single leadership, after the 




Watsuji and Marxism 
In 1926, in the aftermath of the Kyoto University incident, Watsuji wrote his first 
public critique of Marxism. This incident involved a group of thirty-eight students belonging 
to the Social Sciences Study Group, who were arrested and charged with the accusation of 
being supporters of the JCP (Bernstein 1976: 141). Watsuji’s first article appeared in the 
Kyoto University Newspaper in October 1926 and was entitled My Impressions on the 
Incident of the Students’ Arrest (Gakusei kenkyo jiken shokan).88 Kawakami, who was then 
professor at the university, engaged in a written dialogue with Watsuji right after the 
publication of this piece.  
Kawakami was still struggling with Marxist philosophy at that time. His initial ideas 
regarding the reform of Japanese society were characterized by a strong moral trait, which 
included the eradication of poverty through the voluntary renouncement of luxury by the rich 
(Yagi 2007: 4).89 He also saw the involvement of the individual in the social revolution as a 
voluntary gesture driven by moral revolution, a step towards the improving of society. Most 
importantly, Kawakami affirmed that the ‘value’ in Marxist theory had to be extended to the 
whole humankind rather than to a single individual, therefore de-historicizing the process of 
production and basing it on an eternal concept that overlooked the emergence of surplus value 
and exploitation. It was his own student Kushida Tamizō (1885-1984) who first criticized him 
for his moral approach to economy and for been heavily influenced by idealism rather than 
materialism (Yagi 2007: 9-10). Kushida highlighted how this idealist bias was the 
fundamental cause of Kawakami’s misunderstanding of the theory of labour and surplus value. 
On the other hand, Fukumoto attacked Kawakami on the basis of his new theory on 
consciousness and totality that he had learnt from his studies in Germany. By introducing the 
concept of class consciousness, Fukumoto was clearly aiming at criticizing Kawakami’s 
moralistic standpoint and accent on humankind. Fukumoto’s criticism, together with 
Kushida’s, made Kawakami rethink his own interpretation of Marxism. In fact, in 1926, he 
started writing on the concepts of class and on the contradictions that arose when dividing 
society according to class consciousness (Yagi 2007: 22). Despite his deepening knowledge 
of Marx’s Das Kapital and other writings, Kawakami’s moral trait always occupied an 
important position in his thought. 
                                                 
88 Now in WTZ XVII: 420-3. Quotations are from the Collected Works. 
89 Yagi Kiichirō’s article Emergence of Marxian Scholarship in Japan: Kawakami Hajime and his Two Critics 
was originally published in the journal Rekishi to Keizai in 2007. Quotations here are from the online version 




It is in this context that the dialogue between Kawakami and Watsuji has to be 
considered.90 In his first piece, Watsuji starts out by harshly condemning the students for 
having followed a ‘fantasy of youth’ (seinen rashii kūsō) fomented by a mere strategy of 
terror comparable to the violence against the Koreans in the aftermath of the Kantō 
earthquake in 1923 (WTZ XVII: 420). To him, the reason for the call of violence has to be 
traced back to Marx’s books (WTZ XVII: 421). Nevertheless, Watsuji does not question the 
utility of the teaching of social sciences per se at universities. What he questions is the 
outcome this kind of education could have, namely to foment ‘class struggle’ as if the 
students should become devotees of the Russian Revolution (WTZ XVII: 422-3).  
Kawakami immediately replied to Watsuji’s article from the pages of the journal he 
had founded, Shakai Mondai Kenkyū. Kawakami’s approach to Watsuji’s ideas is clearly from 
the standpoint of a Marxist academic. Kawakami describes Watsuji’s language as 
‘ambiguous’ (aimai) and his comparison between the Tokyo and the Kyoto riots as 
‘uncertain’ (bimyō) (KHZ XVII: 97-99). He is thus reaffirming the right of students to study 
dialectical materialism at university. Kawakami thinks that Watsuji is only a follower of 
Yoshino’s minponshugi, whilst, in his opinion, Japanese society cannot be renovated as it is in 
that historical time through the legality of laws. Instead, he sees the study of the Russian 
Revolution like a physician who is studying new treatments for a sick patient, which therefore 
requires continuous experiments and trials in order to attain the right remedy (KHZ XVII: 
107-11). Kawakami affirms: 
Social sciences, as sciences of the truth, wave the sharp scalpel at the 
real, living society; they flip the skin of the different phenomena 
where the truth is hidden; they have to reveal the source of the disease 
underneath the internal connections. There lies the task of physiology 
and, most importantly, from the basis of the fundamental theories of 
physiology, general clinical pathology has emerged 
      (KHZ XVII: 109) 
 
In their continuing exchange, Watsuji defends himself by affirming that he is not 
against the study of Leninism but, rather, against the ‘blind adoration for Leninism and the 
Russian Revolution’ (Leninshugi naishi Rossia kakumei ni mōmokutekini shinsui suru mono) 
(WTZ XVII: 428). His main point is to ask why dialectical materialists interpret dialectics as 
                                                 
90 The other three articles are: On the Incident of the Students’ Arrest. Addressing Watsuji Tetsurō (Gakusei 
kenkyo jiken ni tsuite. Watsuji Tetsurō ni yosu), published in Shakai Mondai Kenkyū in November 1926; A 
Response to Kawakami Hajime (Kawakami Hajime hakushi ni kotau), originally published in Shakai Mondai 
Kenkyū in December 1926 and My Considerations on Watsuji Tetsurō’s Featured Article (Watsuji Tetsurō shi 
yori no kisho narabini kore ni tai suru Watakushi no kansō) published in Shakai Mondai Kenkyū in January 1927. 
Now they are all included, respectively, in KHZ XVII: 93-114, WTZ XVII: 424-44 and KHZ XVII: 371-97. All 




a ‘change’, when it is not clear what dialectics is developing towards. He dismisses Marx’s 
‘materialism’ as “labelling ‘thing’ what before did not have a meaning [in Hegel]” (WTZ 
XVII: 429). Therefore the task of explaining the contradictions arising in the material life of 
the human beings has to be fulfilled by theory and not by materialism. Watsuji continues: 
Employing dialectical materialism as a weapon for the class struggle, 
meaning that dialectical materialism becomes the class science 
(kaikyūteki gakumon) of the proletariat, isn’t it equal to affirming that 
the proletarian existence is necessarily a product of dialectical 
materialism? 
    (WTZ XVII: 430-1; emphasis in the original) 
 
Here Watusji sees dialectical materialism as a powerful weapon that could destroy the 
established social relations and this worry is strictly linked to his outlook on the formation of 
society. In fact, he interprets the flourishing of dialectical materialism as the source of the 
establishment of ‘classes’ as a whole. In his view, this entails that, if it had not been for 
Marxist philosophy, class struggle would not have emerged in Japan. Watsuji tends to 
overlook the fact that, historically, there was already a class of exploited workers in Japan. 
Marxist intellectuals were the ones who tried to give voice to this proletariat and ask for more 
social justice. Nevertheless, they were certainly a threat to the status quo and to Watsuji’s 
ideas of harmony and inter-relationality. This is the reason why he affirms that the reform of 
society can be attained only through a dialectics of the will and an idealist path (WTZ XVII: 
433). Thus, the Russian Revolution should be taught and studied as historical facts not as an 
‘experiment’. If the ‘fundamental principle’ (konpontekina genin) of the socialist doctrine is 
the sacrifice of the people, Watsuji argues, then it means that there is a fundamental 
contradiction immanent in ‘humanity’ (ningensei), because no structure should require the 
death of its own foundation (WTZ XVII: 437).  
Kawakami did not appreciate Watsuji’s second response and, in January 1927, he 
published the last article of the debate. He quotes that there is no ‘blind love’ for Leninism 
and for the Russian Revolution. Rather, what Watsuji calls love is only scientific behaviour 
(KHZ XVII: 380). Thus, he accuses Watsuji of having confused the student riots with the 
teaching of Marxist dialectics. In a hasty comment, Kawakami affirms that laws could as well 
have clauses which are not always beneficial for society. Kawakami still could not explain 
whether Watsuji, despite being a philosopher and an ethicist, is implying something higher 
that goes beyond the sovereignty of the laws and whether he is not considering the state, or 




Kawakami and Watsuji are discussing the topic from two different standpoints. First 
of all, Kawakami is trying to defend his position as a teacher of Marxist philosophy, while, on 
the other hand, Watsuji looks at the situation as a conservative thinker. Their views partly 
coincide on the effect the incidents had, namely questioning the infiltration of violent 
doctrines inside the university campus, which clearly put Kawakami in a controversial 
position. Kawakami does not have a powerful line of argumentation, besides when he rightly 
highlights the fact that Watsuji could have favoured the creation of a Hegelian modelled state. 
Watsuji had not changed his ideas since 1919, the year of the publication of his Two Ways of 
Breeding Democracy, where he argued that the socialist ideas could help reforming the state 
system. Eight years later, after the grant of the universal suffrage, Watsuji is still talking about 
the ‘respect of the laws’ and in this sentence Kawakami immediately glimpses the legacy of 
Yoshino’s minponshugi. On a philosophical level, Watsuji is more active than Kawakami, 
with the references to Hegel and idealist dialectics. Concerning the ‘fundamental principle’ of 
society mentioned by Kawakami, Watsuji is quick to dismiss it as a non-sense. In Watsuji’s 
eyes, if the human being as ningen is a fundamental component of society and, in return, 
society is quintessential for the dialectical movement of human existence, it follows that the 
sacrifice of one or more components for the sake of ‘research’ is absolutely out of question. 
Kawakami is not clear regarding where his dialectics are aiming towards. For Kawakami, 
everything is a question of ‘trial and error’ and the weak point of his reply is the fact he 
cannot give shape to what kind of society he is foreseeing for Japan.  
There is a commonality between the two thinkers that, I believe, could be explained by 
looking at their intellectual background. Fundamentally, Kawakami’s idea of a moral 
revolution, although it changed in the course of his career, is not that distant from Watsuji’s 
idea of a harmonious society based on morality and ethics. Kushida’s critique of Kawakami 
also addressed this point, because he saw that, by posing the accent on the ‘morality’ of a 
social revolution, Kawakami could have implied a positive relationship between capital and 
labour (Yagi 2007: 11). Watsuji and Kawakami were both concerned with societal welfare 
and improvement. The difference between them lies, most of all, in the way they approached 
society as a whole. Whilst Kawakami embraced the social principles of Marxism to some 
extent, Watsuji despised them. Secondly, it is arguable that Watsuji’s considerations on the 
role of democracy here, if compared to Climate or Study of Ethics, were undergoing a period 
of transition. It is possible that the impact Marxism had on Watsuji made him rethink his 
previous theories on the implementation of democracy in Japan. Therefore, this dialogue 




democracy nor Communism were suitable forms of government. The dialogue with 
Kawakami thus occupies a middle position in the development of Watsuji’s thought from the 
1920s to the 1930s. 
Miki as well had criticized Kawakami’s theory on dialectics in 1929, with the article 
Dialectics and its Vulgarization (Benshōhō to sono zokuryūka).91 In this piece, Miki draws 
most of his arguments and conclusions from Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest Stage of 
Capitalism (1916 ) and argues against those who do not see dialectics as logic of development. 
Since imperialism reveals the highest stage of capitalism, he continues, the logic of 
continuation and development that underpins both needs to be dialectical (MKZ X: 61). He 
furthermore explains that the difference between Marxist dialectics and Hegelian idealism is 
that, in Marx, there is a ‘qualitative’ change as the development from feudalism to capitalism 
evidently shows. The vulgar materialists do not realize that the historical development is 
concentrated in the society of ‘now’ (MKZ X: 63). Miki thus engages in an indirect dialogue 
with Kawakami, using Kawakami’s theorizations on dialectics to reveal what dialectics is not. 
For example, Kawakami used the example of the kimono and the kid: once the kid grows, the 
old kimono would not fit him anymore and affirmed that this instance particularly reflected 
the dialectical process. Instead, Miki argues that this is exactly what the vulgar materialists 
are doing, that there could never be a ‘dialectics’ between those two because the kimono is in 
an ‘external’ relation to the kid. The change is ‘quantitative’ and not qualitative. The 
dialectical development of capitalism is completely different, given the fact that capitalism 
sublates itself into imperialism by means of their internal relation (MKZ X: 64-7). Yet, Miki 
affirms that Kawakami is creating a ‘formal logic’ because the universal he is describing is 
nothing else than an abstraction of reality, the contrary of what Marx was preaching. If the 
truth is the concrete universal, Miki says, then a relationship between a formal universal and 
its particular could never take place (MKZ X: 69-74). ‘Only the particular which lies in the 
self-aware universal is a true particular’ (MKZ X: 75).  
Kawakami appears to be the objective of criticism both for Miki and Watsuji. On the 
one hand, Watsuji regarded Kawakami’s struggle to defend the teaching of social sciences as 
a possible threat to the structure of society. Despite the fact that Kawakami’s system was 
fundamentally underpinned by a moral and humanistic trait, the method he employed did not 
resemble the one that Miki or Watsuji used for their elaboration of ningen. Even the Marxists 
could not approve of his apparent misunderstanding of the relationship between capital and 
                                                 




surplus value. Nevertheless, Miki and Watsuji, given their intellectual and political 
differences,  put forward two separate kinds of criticism against Kawakami. On the one hand, 
Watsuji’s creation of a society characterized by harmony and by the absence of social conflict 
aimed at downplaying the role of Marxist philosophy. On the other hand, through his reading 
of Lenin, Miki judged Kawakami’s Marxism as being still a form of Hegelian idealism, 
therefore entailing that Kawakami had not fully understood the relevance of materialist 






Miki Kiyoshi’s ‘Humanistic’ Marxism 
Between 1928 and 1929 Miki  was involved, together with Hani Gorō and Kobayashi 
Isamu, in the establishment of the Marxism-inspired journal Under the Banner of New 
Science (Shinkō kagaku no hata no moto ni) (Doak 1998: 234 ff).92 Miki and Hani later joined 
the Proletariat Science Research Group, until Miki was attacked by the Marxist historian 
Hattori Shisō (1901-1956) and was forced to resign from the association (Doak 1998: 248). In 
this journal, Miki published several articles on different subjects, such as Criticism of Natural 
Sciences, (Kagaku hihan no kadai, 1928), Dialectics and the Organicistic Theory (Yūkitaisei 
to benshōhō, 1928), and Materialism and Its Real Form (Yuibutsuron to sono genjitsu keitai, 
1928). 
According to many critics, Miki cannot be considered a Marxist tout court (Uchida 
2004: 211; Hattori 1997: 197; Akamatsu 1994a: 166; Maruyama 1998: 164 and, to some 
extent, Iwasaki 1971: 142). Rather, most of them agree on defining his methodology as 
‘hermeneutical’, ‘anthropological’ or even as a kind of ‘hermeneutical existentialism’. In fact, 
none of them ever addresses Miki as a ‘dialectical materialist’, but they rather highlight the 
influence that existentialism was still exercising on Miki’s ideas. Since Miki’s object of 
inquiry was the ‘human being’ in existential terms, it was almost natural to him to transpose it 
in a Marxist context where the proletariat as a ‘human class’ (Miki’s new ningen) took up a 
leading role amidst the deep changes Japanese society was undergoing in that period.  
In some way Miki’s ideas could remind us of the debate between Maurice Merleau-
Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre on the role of existentialism and Marxism in France in the 1960s, 
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where there was a need for a refreshing wind in Marxist studies and the necessity to combine 
it with the existentialist thought on the role of the human being (see Merleau-Ponty 1963; 
Sartre 1960). My aim here is not to compare what Miki wrote in the late 1920s with the works 
of the two French philosophers, who had certainly never read him. What I would rather point 
out is the fact that in Europe these ideas gradually returned to the surface with impetus in the 
1960s, especially in 1967 with the republication of Georg Lukács’ 1922’s masterpiece History 
and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics which featured a new preface by the 
author himself (Lukács 1971: ix-xxxix).  
The impact of Lukács on Miki’s philosophy is undoubtedly important, although there 
is no clear indication that Miki had read this book prior to his fascination with Marxist 
philosophy.93 Nevertheless, Fukumoto had been involved in spreading Lukács’ ideas in Japan 
upon his return from Germany. This hints at the fact that Japanese intellectuals might have 
been acquainted with his work. The similarities between Lukács and Miki touch upon 
different aspects of their philosophies, in primis the ideas of totality, reification and class 
consciousness. Before focussing on their relationship, it is necessary to explain how Miki 
took his first steps into Marxist philosophy.  
In 1928, Miki published the volume Historical Materialism and the Present-day 
Consciousness (Yuibutsushikan to gendai no ishiki), which had been previously serialized in 
the journal Shisō in 1927.94 The piece The Marxist Form of Anthropology (Ningengaku no 
marukusuteki keitai) is particularly important and it stands as a corner stone in the formation 
of the ‘third way’. In fact, it is here for the first time that the concept of ‘basic experience’ as 
part of the three-fold theory of the ‘basic-experience, anthropology, ideology’ appears. Miki 
distinguishes between two kinds of ‘experience’, the ‘ordinary experience’ of our daily life 
and the ‘basic experience’. Ordinary experience is lead by the logos which, in turn, is 
produced and required by the deeper basic experience (MKZ III: 5). As previously expressed 
in Pascal, the quintessential particularity of this experience is the uncertain movement 
(fuanteki undō) at the basis of it (MKZ III: 6).  
                                                 
93 Uchida argues differently. He affirms that Miki had read Lukács book during his sojourn in Germany and that 
he made use (tsuyō) especially of the fourth chapter “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat” when 
he wrote his piece on Marxism and materialism (Uchida 2004: 218-9). I would not go insofar as saying that Miki 
had actually read Lukács’ book, since Miki never explicitly quotes or acknowledges his indebtedness to the 
Hungarian philosopher (contrary to most Japanese philosophers who tend not to quote their sources, Miki is 
generally very accurate). Having said that, I do think that Lukács had a great influence on Miki as I will explain 
in the chapter.  
94 Now in MKZ III: 1-156. The last piece of the collection, entitled Hegel and Marx (Hegeru to Marukusu), was 
apparently written anew for the publication of the articles in a volume in 1928 (see Kuno 1967: 524 and Miki’s 




The new definition is here given: 
The human being always finds itself in a negotiating relationship 
(kōshō kankei) with others. Because and in this relationship, existence 
becomes completely meaningful at its eyes. Thus, the significance of 
the undertaking of existence is, for first time, concretely determined 
by the mode of its negotiations 
        (MKZ III: 7) 
 
The particularity of the negotiating relationship is that it is coerced in its everyday 
form (MKZ III: 8). In addition, in the immediacy of experience anthropology comes into 
being, representing the ‘self-understanding’ (jiko ryōkai) of the human being. On the other 
hand, when the basic experience is mediated by the historical background and the 
philosophical consciousness it gives rise to ideology or ‘self-interpretation’ (jiko kaishaku). 
For this reason Miki argues that ideology represents a second kind of logos that belongs to the 
Geisteswissenschaften and he further defines it as the ‘common sphere’ (kyōdōken) (MKZ III: 
11-2). As seen here, anthropology is strictly related to the dynamism and the uncertainty of 
human existence, whilst, on the other hand, ideology takes the role of almost scientifically 
defining the changing of existence in history.  
Yet again, in his piece Hegel and Marx (Hegeru to Marukusu), Miki restates his 
theory of the relationship between first and second logos by saying: 
What I wish to call the ‘mode of existence’ (sonzai no moderu) is the 
establishment of ideology, which happens thanks to the medium of 
anthropology that allows the basic experience to be clarified in its 
specific structure 
       (MKZ III: 121) 
 
The particularity of every experience is determined by the way negotiations take place 
in human existence and it is, in itself, related to the specific historical period according to the  
‘scientific knowledge’ (gakumonteki ninshiki) of the given time (MKZ III: 121-3).  
The concept of anthropology is very important in Miki, as seen before in his study of 
Pascal. Whilst reading Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach, Miki affirms: ‘In Marxism, 
anthropology leads the basic experience of the proletariat’ (MKZ III: 29). Yet again, always 
in regard to the Marxist understanding of the human being, Miki appreciates Feuerbach 
recognition of the importance of human experience. Nonetheless, he subsequently criticizes 
him for having failed to see that his idea of anthropology was still linked to a critique of 
religion (MKZ III: 26). In line with Marx’s critique of Feuerbach (see Theses on Feuerbach, 




The evolutionary process in which the basic experience of the 
proletariat was living sank into the contradictions of Feuerbach’s 
anthropology. At that point, the necessary change that was taking 
place in anthropology was only fully grasped by Marx 
(MKZ III: 29) 
 
Most importantly: ‘Since the proletariat exercises his influence on the world primarily 
through practice, it grasps the self-essence as praxis precisely in the negotiating process’ 
(MKZ III: 30; emphasis added). Practice is related to ‘labour’ (rōdō) and ‘sensuousness’ 
(kansei) as described by Marx in the fifth thesis. 95 In the practical process of dialectical 
exchange with nature, the human essence modifies as much as nature does (MKZ III: 32).96 
To Miki, nature therefore does not have to be seen as in opposition to the human being, but 
rather in the wider context of the dynamics of the world where man historically develops 
(MKZ III: 33-4). It is precisely at this point, where the historicity of the human being is 
defined, that Marxist historical materialism takes the shape of the fundamental moment of 
anthropology and ideology coming together (MKZ III: 38). The present consciousness is the 
realization of unity between the leading basic experience of the proletariat together with all 
the present currents of thought (MKZ III: 37). This creates the starting point of reality 
(genjitsu no shuppatsu ten) where the public sphere becomes our present-day consciousness 
(MKZ III: 220).97  
Miki seems to employ standard Marxist terminology when he describes labour, 
sensuousness, proletariat, materialism. Nevertheless, Miki never defines what his idea of 
‘proletariat’ essentially stands for. He only uses the words puroretaria or, interchangeably, 
musansha.98 Rather, his definition of the proletarian class is always referred to as being in 
relation to something else. For example: 
Labour fundamentally defines the basic structure of the proletariat.  
The proletariat negotiates and exists through this form of negotiation 
                                                 
95 ‘Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants contemplation; but he does not conceive sensuousness 
as practical, human-sensuous activity’ (Marx 1970: V). 
96 This concept is originally expressed in Marx’s Das Kapital. 
97 In The Basic Concept of Hermeneutical Phenomenology (Kaishakugakuteki genshōgaku no kiso gainen), 
published in Shisō in January 1927. Now in MKZ III: 186-220. 
98 As Uchida points out, Miki could refer to the class of toilers that, at that time, started becoming mere paid 
workers and were therefore separated from the land (Uchida 2004: 216). Uchida situates this phenomenon in the 
period of the ‘rentier-state capitalism’ (jinushikokka shinhonshugi) that remained a constant feature of the 
Japanese economy from the Meiji Restoration up until the end of WWII (Uchida 2004: 217). In Japan, this stage 
of the development of capitalism is as well described as ‘imperial rentier-state capitalism’, since the imperial 
family was at the top of the propertied class (Uchida 2004: 217). As pointed out before, the Comintern had 
labelled Japan as an ‘anomaly’ in the Far East, as a result of its mixed type of capitalism, which featured ancient 




that is characterized by sensuous praxis     
    (MKZ III: 45-6, emphasis in the original) 
 
Therefore, ‘labour’ becomes the most important feature of the proletariat because it 
represents an exchange with existence itself in a sensuous and material practice (MKZ III: 48). 
It is here that Miki gives his foremost definition of ‘materialism’ as a ‘hermeneutical concept’ 
(kaishakugakuteki gainen), which will attract the attention and the criticism of most Marxist 
thinkers of that time, including Tosaka Jun. 99 It is hermeneutical because it is in ‘material 
things’ that the human being self-interprets in the first place (MKZ III: 49). Labour represents 
the roots of the formation of concrete materialism and, since it takes place in the ‘production 
in society’ (shakai ni oite seisan), it requires for the human being to be in relation to the Thou 
of its negotiations (MKZ III: 50). ‘The possibility of the human being as a unity if I and Thou 
is for the first time established [in the unity of subject and object]’ (MKZ III: 50). The subject 
and the object are, like in Feuerbach, in a mutual dependence although they do not share the 
same essence, because, otherwise, they will reproduce the mechanisms of Hegelian idealism. 
Man is nothing without the object, says Feuerbach, because man would not be able to 
recognize himself unless he objectifies his own consciousness (Kolakowski I, 1978: 114-5). 
What happens in religion is the fact the objectification of consciousness becomes religious 
mystification (Kolakowski I, 1978: 116). As Furihata underlines, the basic problem of Miki’s 
interpretation of ‘the basic experience of the proletariat’ is exactly this inter-relationality of 
the I and Thou (Furihata 1969: 55). As a matter of fact, if Miki had to be a traditional 
dialectical materialist, he would have seen the basic experience as objectified. Instead, Miki 
re-defines the limits of it by making it inter-subjective in a manner that it is easily spotted as 
of Heideggerian matrix. Again, Furihata sees in this shift and in the lack of a socio-
economical analysis of history a path leading more towards idealism rather than materialism 
(Furihata 1969: 56).  
The accent on the I-Thou relationship, the lack of a clear definition of the proletariat in 
economic terms and the accent on anthropology lead the reader to believe that Miki’s 
interpretation of materialism is flawed if looked at from an economical perspective. What 
Miki sees as anthropology is Feuerbach’s anthropology as centred on the human being. In the 
introduction of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx says: ‘To begin 
                                                 
99 Tosaka writes of Miki: ‘[…] Miki’s Marxist philosophy of that time was not a philosophy, it was nothing else 
than historical materialism (and therefore it continued negating the dialectics of nature). Moreover, that historical 
materialism, in reality, was not materialism, but only a philosophy of history’ (TJZ V: 106), in Miki Kiyoshi shi 
to Miki tetsugaku (Miki Kiyoshi and Miki Philosophy) written in 1936. Now included in Tosaka Jun Collected 




with, the question under discussion is material production. Individuals producing in a society, 
and hence the socially determined production of individuals, is of course the point of 
departure’ (Marx 1970: 1; emphasis in the original). As we can see, this is almost what Miki 
wrote in his piece aforementioned. The problem is that Marx traces material production back 
to the emergence of bourgeois society in economical terms. Miki only seems to be interested 
in the role of the human being and of society in this process. Miki does talk about the 
bourgeois state and ideology but in an abstract way.  
Miki’s innovations in the field of Marxism materialism part from the main ‘scientific’ 
trend that was very popular in Japan at that time. As seen before, even Kawakami’s example 
of the physician and the experiment portrays what could be called ‘scientific Marxism’. 
Miki’s elaborations of a more ‘humanistic’ Marxism were not understood at that time and, in 
the late 1920s, they sparked an outpouring of criticism from the orthodox Marxists. In the 
same period, the Hungarian philosopher Georg Lukács was being attacked by the Stalinists 
for his theory of ‘totality’ that established a direct link between Hegel and Marx (Kolakowski 
III: 254). Influenced by Hegel and Dilthey (as Miki was), Lukács made ‘totality’ one of his 
pivotal concepts:  
Thus the objective forms of all social phenomena change constantly in 
the course of their ceaseless dialectical interactions with each other. 
[…] this is why only the dialectical conception of totality can enable 
us to understand reality as a social process 
     (Lukács 1971: 13; emphasis in the original) 
 
Lukács wrote in favour of a unity of theory and practice and affirmed that reality 
would reach consciousness only in the unity of the two (Lukács 1971: 2). The proletariat as a 
‘class’ was the subject and object of knowledge, in the moment when it realized that it was 
only due to the bourgeois ideology that the subject and the object were mutually dependable. 
Lukács moreover argued that reality as a social process could be only understood through a 
dialectical conception of reality, which was rooted in the ‘totality’: 
The totality of an object can be posited if the positing subject is itself a 
totality; and if the subject wishes to understand itself, it must conceive 
of the object as a totality. In modern society only the classes can 
represent this total point of view 
    (Lukács 1971: 28; emphasis in the original) 
 
The methodology implied by Lukács is ‘orthodoxy’, which, to him, meant only the 
method of materialist dialectics (Lukács 1971: 1). This method was the product of the class 
struggle and, with the evolution of the proletariat, it would have eventually proved to be the 




dialectics resided in its relation to the whole and historical knowledge would have become 
possible solely when the ruling class would have ceased to exist (Lukács 1971: 14 ff). As 
Kolakowski highlights, the Lukácsian idea of totality implies the immediacy of past, present 
and future in itself, making it therefore a ‘foreseeing’ whole in the historical development 
(Kolakowski III, 1978: 266).  
In Miki, Lukács’ influence becomes clear in the second part of Marxism and 
Materialism (Marukusu-shugi to yuibutsuron). 100  Here concepts such as dialectical unity, 
alienation of the consciousness of the proletariat and commodification of human relationships 
appear in a new light.  
Regarding the problem of consciousness, Miki explains: 
Because the human being is a reciprocal negotiation in the societal 
production, a new phenomenon here emerges. It is the burying of 
consciousness 
    (MKZ III: 52, emphasis in the original) 
 
The problem of consciousness is definitely not a recent philosophical question. The 
difference, Miki highlights, is how consciousness was perceived from Augustine on. The 
point of view changed with the advent of Marxism that made consciousness aware of its own 
contradictions and aimed at solving them in this historical period (MKZ III: 54-5). To Miki 
language is ‘the real consciousness of the unity in society’ (MKZ III: 56). As Marx said in 
The German Ideology: 
Language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, 
of intercourse with other men. […] man’s consciousness of the 
necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the 
beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all 
       (Marx 1970: 74) 
 
So, to Miki, Marx’s definition of language is directly linked to Aristotle’s definition of 
the ‘zoon politikón’ and the ‘zoon logastikón’, and it is reflected in the awhileness (bon’yosei, 
Jeweiligkeit) and neutrality (chūwasei) of our existence. 101  Contrary to what Miki had 
previously expressed in Pascal, meaning that the three-fold logos proved to be, in the 
Heideggerian interpretation, the fundamental deception of human existence, here he links the 
neutrality of existence to the introduction of commodities (MKZ III: 60).102 The logos used to 
                                                 
100 Originally published in Shisō in September 1927. Now included in Historical Materialism and the Present-
day Consciousness.  
101 Jeweiligkeit is a Heideggerian term. It could be defined as the temporal particularity and unique finitude of 
the Dasein. Jeweilig is an adverb meaning ‘from time to time’ or ‘accordingly’ (Kisiel 1993: 425-6).  




provide the ‘particularity’ to each existence but, in the modern age, commodities and 
production have taken over, burying the consciousness of the human being (MKZ III: 60). 
‘The particularity of the capitalist society is the fact that the relativeness of existence has 
reached completion in this kind of self-alienation (jiko sogai)’ (MKZ III: 63). The concepts of 
‘reification’ and ‘commodification’ of the human existence are explained by Miki on the basis 
that not only labour has been commodified after the advent of the modern age, but even 
relationships have become a kind of ‘intra-goods’ relationships (MKZ III: 62). The proletariat 
becomes thus a product of its own labour by being alienated by commodities themselves. It is 
the ‘self-alienation of the human being’ (ningen no jiko sogai; die menschliche 
Selbstentfremdung) that leads to the transformation of the logos into ideology, which thus 
oppresses humanity (MKZ III: 63-6).  
It would be interesting here to highlight the description Lukács gave of reification. In 
his system, reification (Verdinglichung) is an evolution of what Marx had called the 
‘commodity fetishism’ (Fetischcharakter der Ware). On the object level, reification 
represents the laws of the market that exercise their power on the commodities, alienating 
man through the exercise of this external power. On the subjective level, these laws work on 
man’s activities, which become themselves commodities, including man’s labour. Reification 
thus means the ‘abstraction of human labour that makes commodities universal’ (Lukács 
1971: 91). Lukács thought that these reified relations had become the normal relation, and that 
our consciousness could not distinguish anymore between natural and reified laws. The 
development of capitalistic societies, therefore, subjected the human being to artificial laws 
that alienated consciousness thanks to the abstraction and alienation of human relationships 
(Lukács 1971: 128 ff). The solution Lukács proposed was for the proletariat to overcome the 
‘immediacy’ of the bourgeois thought and, instead, to find the ‘mediation’ that would have 
uncovered the reified laws and helped the proletariat re-appropriating its consciousness 
(Lukács 1971: 164 ff). Reification could be destroyed, Lukács said: 
only by constant and constantly renewed efforts to disrupt the reified 
structure of existence by concretely relating to the concretely 
manifested contradictions of the total development, by becoming 
conscious of the immanent meanings of these contradictions for the 
total development 
    (Lukács 1971: 197, emphasis in the original) 
To Miki, the estrangement of consciousness from the reification process could be 
solved by the dialectical unity between the philosophical analysis of reality and the praxis 




Marxism reaches the peak of the possibility (genjitsusei) in the 
dialectical unity between theory and practice […] The human being, 
in its material and spiritual whole, has just started glowing in its 
totality (zentaisei ni oite kagayaki hajimeru) 
(MKZ III: 73-6) 
 
The difference between Miki and Lukács is that, to Lukács, classes are the point of 
view of totality that enables us to understand reality as a social process (Lukács 1971: 13). 
Instead, Miki discards the totality that Lukács foresees for the proletariat from its basis: class. 
Miki sees the proletariat as a community of human beings. Miki’s musansha is a societal 
component abstracted from the socio-economical context and normatized as in a theory of 
values. What before was created by language, meaning the deception of human existence, is 
now transposed in the Marxist philosophical context. Miki envisioned a new ‘class’ 
consciousness in Lukácsian terms but, nevertheless, he complemented it with the 
Heideggerian idea of the authenticity of the Dasein. Therefore, the solution to the reification 
of consciousness does not presupposes anymore the existence of the proletarian class per se 
but, rather, it has to be found in the context of a totality striving for an authentic existence. 
The process of this development is similar to Watsuji, although they reached a 
different outcome. They both refused an economical analysis of society and they both stressed 
the importance of the community. Yet, Watsuji’s national community had already been 
established as such by the time he engaged with Marxism, whilst Miki just hinted at the fact 
that society was slowly becoming the focus of his meditations. In this context, the uprising 
that Marxism calls for in the form of the Communist revolution is not present in Miki’s 
thought. The uprising, in Miki, cannot achieve the renovation totality needed. It means that 
the renovation towards the Heideggerian authenticity has to go a step further; it needs to 
become a spiritual renovation of the totality of a community. Not as class, but rather as a 
ningen-class, which eludes the Marxist connotation of the word and transforms itself into a 
new meaning leading to the ‘community’ of human beings.  
Hattori criticizes Miki for having failed to recognize Marxism as an ideology. Rather, 
he says, Miki openly built his Marxist humanism having ideology as a backdrop (Hattori 
1997: 198). The problem of ideology in Miki is as problematic as much as his concept of the 
proletariat is. In Marx, ideology is strictly related to the means of production and to the 
commodities fetishism, helping to create the false consciousness of the proletariat through the 
imposing of the supra-structure of the ruling class.103 In Lukács, as outlined above, ideology 
                                                 




in the capitalist society is best embodied in the reification of the proletarian consciousness. In 
order to create a new, true ideology it is necessary to destroy the ruling class and to ‘mediate’ 
the immediate reified laws if the proletarian consciousness has to emerge. In Miki, ideology is 
first identified as the natural development of anthropology and as the ‘self-understanding’ of 
the human being or as the common sphere of the Geisteswissenschaften. On the other hand, in 
Pragmatism and Materialism, Miki speaks about a logos oppressing humanity by 
transforming itself into ideology. It appears that while Miki continued to read Marxist texts, 
the more he grasped the real meaning of them. Thus, it is not a coincidence that the 
understanding of ideology as a pillar in Marxist thought comes to exist in Miki’s 
interpretation later in 1927. Certainly ideology in Marxist terms has not to be understood in 
derogative terms. Ideology is formed though the unfolding of history and it belongs to the 
ruling class of the specific time. This is the reason why Marxism, though a teleological view 
of history, puts the proletariat and its ideology as the winner of the revolution. Miki sees 
ideology in different terms. He definitely highlights ideology as linked to the historical 
process, although it is a more ‘natural’ development rather than false consciousness.  
After this first part, the differences between Miki and Watsuji have become clear. 
Watsuji criticized the emergence of ‘classes’ as an erroneous standpoint of analysis. He did 
not believe in the economically based framework adopted by Marxism because it would have 
destroyed his particular philosophical system based on the unity of a community. Miki, on the 
other hand, found Marxism inspirational. Marxist theories on the basic experience provided 
him with a new framework of analysis that could have helped him escape the mere theoretical 
conundrum of his first Pascalian phase. What they are both lacking is an economical 
understanding of Marxism. Miki talks about the human being in a highly theoretical and 
philosophical way, despite the accent posed on the praxis of the proletariat. Watsuji refuses in 
toto to economically acknowledge capitalism as a global phenomenon. They are both 
concerned with the ‘totality’ of the human being, with the I-Thou relationship and, in 
Watsuji’s case, with maintaining the established social order. They are both leading towards a 
‘communitarian’ view of the human being that will be further explained in the following 
sections. Economics is neither the kernel nor the structure of their philosophical systems; the 







Watsuji and Japanese Society 
Some of the themes that Watsuji touched in his dialogue with Kawakami resurface in 
the article An Ethical Critique of Marxism (Marukusu-shugi no rinriteki hihan, 1930).104 This 
piece on Marxism is particularly important if read as a prelude to Watsuji’s Study of Ethics 
(Yonetani 1992b: 486). Secondly, it helps understanding Watsuji’s ideas on the role of 
dialectical materialism. In fact, if Watsuji agreed with Marx’s critique of capitalism and 
individualism, he harshly criticized his economical-socialist framework.  
Most of all, Watsuji’s considerations gravitate around the concept of the human being 
and how this has been interpreted in Marxist philosophy. Watsuji thinks that the theoretical 
background for any research of the human being has to be grounded in dialectics (WTZBII: 
95-6). Using the same conceptual framework of his Climate and Study of Ethics, Watsuji 
argues that the human being is formed by the two components of the individual and the social. 
The family therefore, as seen before, becomes the first embodiment of society and it 
represents a kind of ‘social totality’. The difference between dialectics and formal logic, as 
Miki had already pointed out in his critique of Kawakami, is the fact that in formal logic there 
is no ‘mediation’ (chōtei) (WTZBII: 97). Dialectics is a concrete and dynamic movement that 
rose from Hegel and it is not possible to attribute to Marx the invention of it. As already 
outlined above, Watsuji thinks that Marx only added ‘materialism’ to the Hegelian dialectics 
(WTZBII: 99). Watsuji moreover argues that Marx looked at society only from a political 
point of view, because, in pure thinking, there is no distinction between the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie.  
Watsuji did not fully understand the importance of the ‘commodity fetishism’ in 
Marxist thought. Instead, he continues his criticism of Marxist thought in Japan as linked to 
the absorption of the Western idea of individualism in the Meiji period. The individualism 
inherited from Darwin and Spencer has ruined the old Japanese society: 
Japan nowadays has undoubtedly made great economical progress. 
Nevertheless, alongside the economical development there has been a 
loss of the original way of thinking and it is undeniable that a great 
influence has penetrated [into society] […] Needless to say, things 
such as familism (kazokushugi), state-nationalism (kokkashugi) and 
nationalism (kokuminshugi) have now been subverted 
       (WTZBII: 103-4) 
                                                 
104 The article is today included in a separate volume of Watsuji’s Collected Works in the section ‘Conference 
notes’. Yonetani Masafumi has reconstructed the history of this text, which belonged to Watsuji’s personal 
collection. The manuscript was written for the ‘Shisō Mondai Kōshūkai’ (‘Course on ideas’), that was held at 
Kyoto University in July 1930. The original title is A Second Ethical Critique of Marxism, because, as Yonetani 
explains, a first lecture with the same title had already been given by Fujii Kenjirō in 1928, who was professor of 




The real danger would be to forget the standpoint of the people’s totality caused by the 
adoption of the capitalist system. To Watsuji Marxism is not an original ‘product’ of Japanese 
culture; on the contrary, it represents the fruit of the individualistic way of thinking typical of 
the West. Watsuji argues from a completely theoretical point of view, without taking into 
consideration the real economic development of society. In support of this, he even argues 
that bourgeoisie and proletariat do not exist as separate entities, since they are both composed 
by concrete human beings. 
In the second part of the article, Watsuji admits that Marxism has the merit of having 
recognized the historicity of the human being and the abstractness of natural sciences 
(WTZBII: 105-6). Yet, Watsuji thinks that Marx’s concept of production still lacks 
concreteness and he thus suggests including climatology in the analysis (WTZBII: 109). In 
addition, Watsuji considers ‘class’ as another type of abstraction that refers to an abstract 
economical category. In his view, the original form of society is the totality of the people that 
participate in it and, if this were to be considered as a mere sum of exchange values, its ethical 
and moral prescriptions would be erased (WTZBII: 118-25). This would lead to a degradation 
from a Gemeinschaft or ‘communal society’ (kyōdō shakai) to a Gesellschaft or ‘profit 
society’ (rieki shakai).105 On the contrary, the ‘use-value’ (shiyō kachi) typical of primitive 
societies could help mediating the two (WTZBII: 125-9). This point is hence very important 
in Watsuji’s critique of Marxism, since he is arguing here that, since in primitive and tribal 
societies there was no exchange value present, it follows that those cannot be included in the 
process of the historical development of capitalism. To Watsuji, capitalism is only a ‘stage’ of 
history (WTZBII: 128-9). Watsuji fundamentally denies the teleology of history of the 
Marxist doctrine. If capitalism is only a ‘stage’ abruptly separated from historical 
development, certainly a critique based on class distinction would not be appropriate. 
Watsuji’s view of history is teleological, notwithstanding in the Marxist acceptation of the 
term. His highest aim is to bring society towards its sublation into the state.  
Watsuji thinks that since history is a fundamental part of the human existence, and the 
state is the highest sovereignty above all, then the process of development of both history and 
historicity is resolved in the morality of the state. It might be argued that the accent posed on 
the ‘use-value’ symbolizes to Watsuji a return the purity of pre-Meiji Japan, where Western 
thought had not been introduced yet. Nevertheless, Watsuji never regarded the Meiji period as 
                                                 
105 The distinction is drawn upon Friederich Tönnies’ distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. This 
point is further developed in Watsuji’s Study of Ethics and it becomes the corner-stone of his critique of 




a period of decadence or loss of the collective identity. The valorisation of the use-value does 
not represent a form of nostalgia for an idyllic past. Rather, the assumption that the state 
embodies the highest ethical structure above all stands as symbol of an ideal society projected 
into the future. Kawakami had already pointed out that Watsuji recognized the state as being 
above the legality of laws. As a matter of fact, Watsuji’s state is a spiritual vision beyond its 
mundane government. 
In order to support his thesis on the erroneous standpoint of social and economical 
analysis, Watsuji affirms that in a communitarian society the concept of ‘collective 
responsibility’ (rentai sekinin) is at the basis of its unity, whilst it is not present in a company 
or association where only the leadership alone takes responsibility for the actions of the group 
(WTZBII: 129). Therefore, it is wrong to include the communitarian society inside the 
modern profit society, since they do not share the same intrinsic values. Watsuji argues that 
the theory of the jita-furi expressed in Climate is exemplificative of the unity between self 
and other and of the awareness of the individual of belonging to totality. This concept is 
related to the basic concept of ethics, that Watsuji affirms being at the basis of Kant’s 
morality as well. What Marx has failed to recognize is the importance of moral principles that 
do not fall under the umbrella of economics. By super-imposing class consciousness related to 
economical development to the original morality, for example, of primitive societies, Marx 
has confused the two categories (WTZBII: 130-4). Marx’s contradictions are all rooted in the 
error of looking at ethics from the standpoint of economics and by creating a super-structure 
(jōsō kenchiku) upon it (WTZBII: 135): 
In Marx’s interpretation, in the study of dialectical materialism, 
human morality emerges from the economical structure of society. In 
other words, is nothing else than a super-structure […] [In the study of 
dialectical materialism] the legislative and political super-structures 
that Marx recognizes as structures above the economical one, and in 
particular the legislative one, are considered to be the religious, artistic 
and philosophical basis of ideology. Nonetheless, the word morality is 
never mentioned 
       (WTZBII: 135-6) 
 
For this reason, Marx is able to argue that there are different kinds of consciousness 
and morality, one for the proletariat and one for the bourgeoisie, which therefore correspond 
to the concept of ideology. Watsuji, following the interpretation of Bucharin according to 
whom to the bourgeoisie belongs a theoretical morality based on egotism while practical 
materialism belongs to the proletariat, sees it as a contradiction in terms. Marxism is 




the standpoint of the morality of society. Instead, Watsuji proposes a global analysis that will 
take into consideration the ‘totality’ of the community, where in the various stages of 
aggregation, from the family to the people, the responsibilities will be shared. Looking at a 
concrete totality, Watsuji affirms, means looking at the ‘people’ (kokumin) (WTZBII: 138).  
If we look at the profit society, we will see the proletariat; if we look 
at the communitarian society, we have to look at the people. In this 
way, when we concretely grasp human society, we grasp things like 
familism and nationalism (kokuminshugi). This represents, to me, the 
real and concrete socialism […] The proletariat is often described on 
the basis of its being an ‘international association’. Nevertheless, the 
union of profit societies and the union of communitarian societies 
completely differ 
       (WTZBII: 138-9) 
 
This happens because the communitarian totality represents the self-awareness of the 
whole community, while the union of proletariat does not, since it is only based on 
internationalism as unity of different national constituents. Therefore, in order to reform 
society, it is necessary to start from the moral basis, because the individual is capable of being 
aware of the totality that resides in him and to return to it as the source of ‘humanity’ 
(ningensei) (WTZBII: 141). In Japan, nowadays, the dangerous ideas come from the fact that 
political power has lost its ethical foundations, becoming an immoral government (WTZBII: 
142).  
In light of these passages, I would argue that this ‘totality’ of the community that 
Watsuji is talking about stands as the foundation of his later involvement, in one way or the 
other, with the Japanese political elites during the years of the war. His system provides 
justification for the establishment of a Japanese-community based existence. Watsuji created 
a fragile system of society which is only imagined as idyllic. To Watsuji now the existence of 
a communitarian society has become a political question aimed at counteracting the practical 
allure of Marxism on a generation of young intellectuals. I nevertheless believe that Marxism 
still appealed to Watsuji since they both condemned the isolation of the individual that came 
along with the industrialization of society. Yet, Watsuji refuses to accept an economical 
analysis of society on the basis that economy cannot explain morality. This perhaps represents 
the weakest point of Watsuji’s critique, the failure to recognize that the alienation and 
reification of his betweeness is not only a question of ‘import’ of Western thought, but rather 
a problem of global development. Watsuji mainly fails to understand the practical aspect of 




At this point, Tosaka Jun’s words could be quite illuminating. Despite the fact that 
Tosaka is here specifically criticizing Watsuji’s Study of Ethics, I believe his critique perfectly 
nails Watsuji’s major flaw regarding his understanding of Marxism. According to Tosaka, 
Watsuji abstracted universal concepts such ethics and the human being only to transform 
them into something particular and Japanese. The effect is the creation of an ‘Asian’ or 
‘Japanese’ ethics. By means of this invention, Watsuji set Japanese people and Japanese 
‘things’ as a model that every other nation would have to look up to (Tosaka 1973: 215). This 
method epitomizes the culturalist trend that Tosaka vehemently warned against. From 
Tosaka’s Marxist point of view, in Watsuji’s works the human existence was completely 
detached from reality. Therefore, Watsuji merely saw human existence as an ‘expression’ in 
words totally abstracted from its significance:  
The result of the creation of the materialist, productive relations by 
human existence by means of the cause-effect process is not ethics. 
Instead of opting for structural relationships grounded in materialism, 
an idealist creative relationship has been chosen so that the basic 
materialist historical society, as a social symbol, is merely a given fact 
    (Tosaka 1973: 220, emphasis in the original) 
 
Tosaka said that ‘anthropologism’ (ningengakushugi) was the most significant 
characteristic of Watsuji’s thought and, he pointed out, it was profoundly grounded in the 
essence of Japaneseness that was unfortunately comparable to Hitlerism in Germany (Tosaka 
1973: 222). 
In another piece, Tosaka described Watsuji as an ‘aristocratic, resistant reactionary’ 
(kizokuteki hankōsei hansayōsei) (TJZ V: 96). Regarding Watsuji’s idea of nature, Tosaka 
judged it as being derived from Heidegger and transformed into a kind of philology, which 
was, most of all, a ‘Japanese philology’. Watsuji, in Tosaka’s eyes, embodied the leading 
trend of Japanese academia that epitomized the modern bourgeois philosophy. This bourgeois 
philosophy was then used by Watsuji as a weapon against Marxist thought.  
The anthropologism at the centre of Watsuji’s thought is Watsuji’s response to the 
Marxian concept of class. By dismissing ‘class’ as a useless and super-imposed economical 
structure, Watsuji wants to re-affirm the centrality of his now ‘communal’ human being. 
What before was the small family nucleus has been transformed into a national community 
which belongs to a specificity that goes beyond mere national characteristics. Instead, it takes 
the shape of the specificity and the locality of a given race. This step, which started as a 
reaction to Marxism, brings a whole community towards a fascistization of itself. The 




reinvented itself in a mythical past in order to come to terms with the shock of modernity. The 
mythization of the past is rooted in the very same abstractness of the human being that has 
been transformed into a community. The result is the failure to recognize the importance of 
materialism, global development and realism of human existence.  
Watsuji does speak about the ‘concreteness’ of the human being he has created by 
linking it to the historical past through the medium of the relationship with the ancestors. 
Nevertheless, on a theoretical level, there is a gap. The use of the hermeneutical methodology 
does not provide Watsuji with a tool to define what ethics substantially is. It only justifies 
how ethics work in the social realm. This significant gap represents the link between the 
universal concept of human existence and its particular counterpart. Without grounding the 
human being in a socio-historical context that goes beyond its mere relation with climatology, 
Watsuji is able to abstract it and make it become an ideal model that eventually transforms 
itself into the cultural particularism of Japan. In the critique of Marxism this step emerges 
quite clearly. Accordingly, the fact that capitalism is not seen in the process of an active, 
teleological history but a mere ‘stage’ seems to imply a return to an ideal society where 
individualism and alienation never existed. Yet again, it is not the nostalgia for the past that 
pushes Watsuji in that direction. Rather, it is a vision of an absolute historical future 
belonging to a particular society. In this stage, Watsuji’s faith in the moral destiny of Japan 
shows its fist signs of germination. The return to this envisioned community that could 
overcome ‘Western’ modernity is precisely that detachment from the reality of history that 
will bring Watsuji to affirm that Japan was morally entitled to a destiny of victory. The ideal 















The Return to the Pascalian Moment 
In his analysis of the importance of history in the formation of knowledge Miki returns 
to Pascal and Lukács by means of George Sorel (1847-1922).106 Miki affirms that Sorel’s 
revolutionary-syndicalism was highly influenced by Bergson’s intuitionism, because both 
stressed the intuition of action (MKZ III: 109-10). Nevertheless, Bergson’s theories did not 
allow for a foreseeing of the future, because his focus was limited to the limitation of present 
and past and their mutual relationship (MKZ III: 111). Sorel, on the other hand, recognized 
the immediacy of the class struggle by embodying it in the ‘general strike’ (sōdōmeihiku) that 
would have materialized in a catastrophic event. Miki thinks that Sorel’s thought is an 
eschatological one, because it has complete faith in the idea that the proletariat and its 
revolution would rise after the destruction of the bourgeoisie (MKZ III: 112). Sorel’s theories, 
Miki thinks, are a kind of ‘Pascalinité’, because they consider the change possible on the basis 
of faith (MKZ III: 113). Miki equals Sorel’s violent, revolutionary practice to Pascal’s travail 
pour l’incertain and the wager due to the fact that they aim at rescuing society from 
decadence (MKZ III: 112). Despite the fact that Miki seems to sympathize with the anarco-
syndacalists, he nevertheless criticizes them for not having recognized the role of dialectics in 
Marxist philosophy. As seen before, to Miki it was important, as it was for Lukács, to stress 
the centrality of the dialectical movement inside the totality. Totality is bound to history 
because it is in history that the human being self-understands itself.  
In another example, Miki binds the concept of history in Marxism to its development 
in the Historicist trend. Miki says that the concept of ‘humanity’ in Dilthey became crucial 
because of its relation to the immediacy of totality as the experience at the basis of the study 
of history (MKZ III: 321).107 The mistake, or the ‘suicide’ (jisatsu) as Miki calls it, of the  
Historicists was their failure to recognize the value of the historicity of existence as a two-
moment stage in the historical development (MKZ III: 323). Miki explains: 
Regarding what I have analyzed as the two moments of the historicity 
of human existence, Hegel and the Historicist only completely 
understood the first one, namely the historicity of life (sei no 
rekishisei). Nonetheless, they almost did not grasp at all [the second 
moment]: the lifefulness of history (rekishi no seimeisei). As a 
consequence, they did not acknowledge what has to be most 
importantly grasped: the unfolding of the present-day as history. To 
                                                 
106  In Pragmatism and Marxist Philosophy (Puragumachizumu to marukishizumu no tetsugaku). Originally 
published in Shisō in December 1927. Now included in Historical Materialism and the Present-day 
Consciousness. 
107 In The Organicist Theory and Dialectics (Yūkitaisetsu to benshōhō). Originally published in Shinkō kagaku 




them, the present-day is rather a finite, united body that has reached 
completion (kanryō shita tōitsutai). It is for this reason that whatever 
is eternal is judged according to this108 
       (MKZ III: 323) 
 
The relationship between history and dialectics becomes therefore even more 
significant if seen in the light of progression and teleology. The meaning of existence as 
historicity is important, but the lifefulness of history is even more. Historicity precedes 
history as the social structure of human existence because, in Miki, it represents the premises 
for the unfolding itself. As Sugimoto has pointed out, history takes significance from its being 
lived in the praxis of the present. Therefore, even practical consciousness is the true historical 
consciousness and history is the history of the present (Sugimoto 2004: 206). The criticism 
addressed to Sorel is here thus restated in the analysis of Hegel and the Historicist philosophy. 
The dialectical unity of past, present and future is embodied in the present-day consciousness 
of totality, which could be as well defined as the Lukácsian ‘foreseeing’ totality. This is the 
reason why, I believe, Miki defines the Marxist dialectical system as an open one, contrary to 
Hegel’s closed system of the Absolute Idea (MKZ III: 333). Since dialectical materialism is 
concerned with the present, it is the present-day consciousness and historicity that take up the 
roles of corner stones in Miki’s philosophy. As a matter of fact, the accent posed on the 
society of ‘now’ and on the supremacy of the present time are themes that will be further 
explored in Miki’s subsequent production. In the early 1930s Miki will publish his Philosophy 
of History alongside other works that specifically deal with the philosophical understanding of 
history and human existence. It will be there that the present time will become the nation-time 
and the focus will shift from a historical society to a historical nation.  
Despite the fact that the present-day is the highest point of consideration, it remains 
bound to the openness of the dialectical system. It is in this context that we have to read 
Miki’s religious related Marxist pieces that, incidentally, caused the outcry of the ‘orthodox’ 
Marxists. They were published in different journals between 1929 and 1930 and they mainly 
deal with the relationship between the proletarian movement and religion.109 Uchida considers 
these articles as the strongest proof of the link between the early Pascal and the Marxist 
                                                 
108 Compare this to Walter Benjamin’s XVI thesis in the Theses on the Philosophy of History: ‘Historicism gives 
the “eternal” image of the past; historical materialism supplies a unique experience with the past” (Benjamin 
1968: 262).  
109 The articles are: Literature, Religion and the Proletarian Movement (Bungei to shūkyō to puroretaria undō), 
What kind of Criticism do we Address to Religion? (Donnani shūkyō wo hihan suru ka), Religious Struggle and 
Class Struggle (Shūkyō tōsō to kaikyū tōsō) and Freedom and Necessity in Dialectics (Benshōhō ni okeru jiyū to 
hitsuzen). The first three articles were published originally in the newspaper Chūgai Nippō in the course of 1930, 
while the last one was published in October 1929 in Shisō. Nowadays they are respectively in MKZ XX: 83-91; 




period (Uchida 2004: 237). I think that, in addition to this consideration, they are furthermore 
the evidence that Miki’s religiosity of the human being has, at this point, evolved towards a 
religiosity of the societal human being. The accent Miki puts on the practical side of the 
human existence seems to me to be the pivotal shift within his elaborations because it allows 
not only ‘concreteness’, but, most of all, ‘action’ on a community level. 
In order to fully understand the depth of Miki’s religious humanism it is necessary to 
provide a brief account of the intellectual debates that were taking place between 1928 and 
1930 and the reason why Hattori Shisō and his peers found Miki’s philosophy completely 
separated from Marxist orthodoxy. The first critique addressed to Miki appeared in 
Marukusushugi Kōza in 1928 and was written by Saeki Shunpei, the penname used by Hattori 
Shisō (Iwasaki 1971: 124). The article had the title Dialectical Materialism and Historical 
Materialism (Yuibutsu benshōhō to yuibutsu shikan).  His critique mainly gravitated around 
the concepts of ‘basic experience’ and ‘negotiating existence’, which, in Hattori’s eyes, had 
nothing to do with Marxism. He accused Miki and the other editors of Under the Banner of 
New Science of having operated a shift (tenkō) in Marxist philosophy and that this shift was 
leading towards a return to the organistic theory and social-democratic ideas (Iwasaki 1971: 
125-6). Miki’s responded as follows110: 
Even theory is a product of history. From below (shita ni oite), the 
established theory is regulated by the existence of that historical 
period. From above (ue ni oite), it is constrained by the theoretical 
consciousness of that historical time. The latter represents what I have 
so far named ‘the common sphere’     
    (MKZ III: 334; emphasis in the original) 
 
Miki thinks that Hattori is theorizing on materialism, while, on the other hand, there 
should be a clear distinction between concrete, historical materialism and its basic definition 
(MKZ III: 345). In a reverse course, in the second part of the article, Miki starts justifying 
himself and his views. He specifies that his ‘model of existence’ is drawn upon Lenin’s 
concept of property of existence (sonzai no zokusei), although he explicitly avoids using this 
term because he thinks he could be mistaken for a category of natural sciences (MKZ III: 
358).111 He, instead, defines his concept as ‘Jedem Dasein mögliche Weisen zu sein’ (sonzai 
                                                 
110 In Materialism and its Real Form. A Critique of the Critique (Yuibutsuron to sono genjitsu keitai. Hihan no 
hihan), published in Shinkō kagaku no hata no moto ni  in January 1929. Now in MKZ III: 334-366.  
111 This part and the following regarding Heidegger are actually inserted in a footnote and not in the main body 
of the text. Given the sensitivity of the subject, which is concerned with Miki’s intellectual integrity, I believe 




no shikata) (MKZ III: 358)112. Most importantly, Miki openly acknowledges his indebtedness 
to ‘Professor Heidegger’, however refusing to accept the allegations that his ideas are a copy 
of Heidegger’s formulations (MKZ III: 358). His theories are a form of Marxism, because 
they comprise the mutual, dynamic relationship between existence of nature and human 
existence and, moreover, his concept of human existence is socially determined as in Marx’s 
writings (MKZ III: 360).  
By looking at the accusations and at Miki’s reply, it appears that Hattori’s criticism 
was not without a reason. The theoretical speculations Miki had published at that point could 
not be considered entirely Marxist, given both the Heideggerian language and the conceptual 
framework used. Secondly, it appears that Miki was struggling to defend his positions since 
he was forced to come to terms with the influence Heidegger’s thought had upon him. In later 
articles that were subsequently published later in 1929 and in early 1930, Miki will express 
his distress even more in counteracting the increasing condemnations coming from different 
orthodox Marxists. The definition of ideology and his speculations on the ‘mode of existence’ 
clearly show an un-Marxist matrix. As seen in the very first part of this chapter, Miki still 
thinks that the movement at the basis of human existence is anxiety, which, in return, it is the 
basic assumption for a religious understanding of life. The human being remains so far a 
‘medianic existence’ caught between the everyday logos, guided by the everyday, false 
language, aka false consciousness, and ideology, which is imposed by above. Between these 
two constraining forces the role of the human being remains unclear. A new consciousness 
should arise, as Miki suggested, although it is not evident from which side of the two 
components. If the human being represents its own possibility, it therefore needs to re-
appropriate its authenticity, in Heideggerian terms. This is the key question in Miki’s Marxist 
writings. Has the authenticity to be found in the negotiating process with other human beings 
at the moment where the reification of their relations has been unmasked? Or, on the other 
hand, is it impossible to retrace it anywhere in the concrete experience of life?  
Miki does not seem to be able to reply to these questions. Therefore, he shifts his focus 
to the relationship between religion and the proletariat and argues that this relationship is 
                                                 
112 The original passage from Heidegger reads: ‘Die an diesem Seienden herausstellbaren Charaktere sind daher 
nicht vorhandene »Eigenschaften« eines so und so »aussehenden« vorhandenen Seienden, sondern je ihm 
mögliche Weisen zu sein und nur das. Alles Sosein dieses Seienden ist primär Sein.’ (Heidegger 1927: 42). 
Miki’s German is evidently corrupted. Macquarrie and Robinson translates Heiddeger’s passage as: ‘They are in 




indeed possible, albeit from the standpoint of the proletarian movement and class struggle 
(MKZ XIII: 17-8).113  
In a society without exploitation, even religion could completely 
renovate itself. Nonetheless, it would still be religion. As once 
Nietzsche said, the future philosophical thought will be born from a 
type (taipu) of human being called the weak and apathetic philosopher 
      (MKZ XIII: 18-9)114 
 
He sees an interesting parallel between Marxism and religion in light of the fact that 
they both point at humanity as a whole. Yet, religion has helped reifing (butsuka) human 
relationship, whilst Marxism aims at destroying the reified laws (MKZ XX: 86 ff).115 One 
possible solution Miki foresees would be to view religion from the standpoint of class society, 
because that is the framework every kind of critique has to start from (MKZ XIII: 6-7).116 One 
of the major flaws in Miki’s system is that the class struggle he talks about cannot be tied to 
any ‘class’. Yet again, the relationship he sees between religion and the proletariat is 
‘humanity’, which is a clear sign that it was still comprised in his framework of the religion of 
the human being. Interestingly enough, the reference to the Nietzschean ‘type’ is a theme that 
Miki will explore and exploit in the subsequent period of intellectual career and that will 
become the thrust of his meditations on the renovation of the human being.117 Understandably, 
after the publication of these articles, Miki’s theories were smashed in nearly every journal 
that dealt with Marxism, even after his arrest in May 1930.118  
In August 1930 Hattori Shisō and his peers published the Theses against Miki 
Philosophy (Tetsugaku ni tai suru wareware no taido. Miki tetsugaku ni tai suru tēzē) in 
Puroretaria Kagaku. There Miki was extensively accused of belonging to the bourgeois 
intelligentsia and to be a promoter of bourgeois ideology. His concept of the ‘basic experience 
of the proletariat’ was defined as nothing else than bourgeois idealism aimed at preventing the 
development of Marxism (Iwasaki 1971: 137). In September, Akizawa, under the pressure of 
the ‘theses’, publicly renounced his belonging to the ‘Miki tetsugaku’ faction (Iwasaki 1971: 
                                                 
113 Religious Struggle and Proletarian Struggle. 
114 Miki’s critique of the religious figures rather than to the religious doctrines is very close to Nietzsche’s own 
critique of Christianity as expressed in Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883-85), Beyond Good and Evil (1886), and 
On the Genealogy of Morals (1887). 
115 In Literature, Religion and the Proletarian Movement. 
116 In What kind of Criticism do We Address to Religion? 
117 See Chapt. 4. 
118 Miki was arrested under the restrictions of the Peace Preservation Law for having allegedly financed the 
campaign of the Communist Party. He was released shortly afterwards but subsequently rearrested in July and 
locked up at Totoyama prison until November (Uchida 2004: 255).  As a consequence, he had to leave his 
position at Hōsei University and start his career outside academia, providing for him and his family with the 




131). According to Iwasaki, the betrayal of one of Miki’s peers signed the end of Miki’s 
Marxist philosophy (Iwasaki 1971: 132).  
As briefly sketched here, the interpretation of Miki as a ‘humanistic Marxist’ not only 
is a common agreement amongst the present-day scholars, but it had already initiated in the 
1930s. Perhaps, the accent posed on the human being was the fatal move at the eyes of the 
hard-core Marxists. Furthermore, the references to Dilthey and the semi-positive assessment 
of Historicism, could as well have contributed, on the one hand, to the creation of Miki’s 
original ideas and, on the other hand, to the problems highlighted by his critics. As Iwasaki 
says, the position of Miki’s philosophy should not be judged too hastily (Iwasaki 1971: 141).  
Tosaka Jun had already noticed the incongruence in Miki’s interpretation of Marxism. 
In 1936, Tosaka wrote that Miki was never a Marxist, because Miki’s philosophy was a 
philosophy of history based on historical materialism, not on dialectical materialism. Tosaka 
traced the causes of this gap in Miki’s studies of Dilthey and his previous analysis of Pascal 
(TJZ V: 106-7). Miki’s tenkō, Tosaka argued, did not happen after 1930, but already at the 
time of his involvement with the Proletarian Research Group, where he started being 
interested in Nishida’s philosophy that led him to shape a ‘metaphysical, teleological view of 
history’ (keijijōgakutekina, shingakutekina rekishikan) (TJZ V: 107). 
Miki’s philosophy of history is nothing else than humanism, Tosaka said, because: 
Humanism (hyūmanizumu) is what stands in contrast to Eastern 
‘naturalism’ (tōyōtekina shizenshugi) (which in reality is nothing else 
than a category applied to metaphysical history). Humanism can be 
explained in terms of the human being that arises from history, 
changes in history and dissolves in it 
        (TJZ V: 108) 
 
The rift between the Marxists actively involved with the JCP and the theoretical 
Marxists, such as Kawakami, Miki and, to some extent, Watsuji, lies on a different 
interpretation of ideology (Iwasaki 1971: 142). The academics sought to define and interpret 
Marx’s idea in the light of the history of philosophy and the development of thought. On the 
contrary, Hattori, Fukumoto and the others saw in Marxism a weapon against the growing 
totalitarianism perpetrated by the Japanese political elite. Hence, their achievements should 
not be regarded as a failure, but rather as an attainment of a different vision of Marxism. 
Uchida thinks that the importance of religion in Miki’s thought has to be seen in the 
context of the Marx-Feuerbach relation (Uchida 2004: 246). He therefore affirms that the 
problem of the consciousness of the individual did not start with the publication of Pascal, but 




existentialism’ took shape for the first time (Uchida 2004: 246). Thus, the question of the 
individual consciousness in existential terms remains crucial even in Miki’s treatment of 
Marx. The link between the religious reform and the proletarian movement has to be 
interpreted in the light of the individual renovation and then, in a second stage, in the 
renovation of the proletariat (Uchida 2004: 248-9). Despite the fact that I agree with Uchida 
insofar his idea of the individual consciousness and the leap to the proletariat as a class is 
concerned, I think that it is not merely a question of individual freedom as in Kant. I believe 
that Miki’s contamination between materialism and spiritual matter is a question of Angst. His 
anthropological existentialist Marxist-driven theories are a continuation of the path he had 
already undertaken with Pascal. The problem of the renovation of the human being happens 
because there is oppression from above. This oppression from above is very similar to the 
feeling of anxiety connected to the infinite as described in Pascal. With the introduction of 
the Marxist view of historical development Miki was able to link history to nature and to 
human existence. History and historicity become deeply entangled as fundamental parts of 
human life. Dialectics helped this process of renovation by providing the methodology and 
means for a renovation in the religious sense. Furthermore, dialectical materialism, with his 
focus on praxis, helped reshaping the fundamental error the Historicists had done by posing 
the accent on the theoretical aspect of history. Praxis was also the condition by means of 
which the new ‘ningen-class’ of the proletariat could have freed himself from the oppression 
of ideology.  
Heideggerian authenticity is therefore realized in the religious renovation of the 
human being that happens through the dialectical movement aiming at the Lukácsian 
‘foreseeing’ totality through the means of praxis. Anthropology becomes the medium between 
the logos and ideology and, since ideology is the super-structure, it could be compared with 
the Lukácsian or Marxian false consciousness. That is the reason why individual existences 
are abstracted in history, because they are guided by the ordinary logos and not by the basic 
experience. This is purely Heidegger’s das Man. The difference and overcoming of Heidegger 
happens in the shift from individuality to society. As Miki said, the human being reaches its 
material and spiritual whole in Marxist historical materialism, in the unity of theory and 
practice. Nevertheless, materialism is also hermeneutics, the self-understanding of man. 
Although Miki affirms that the proletariat self-understands in the praxis of labour, I would go 
a step further and argue that not only is the proletariat, but it is society as a whole. At this 
point the medium of hermeneutics clearly appears and it is related to the concept of 




of human existence in Miki is transformed in authenticity as a re-appropriation of the 
openness of the possibilities given to the Dasein in the praxis of the everyday life. The 
religious renovation comes to terms with the expression of the sociality of the human 






As we have seen, Miki and Watsuji seemed to reach similar conclusions but through 
different paths.119 They were both concerned with the establishment of a totality: in Watsuji it 
took the shape of the Japanese nation, in Miki it became his counterpart to the Marxist 
concept of class. Secondly, philosophy of history makes its first appearance. I believe that 
Miki, with the construction of his humanism-oriented Marxist system, already prepared his 
subsequent involvement with this kind of philosophy. Watsuji followed the same path, since 
philosophy of history had always been present in his works. This major shift does not only 
regard Miki; it is a common feature of the development of Japanese philosophy in the 1930s 
and early 1940s. Nishida, Tanabe, as well as the participants of the later Chūōkōron 
roundtables, all saw in the philosophy of history a tool to analyze and justify the Japanese 
standpoint in the global scenario of the Second World War. Philosophy of history as it will be 
interpreted by Miki in the 1930s gathers most of the issues already underlined here. Although 
Miki’s career will continue on a different path than Marxist philosophy, the praxis this type of 
philosophical argumentation provided will linger in Miki’s thought for the years to come.  
Thirdly, religion also plays an important role in both systems of thought. The 
abstractness of Watsuji’s human existence tends to take the nuances of a nationalistic 
ideology firmly rooted in the ideology of the kokutai. To further clarify the relationship 
between state and religion in Japan, it is noteworthy to refer to what Karl Löwith wrote in 
1942: 
Japan is the only modern nation with a genuine natural religion, where 
religion neither transcends nor interferes with but supports the socio-
political system 
       (Löwith 1983: 549) 
 
                                                 




The question of religion is therefore important in Watsuji’s case, although it does not 
have to be mistaken for a belief akin to Christianity. The religion of the kokutai is a product of 
society (very much like Marx) and Watsuji recognizes to this principle the function of uniting 
a whole nation. The religious-political principle explained in the previous chapter has now to 
be understood as a prototype of national unity. Therefore, the negation of the religious 
symbolism of the emperor as proposed by the Marxists would have disrupted the whole 
structure of Japanese society. Thus, I believe that the abstractness of the human being Watsuji 
created is the result of a culturally based analysis of human existence aimed at safeguarding a 
semi-religious figure bound to Hegelian idealism. Watsuji’s human being, already grounded 
in history, became thus a political question for a whole community aimed at counteracting the 
practical appealing of Marxism on a generation of young intellectuals. 
In Miki, the role of the human being and its Angst finally found a solid ground in the 
practical basic experience grounded in history thanks to the medium of Marxism. The 
religious vision present in Miki’s works is still a reminder of his previous Pascalian phase. 
The influence of Heidegger and Lukács, comprehensive of both aspects of theory and praxis, 
is brought together and underpinned in a unified vision of a communal human being that 
substitutes class. Miki invented a new ningen-class, Watsuji dismissed ‘class’ in toto. Both 
aimed at preserving or foreseeing a new totality which became more of a ‘particular’ 
community rather than a universal concept. In the early 1940s, in the midst of the Second 
World War and with the expansion of the Japanese empire, this societal totality will finally 

















IV. NINGEN AND THE NATIONAL CHARACTER 
History and the Nation: the 1930s and the 1950s 
 
This is my morning, my day beginneth: arise now, 
arise, thou great noontide- Thus spake 
Zarathustra and left his cave, glowing and strong, 
like a morning sun coming out of gloomy 
mountains.120 
 
The historizing of history is the historizing of 
Being-in-the-World.121 
 
     
 
This chapter is an attempt to bring Miki Kiyoshi and Watsuji Tetsurō together by 
means of synchronicity. I will analyze Miki Kiyoshi’s Philosophy of History (Rekishi 
tetsugaku, 1932) and his pieces on ‘humanism’ (1932-36) and, regarding Watsuji, I will shift 
to his postwar production.122 Specifically, I will consider the second volume of Study of 
Ethics that appeared in 1949 and Two Pioneers in the Philosophy of History: Vico and Herder 
(Kindai rekishitetsugaku no senkusha: Bico to Heruda, 1950).123 I will also take into account 
Sakoku. Japan’s Tragedy (Sakoku. Nihon no higeki, 1950) and parts of his collection of 
articles The Buried Japan (Uzumoreta nihon, 1951).124 
In the previous chapters we have traced the genesis of the idea of ningen, its early 
developments and we have reached some preliminary outcomes, namely in Miki the creation 
of a ‘societal ningen’ and in Watsuji the Japanese national ningen. In this part, I will show 
how Miki’s human being transforms itself into a national character, reaching a form that is 
very close to Watsuji’s vision. After 1932, Miki shifts his attention from Marxism and society 
to history and society. This movement coincides with the emerging of totalitarian forces in 
Japan that brought Miki to describe the period of the mid-1930s as a period of Angst.  
Therefore, Miki appears to be increasingly involved with the politics of his time, when 
the Japanese state was putting forward a more aggressive foreign policy and, domestically, it 
was implementing more repressive measures in order to safeguard the status quo. In 1931 
officers of the Kwantung Army blew up parts of the Southern Manchurian Railway Line, only 
to then accuse General Chang Hsueh-liang’s army of having perpetrated the offence (Bix 
                                                 
120 Nietzsche 1999: 236, emphasis in the original. 
121 Heidegger 1963: 440, emphasis in the original. 
122 Now in MKZ VI: 1-288. 
123 Now in WTZ XI: 1-434 and WTZ VI: 357-421. 




2000: 235). This gave the pretext to the Japanese to attack the Chinese nationalist Manchurian 
forces and to occupy parts of Southern Manchuria. The Chinese immediately appealed to the 
League of Nations and petitioned it to stop the advance of the Japanese. The international 
image of Japanese was at stake, as well as its domestic order. Nevertheless, the army was not 
ordered to withdraw by the then emperor Hirohito who let his soldiers advance and establish a 
puppet regime in the South in 1932, in defiance of the ruling of the League of Nations. This 
event is usually considered to be the first step in the creation of the later-to-be Japanese 
empire. Furthermore, in 1933 Martin Heidegger delivered his in-famous lecture The Self-
Assertion of the German University when he was nominated rector of the university of 
Freiburg. This speech is widely considered the endorsement of Hitler’s Nazism by Heidegger, 
something that will remain a stain in the German philosopher’s career.  
These two incidents sparked a wide sense of uncertainty and Angst amongst Japanese 
intellectuals. Miyakawa describes this period as the one of ‘the culture of crisis’ and of the 
‘philosophy of crisis’ (Miyakawa 1970: 91). This climate coincides with what was happening 
in Europe with the rise of Hitler in Germany and Mussolini in Italy and with the increase of 
xenophobic and nationalist sentiments. In Japan, the rise of totalitarian forces was reflected in 
several countermeasures that the government took in the early 1930s. In January 1933 Ōtsuka 
Kin’nosuke, Kawakami Hajime and several members of the then underground Japanese 
Communist Party were arrested under the Peace Preservation Law. In February of the same 
year, Kobayashi Takiji, the preeminent author of proletarian literature, was arrested and died 
under torture (Miyakawa 1970: 91-2). In July, the so-called ‘Takigawa Incident’ sparked a 
row of widespread indignation at the Faculty of Law of Kyoto Imperial University. Takigawa 
Yukitoki (1891-1962), professor of law, was put under pressure by the director of the faculty 
for his ideas regarding adultery and the right of legal defense in the case of a crime. 
Takigawa’s considerations were taken up by Minoda Muneki, an extreme right-wing member 
of the Genri Nihonsha, as symbols of Communist propaganda and signaled to the Ministry of 
Education. As soon as Takigawa was dismissed, the other professors went on strike and 
showed solidarity with their peer (see Yusa 1998: 26-7 and Barshay 1988: 38-44). Miki as 
well contributed to this protest with an article entitled A Re-Examination of the Kyoto 
University Problem (Kyōdai mondai no saiginmi).125  
In this period of high international and national tensions, Miki publishes A 
Philosophical Explanation of the Consciousness of Crisis (Kiki ishiki no tetsugakuteki kaimei) 
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in 1932 followed by The Idea of Angst and its Overcoming (Fuan no shisō to sono chōkoku) 
in 1933, and Heidegger and the Faith of Philosophy (Haideggā to tetsugaku no unmei), which 
represents a direct response to Heidegger’s Freiburg lecture.126 These three pieces are deeply 
connected and, alongside Philosophy of History, show the complexity of Miki’s thought and 
the various issues he was struggling with in the years between 1932 and 1935. First of all, the 
topics of time and consciousness, secondly the question of the role of the human being and 
third, the interpretation of the historical period Miki was living in: the time of ‘crisis’.  
As we shall see, already from Philosophy of History, Miki is concerned with the 
central question of the historical existence of the human being, which he finds in the 
‘historicity of history’ or ‘fundamental history’ that underpins it. Moreover, Miki attempts to 
re-conceptualize the problem of time in relation to history and nature, and he establishes the 
supremacy of the present over the past and the future. This is not a new element in his 
production. Already in The Organicistic Theory and Dialectics, in 1928, Miki had 
reprimanded the Historicists for not having recognized ‘the unfolding of the present day as 
history’.127 The difference is that, if before the concept of a ‘societal human being’ was put in 
a Marxist-inspired context, here the supremacy is awarded to philosophy of history and 
humanism. By underpinning society to a fundamental historicity grounded in the present 
temporality, Miki raises this society to a national level. This move presents itself as a step 
further into the political ideology of the time that could already be symptomatic of Miki’s 
subsequent involvement with the Shōwa Research Association in the late 1930s. He portrays a 
national, absolute present time that, as Harootunian poignantly says, is based on the 
assumption of the existence of an already formed nation-state (Harootunian 2008: 109). At 
this point Miki’s human being becomes a national human being, which could resemble, in 
some aspects, the conclusions reached by Watsuji in his first volume of Study of Ethics. 
Most importantly, the atmosphere of Angst that had been so pervasive in the first part 
of Miki’s intellectual career vigorously returns into Miki’s writings. Angst, in connection with 
the newly redefined medianity as the unity of logos and pathos in human consciousness, will 
play a key role in his construction of the national society. Thus, Miki continues his 
explorations of the human being qua medianity by trapping it in the condition of uncertainty 
of his historical time.  
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In the comparison between Watsuji’s prewar and postwar production, I will attempt to 
show the continuity of his thought. I believe that Watsuji did not essentially modify his 
prewar views on the emperor and on the Japanese nation. Even after 1945, Watsuji still 
remains a conservative attached to his prewar intellectual breeding based on the Imperial 
Rescript on Education (1890). Therefore, to him, the nation is still represented in the 
community of the Japanese people and in the figure of the emperor as a father. This move 
allows him to accuse the rulers of the Tokugawa period (1603-1868) of having caused the 
catastrophic defeat of 1945.   
What changed is not the content or the substance of Watsuji’s ideas, but, rather, the 
historical context. In 1945 Japan lost the war and was occupied de facto by the United States 
with a mandate of the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP). Japan regained 
territorial independence in 1952, albeit several American military bases remain stationed in 
Japan even today. Led by General MacArthur, the Americans drafted the new Japanese 
Constitution in 1947 that redefined the role of the Japanese emperor as the ‘symbol’ (shōchō) 
of the nation and stripped him of his military and political powers. Nevertheless, Emperor 
Hirohito was not removed from his position nor did he abdicate, a political issue that is still a 
matter of controversy amongst historians nowadays. Moreover, the Allied powers established 
a tribunal, the Tokyo Trial, that should have served the same function of the Nuremberg Trial 
in Germany. Notwithstanding, only a few military commanders were put on trial and hanged, 
whilst the emperor was not even prosecuted.128  Yet again, in the period immediately after the 
end of the war the Americans started a policy of purges in Japanese universities. Some have 
argued that Watsuji’s alleged ‘change of views’ was dictated by the unwillingness to leave his 
post at Tokyo University (see LaFleur 2001 and Yuasa 1988). It is arguable that Watsuji did 
not want to be purged and that therefore changed his language without substantially modify 
his fundamental concepts. I agree with this view, although I do not agree with the underlying 
cause that pushed Watsuji to act accordingly. As we shall later in the chapter, the reason why 
Watsuji did not change his ideas is because he was still focusing on the particularity of Japan. 
The rhetoric changed, although the content of his work did not.  
As a matter of fact in 1950, alongside Vico and Herder, Watsuji publishes the second 
volume of Study of Ethics and The Buried Japan. The latter is an edited volume where 
Watsuji collected some of the pieces he wrote in the late 1940s. If Study of Ethics, The Buried 
Japan and Our Standpoint (Ware ware no tachiba, included in The Buried Japan) have to be 
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compared, we could see that the themes are recurrent and the topics here addressed are very 
similar. First of all there is the problem of modernity, which Watsuji seems to be considering 
an important issue even for postwar Japan. As we shall see in the analysis of Sakoku, Watsuji 
blamed the Japanese defeat in WWII on the technological and intellectual delay that Japan 
accumulated during the sakoku period (1633-1857).129 Watsuji establishes a line of continuity 
between the rulers of that time and the political figures who led Japan in the interwar years, 
blaming both for the destruction they brought. Secondly, Watsuji here begins his meditations 
on the role of the emperor in the framework of the postwar Japan state in order to come to 
terms with his new role of ‘symbol’ of the nation. As he had theorized in the previous years, 
Watsuji still believed in the particularity of Japan as a particular and exceptional nation where 
the structure of the state was embodied in the ethical principle of betweeness. The ningen as a 
national character, therefore, does not undergo a major change in its fundamental structure.  
For Miki, the renovation of the human being foreseen so far on an individual but also 
collective basis takes here the shape of the renovation of a national community through a new 
form of temporality called ‘historicity of history’. As it had already happened with Pascal, the 
renovation Miki is talking about brings on itself the nuances of a religious renovation very 
close to Heidegger or Shestov’s ideas of ‘authentic temporality’ and of the ‘eccentric man’. 
To Watsuji, the path of the national character, already marked in his prewar production, 
becomes even more highlighted after 1945. Diachronically, they seem to have little to share. 
Synchronically, this chapter shows how they fundamentally came together in depicting an 
achieved national time beholder of a national, Japanese character. This will bring about 
different political consequences for both thinkers, reinforcing Watsuji’s ideological stands 
and exposing Miki’s controversial alignment with the ideology of his time. 
In order to have a complete picture, I will analyze not only how Miki reaches these 
conclusions but also the influence other thinkers had on his thoughts. It will be thus crucial to 
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Time and Consciousness 
In Philosophy of History Miki distinguishes between two types of history: the historia 
rerum gestarum, or subjective history and res gestae or objective history (dekigoto). 
According to his new definition, they correspond to historia qua logos and history qua 
existence (MKZ VI: 6). The trick to make them come together as ‘history’ is to relate them to 
the present, or the historical time where the writing of history as an actual human action takes 
shape as a repeating of the past (kurikaesu). Most importantly, the writing of history needs to 
be underpinned by a certain totality which is the kairos or ‘the right moment’. Miki calls it 
‘the temporal aspect of the present’, borrowing the expression from Spranger’s 
Zeitperspektive der Gegenwart. Already from this passage we can see how the ‘present’ and 
its perspective come to occupy a pivotal role in his system. 
Nevertheless, those two types of history are not sufficient if the goal is to sketch its 
genealogy. For this reason, Miki introduces a third element: history qua facts (jijitsu toshite 
no rekishi) (MKZ VI: 262-3). History qua facts obeys to the order of contemporaneity or 
gendaisei, which represents a small part of every totality. It can moreover overtake history 
qua existence and elevate it to a higher order, where the present becomes historical and non-
historical, à la Nietzsche. Its foundational moment is embodied in the Ur-Geschichte or 
foundational history that creates a complete and superior order which is the one of the 
historicity of facts (MKZ VI: 26). What are the facts that Miki describes? First of all, they do 
not regard strictly ‘history’, but they are intrinsically linked to the concept of ‘action’ (koi) as 
well. History qua facts is the one that acts in the process of the creation of history, when 
human action becomes historical and historical action becomes human. As Akamatsu points 
out, in this case ‘facts’ is very close to the Ficthtian Tat-Sache, implying that facts themselves 
become a self-evident activity (Akamatsu 1994a: 187). It is for this reason that the action of 
producing history (history qua facts) is in a dialectical relationship with the produced history 
(history qua existence). Most of all, Miki underlines that, in order for historical knowledge to 
emerge, an action of free will is necessary (MKZ VI: 27). Free will acts as a ‘rupture’ 
(setsudan) by means of which every totality moves and detaches from the past. In an interplay 
between Hegel and Marx, Miki reaches the conclusion that history is not what Kant described 
as ‘practice’ or Fichte Tathandlung, it rather embodies a practical and sensuous principle of 
acting.  
The most important part here is the stress that Miki puts on the ‘societal’ aspect of 
history. Since history is not divided from nature, as Fichte suggested, is not even divided from 




where people relate to a certain group (Miki calls it shuzoku). For this reason produced history 
and producing history are in a dialectical relationship, out of the necessity for individuals and 
mankind to relate to a particular past and tradition (MKZ VI: 36-7). This seems to imply that 
Miki is here talking about a well defined community that can take the form of a nation. This 
stands as an attempt to go beyond Marx by subsuming Marxist philosophy into philosophy of 
history. This is the move that, I believe, will bring Miki on the path leading to the Shōwa 
Kenkyūkai and to his involvement with Japanese ultranationalism. By quoting Heidegger and 
his ‘authentic historicity as authentic temporality’, Miki decrees a nation time based on an 
active, present temporality.130 
Miki is keen to underline that his system is different from both the idealist and the 
materialist. In fact, he affirms that both conceptions of history are underpinned by the same 
ontological determination, which prescribes the characteristics of the conception itself (MKZ 
VI: 56). Simply, one calls it ‘ontological determination’ and the other one ‘anthropology’. In 
order to clarify his view, Miki draws a parallel between his concept of history and Dilthey’s 
division of ‘experience’, ‘expression’ and ‘comprehension’ (Verstehen). Miki considers 
Dilthey’s separation between the natural sciences and the human and historical science, based 
on the categorization of the experience of ‘life’ (Erleben) and of the ‘comprehension’ and 
‘communication’ of this experience between men, as a ‘psychological’ distinction. In 
Dilthey’s view, the unfolding of history does not rely on the presence of an absolute entity, 
but rather it is underpinned by human creation and its ability to ‘create’ history. Therefore, 
Dilthey’s principle is that history encompasses life. Although Miki draws some his ideas from 
Dilthey, he still cannot accept that the Geisteswittenschaften did not include the idea of the 
dialectical relationship between history qua facts and history qua existence (MKZ VI: 89). 
The hermeneutical method, Miki says, is adequate for an organicistic theory, because they 
abide to the same logic (MKZ VI: 57). Instead, Miki defines his historical method and 
historical knowledge in terms of dialectics, attempting to overcome Dilthey’s and the 
Historicists view of an encompassing history divided from nature. The key to understand 
history, Miki affirms, is to understand the three-fold system of the history qua logos, history 
qua existence and history qua facts in their dialectical relationship (MKZ VI: 57-8). The 
dialectical movement allows the history qua existence and the history qua facts to be bridged 
together in the experience (taiken) of nothingness (MKZ VI: 91). The facts themselves are, to 
Miki, the negative moment of the movement, since they are linked to the historical past if 
                                                 




represented in reality. This reasoning, as Miki himself acknowledges, is very close to the 
Heideggerian notion of the finitude of the Dasein (MKZ VI: 91-4). If the feeling of history 
and historical knowledge arise from nothingness, they are the result of a societal pathos. 
Hattori describes it in these terms: ‘When historical consciousness feels the destiny of its era, 
it perceives its pathos’ (Hattori 1997: 199). Historical events of the past remain in the 
historical description of the present, therefore allowing for the historical present to become 
the central fact of historical knowledge (Hattori 1997: 199).  
In order to support this point, Miki says that history qua existence appears in a 
multitude of categories, or what Marx had described as the ‘economical categories’ or 
multiple relations (MKZ VI: 133). This implies that things show themselves in a multitude of 
forms, therefore entailing a certain ‘already’ or ‘in reality’. The fundamental characteristic of 
the history qua existence is thus the ‘appearing’ as historical time which already bears in its 
structure the ‘now’ or the ‘already’ (MKZ VI: 182). What provides structure to this kind of 
temporality is factual time and what provides its substance is the history qua facts (MKZ VI: 
134). The transformation from one to the other happens thanks to the mediating dialectics that 
does not have to be mistaken with the Hegelian self-unfolding of the Spirit. The root of the 
change is the original existence that is located beyond existence. In accordance with 
Kierkegaard, according to whom eternal time is a subjective, active time understood as an 
instant, Miki concludes that factual time could actually be considered as an instant separated 
from the ‘eternal now’ as well as being separated from the present in objective time (MKZ 
VI: 167). Specifically, factual time represents the ‘instant’ understood as instant historicity. 
Instead, historical time embodies the continuity as systematic historicity. Their dialectical 
relationship gives birth to history (MKZ VI: 183). Most importantly, the fundamental 
characteristic of factual time is ‘futurity of the origin’ (honrai no miraisei), because time 
flows from the past to the future. 
In a reminiscence of Heidegger, Miki describes what ‘expecting’ means to him: 
Expecting is the characteristic of historical time. Yet, it is the 
particular ‘futurity’ as the one that does not have an origin that is the 
character of factual time. Furthermore, it is also ‘anticipatory’ 
       (MKZ VI: 198) 
Again: 
Our life is not simply one sound, it is rather the unity of myriad of 
sounds. These are natural, historical and factual times that arise in a 
concrete structure of relations. Yet again, it is not a ‘pleasant 
symphony’. It is a dialectical relationship which encompasses 




cannot be separated from it. This represents the circle of the formation 
of real time 
       (MKZ VI: 199-200) 
 
The first passage is clearly a reprise of the Heideggerian theme of the ‘authentic 
temporality’ as the anticipatory feature of the Dasein to grasp its own existence. It is worth 
noticing here that it is directly linked to factual time and that it does not entail having an 
origin. Having an origin, in this case, would imply a teleological view of time which requires 
a starting point. Instead, the circularity of the dialectical movement avoids this question and 
poses the basis for the grounding in the originality of history that equally generates in a 
reminiscence of Nishida’s Absolute Nothingness. On the other hand, the second passage 
describes how natural, factual and existential times prescribe real time. In a previous part, 
Miki had already specified how natural and historical time are internally different if looked at 
from the perspective of the human being, since history implies human activity (MKZ VI: 186-
9). From both we can assume that the ‘time’ Miki talks about is a very human one, aimed at 
satisfying the condition for the attainment of an authentic way of living. As explained in 
previous chapters, nothing has fundamentally changed in his thought, since it is from Pascal 
that Miki strives to locate authentic existence.  
The themes developed in Philosophy of History return strongly in one article that I 
consider to be one of the most lucid philosophical analysis that Miki ever wrote: 
Anthropology and Philosophy of History (Ningengaku to rekishi tetsugaku), published in May 
1935 in the journal Risō.131 In this piece Miki goes back and gives new shape to his concept 
of anthropology. He explains ‘reality’ (genjitsu) in terms of ‘historicity’ (rekishisei), therefore 
colluding real and practical anthropology with history. The result is ‘historical anthropology’. 
Its three basic categories are everydayness (nichijōsei), world historicity (sekai rekishisei) and 
historicity. Philosophy of history, Miki says, should be concerned with the study of 
everydayness which represents its method (MKZ V: 84-7). What Miki then calls the 
historicity of historical anthropology is anthropology from the standpoint of historicity; on the 
other hand, what is expressed in the actions and productions is concreteness or the human 
being itself. It follows that everydayness and world historicity are united and form history as a 
whole, very much alike the history qua facts and the history qua existence. The key question 
that remains unsolved is how this fundamental historicity can underpin both. On this point 
Miki can only paraphrase what perhaps would need a deeper explanation: 
                                                 




In order to fully understand the fundamental historicity of the human 
being, the understanding of the historical and the understanding of the 
everyday have to be mutually clarified and judged according to each 
other. First of all, world historicity will be considered according to 
everydayness 
       (MKZ V: 87) 
The relationship between nature and historicity occupies another special position in 
Miki’s wondering. As a matter of fact, he considers nature as the internal moment of history 
that is rooted in ‘action’ as ‘event’. In a parallel between necessity and contingency, Miki 
confronts nature and history, concluding that the former is spatial and the latter temporal. Yet, 
history is spatial as well, if we follow the reasoning that space is only an aspect of temporality.  
And here Miki reaches the core of his analysis of time and existence, which appears to 
be a profound meditation on Heidegger’s concept of time and an original reinterpretation of it. 
Miki argues that historical-temporal things are circular and continuous at the same time. In 
their division, the circular aspects are the ‘periode’ and the continuous ones the ‘epoché’ 
(MKZ V: 101). In their unity, they symbolize the Zeitraum, where they ‘enrich’ (jūjitsu) each 
other. In the analysis of the three categories, everydayness represents the circular aspect and 
world historicity the continuous one. The kind of ‘time’ that prescribes their separation is the 
kairos qua event (MKZ V: 101). The kairos, in this instance, is comparable to the 
Heideggerian Zeitigung, which in his philosophy embodies the real essence and maturity of 
time. As a matter of fact, Miki calls the kairos the ‘ripened time’ (juku suru, jijuku) from 
which history is produced because it is where the two aspects come together in the ‘enriched 
time’ (MKZ V: 103). Despite the fact that everydayness and world historicity should be 
separated, they are still in a dialectical relationship because they act in a human world that, as 
seen before, is based on a dialectical movement.  
This brief account shows how many issues are at stake in Miki’s thought. First of all, 
despite the fact that Miki tried to synthesize time into the present by mean of the kairos qua 
event, his attempt utterly fails. If the event is the ‘ripened time’ and therefore also time in its 
maturity, it means that it temporalizes the principle of world historicity as well. It creates a 
kind of ‘protohistory’ that sounds more Hegelian than practical. Miki’s present becomes the 
kernel of his system, it is absolutized and traps facts in their own reality. The accent posed on 
human action and on the anthropology of the historical world can only partially provide a 
solution to avoid making the present totality.  
This core problem has already been noted by Harootunian. He argues that Miki’s 




state had already taken shape (Harootunian 2008: 109). The implication is that world 
historicity finds its natural parallel in the historical world of the 1930s and everydayness in 
the national world of Japan. The take over of the present, the accent on everydayness and the 
appearance of the historicity of the human being (as a nation, it could be argued) are all 
elements that tend to put Miki in relation to some aspects of fascist ideologies.  
Despite this, there are still some similarities between Miki’s concepts of everydayness 
and type and Tosaka Jun’s elaborations of the ‘everyday’ and the ‘character’. Tosaka’s views, 
it has to be specified, are elaborated from a Marxist perspective and therefore achieve quite 
dissimilar results compared to Miki’s. Nevertheless, this does not deny the fact there are 
actual influences between the two. As a matter of fact, when Miki wrote his article regarding 
the Takigawa incident, he had joined, alongside Tosaka and other intellectuals, the 
‘Association for Liberal Studies’ (Gakugei jiyū domei) to protest against the interference of 
the state into university matters (Uchida 2004: 128). Moreover, Miki and Tosaka had been 
peers and colleagues at Kyoto Imperial University.  
Tosaka elaborated a different concept of everydayness, which does not have the same 
connotations of Miki’s but it is still somehow related. Everydayness is the principle guiding 
the practical and philosophical truth of the so-called ‘characterial concepts’ or the concepts 
that characterized our common sense and daily life by means of the character. 132  The 
character is ‘qualitative division’ of history and it is introduced by Tosaka as a mean to 
overcome both the divisions of time qua eternity and time qua instant. His character is, first of 
all, a human concept and its origin is the incision (kokuin) that leaves the impression on the 
everyday things (TJZ II: 7). Moreover, it characterizes every era as a societal phenomenon 
that has to be grasped practically, on the basis of the sensuousness of history. Time in general 
is, instead, divided in two categories: the actual, eternalized time, as in Augustine, Plato and 
Plotinus and, on the other hand, the instant, spatialized time, as the one of Aristotle (TJZ III: 
96-7). Time has different characters, as seen above, and they embrace the content of history, 
providing the definition of the different eras through the material relations and the means of 
production (TJZ III: 99). Yet, the character abides to the principle of the everyday, where the 
present (genzai) where people live in becomes ‘presentness’ and ‘reality’. What Tosaka seeks 
to reach is to find in the principle of the everydayness that would inlay the practical life as a 
necessity in the history of the present (see also Harootunian 2008).  
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The difference between Miki and Tosaka has to be found first of all in the different 
definition of the everyday, which is Miki is linked to the principle of world history, whilst in 
Tosaka it is embedded in the present. On the other hand, if in Tosaka the necessity is 
expressed in practical life, in Miki necessity appears to be contingent in the sense that ‘rebels’ 
against the necessity of nature. Free action is the rupture of the totality of history, it is its 
multiplicity (in this case it is similar to Tosaka’s character) but with the difference that 
everydayness remains a part of the total historicity. Historical time as character is reality in 
Tosaka as well in Miki, but the kairos qua event prevents Miki from discarding his system 
from the idealist Hegelianism. Tosaka’s everydayness is materialist and abides to the laws of 
dialectical materialism; Miki’s everydayness is bound to a transcendental existence that 
opposes materialism in every sense.  
The transition between Philosophy of History and Anthropology and Philosophy of 
History shows how Miki’s ideas underwent a strong development in only three years. In the 
first book the concepts of action, history qua facts and history qua existence, historical time 
were analyzed in the context of what philosophy of history can mean for human existence. In 
the second piece, the thrust is more on the significance of time both from an internal and 
external points of view. Action remains the constant thread. Nevertheless, action was before 
the act of free will thanks to which every totality moved away from the past and was 
projected into the future. Here, in Anthropology and Philosophy of History, action is not 
anymore an act of free will. It rather embodies the event that crystallizes time in the present. It 
is nonetheless true that the present had always been a constant worry for Miki. Inasmuch as 
he tries to sweep away from a Hegelian kind of eternal present he still leans towards it by 
making it the principle of both everydayness and world historicity. Worse, he makes world 
historicity depend on the everyday. This move underpins the presence of the everyday as 
national time, since time and history are human, as Miki clearly expresses. By presupposing 
an eternal present upon which world history is decided, he unwillingly grants Japan a superior 
role into the world scenario. Thirdly, the concept of destiny appears reinforced.  As we shall 
see later, Miki criticizes Heidegger because of the accent he put on ‘blood, soil and land’ and 
for his ‘love of destiny’, albeit Miki himself seems not to be completely lucid on his side 
either. Specifically, it proposes a temporal condition by means of which the national time is 
tight to national destiny. This point is crucial, since it lays the foundations of the failure of 
Miki’s philosophical system at the end of WWII. As I will subsequently argue, the faith that 




being.133 It is sufficient to say here that, by bounding temporality to destiny, Miki predestined 
the outcome of his whole system. 
One of the major issues here at stake is the fact that, in 1935, Miki publishes a striking 
article against totalitarianism: A Critique of Totalitarianism (Zentaishugi hihan) in 
Rokkōdai. 134 The outstanding feature of this piece is that Miki describes how totalitarian 
ideologies are rooted into the organicistic views of history, where the state is considered the 
reality of totality and the reality of the union of people (MKZ XIX: 668). He argues that with 
the spiritualization of nature and by posing the accent on blood and soil, these ideologues 
(Miki mentions Gentile, Schmitt and Spann) merely amplified the natural role of the state and 
the ‘natural’ relations in society, negating the intermediate moment of dialectics (MKZ XIX: 
669-72). Miki argues that by depicting the state as the totality, they were fundamentally 
denying the intermediate, negative moment of the individual, because the independence of its 
own members is what makes the relationship dialectical in the first place and anti-totalitarian 
in the second.  
Miki’s view of history should thus oppose the organicistic theories being underpinned 
by the dialectical movement. However, as mentioned before, this does not happen. Probably 
his aim would have been to escape the establishment of a similar system, although his 
absolute present reaches the same conclusions. In fact, his total present simply synthesizes 
another way to state the presence of an achieved nation-state. Even Watsuji was capable of 
synthesizing the negative moment of the individual with the positive moment of the state and 
he did indeed create a kind of Hegelian system where everything was subsumed in the 
absolute state. Miki does not approach the problem from the same standpoint, but the 
implications of his reasoning reach the same goal: the creation of a nation-state with a clear 
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Anthropology and Ideology: the Role of Consciousness   
In the last part of Philosophy of History Miki returns to the concepts of anthropology 
and ideology and to their relation. History and historical description, Miki affirms, are 
determined by politics and culture, since they belong to the realm of ideology. As he had 
described previously, ideology represents the ‘common sphere’ where the philosophical and 
intellectual atmosphere of the given time gives birth to the second kind of logos.135 
Yet, philosophy of history is rather concerned with philosophical problems than with 
historical ones (MKZ VI: 220-1). Philosophy of history is dedicated to the role of the human 
being in shaping its own history through poiesis, therefore it is deeply interlinked to 
anthropology. The problem of the ‘burying of consciousness’ that Miki had so vehemently 
warned against finds here its solution in the recognition of this very same problem and in the 
attempt to solve it. In Miki’s words: ‘The problem of anthropology is disclosed and then 
smashed under the reality of ideology’ (MKZ VI: 224, emphasis in the original). In addition, 
Miki wants to prove that the question of anthropology is not only relative to objective 
existence, but that is intimately bound to the way we write history and, most of all, to the 
different historical periods it was developed in.  
It is here that Miki clearly explains how historical research should be conducted. Since 
the views on history are usually socially prescribed and society is practical, active and 
concrete, it follows that the conception of history is a matter for the history qua existence 
rather than the history qua logos. Different anthropologies were developed in different 
conceptions of history as much as they abide to their ontological limitations (MKZ VI: 248). 
Like Nietzsche, Miki affirms that historical knowledge arises from history itself, letting room 
for genealogy to prescribe how facts are established. This kind of genealogy is although 
intermingled with the view that the historical world is produced by men and that, without the 
knowledge of the past, the enterprise of establishing historical consciousness would be vain. 
The present and future importance of historical facts is made possible through the historical 
traces that historical research has looked for, supported and controlled in objective existence. 
To conclude, in a parallel between the development of art history and history itself, Miki says 
that as the interpretation of art changes with the discovery of new things dug from the past 
and might be therefore labeled differently throughout the years, so the same has to apply to 
historical description, which lives through life, precisely human life (MKZ VI: 270). 
                                                 




 Since life changes and adapts, historical knowledge has to undergo the same process. 
Funayama notices that, despite Miki’s efforts to isolate praxis even in this book, his 
standpoint remains quite transcendental (Funayama 1995: 173). In fact, although Miki tries to 
overcome Simmel’s concept of ‘life’ and Dilthey’s ‘experience’, he cannot but admire the 
ideas of these philosophers (Funayama 1995: 174). This is the reason why Miki takes refuge 
into the concept of nothingness that brings him, once again, on the path of existentialism (see 
also Funayama 1995: 178). Nonetheless, Miki underlines that facts are a kind of ‘production’ 
directly linked to the practical subject. The crucial difference from Marxism is that, although 
existence is rooted in history, at the same time it denies a teleological view of history because 
of the presence of the historicity that denies the attainment of a new society through 
revolution. In fact, if factual time does not have an origin and develops in an eternal and 
present circularity, it does not leave room for a finalistic historical theory. Moreover, Miki’s 
new interpretation of historical knowledge is based on a community-national platform and not, 
as in Marxism, on a social class. In The Philosophical Foundation of Humanism 
(Hyūmanizumu no tetsugakuteki kiso), written in 1936, Miki even criticizes class struggle as 
envisioned by Marxist intellectuals as a negative moment that needs to be overcome in favour 
of a more harmonious relationship between the individual and the collectivity (MKZ V: 
185).136 
As a matter of fact, the role of consciousness changes dramatically from his Marxist 
period, since consciousness becomes the unifying principle of dialectics, instead of 
representing what has been oppressed with the introduction of commodities137:   
The human being possesses the dialectical structure of facts and 
existence and this structure is mediated by consciousness. 
Consciousness epitomizes the mediating, dialectical origin 
      (MKZ X: 247)138 
 
Consciousness is the medium between objective existence and subjective facts that 
concretizes dialectics. It follows that praxis cannot be immediate, but needs to be mediated, 
which could only take place with the juxtaposition of existence and facts, as well as in their 
unity. The key is the human being, thanks to whose life history unfolds. To Miki, the human 
being as a medium represents a philosophical necessity, and not a contingency, that has to be 
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reckoned with (MKZ V: 45).139 The human being is both the subject and object, the wonderer 
and the wondered. It is at this point that human consciousness takes the shape of the 
‘fundamental essence of the human being as median’ (MKZ V: 49). Consciousness represents 
the transcendence of human existence, what makes the dialectical relationship between 
subject and object possible.  
The medianity that Miki points at is the same medianity of Pascal and of his Marxist 
period. In his first book Miki had described this condition as the uncertainty that arises when 
the human being comes to grip with its position of medium between totality and infinity. 
Later in his career, as seen above, medianity had surfaced as human existence trapped 
between the everyday logos and ideology. Therefore, his considerations on the role of 
consciousness dramatically changed in time. As a matter of fact, in Marxism and Materialism 
Miki had defined consciousness as related to language, therefore slightly differentiating 
himself from the Lukácsian definition of consciousness.140 Nevertheless, there the I-Thou 
relationship had been reified by the introduction of commodities. With these considerations 
on the role of consciousness, Miki had seemed to aim at the destruction of the immediacy and 
naturalization of reified laws, but he had not been able to describe the new type of mediated 
consciousness, as foreseen by Lukács. In Philosophy of History consciousness becomes the 
‘medium’ or the dialectical origin, which is not that far from what Lukács had theorized.  
Lukács’ solution to reification is to become conscious of the ‘immanent meanings of these 
contradictions [of the reified structure]’ and Miki as well says that human consciousness is the 
fundamental principle to realize the condition of medianity of the human being. Thus, this 
later work seems to embody a Marxist principle of totality and dialectical mediation. Yet, in 
reality, it does not. The accent on transcendence thwarts and distances Miki from the 
materialist principle of Marxist philosophy. The point is that there are no reified laws nor a 
reified structure in Miki’s thought at this point in time. Medianity is here linked to the 
previous considerations in Pascal, where the condition of Angst pervaded the human being. It 
follows that Miki seems to draw a parallel between the social and historical context of anxiety 
witnessed in Germany in the early 1920s to the one he was experiencing in Japan in the late 
1930s. Angst and existentialism-inspired theorizations surpass Marxist materialism and its 
accent on class struggle and class division. It is at this point of his career that Miki returns to 
the problem of ‘humanism’.  
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Angst and Humanism: the Renovation of the Human Being as ‘Type’ 
In A Philosophical Explanation of the Consciousness of Crisis Miki is concerned with 
the value ideas can have. He divides the value from the nature of ideas, which is also defined 
as the ‘character’. The character is the subjective, practical side of ideas and it is usually 
molded by the cultural environment (MKZ V: 6-7). During the time of crisis, the value takes 
over the character and unnatural thoughts become the norm, giving usually birth to utopia. 
‘Crisis’ is a historical feeling directed towards experience and facts. It embodies human 
feelings and it arises in different historical times because rooted in the temporal, epochal and 
social condition of the given time. The best way to describe it would be to call it the ‘moment 
critique’, or the condition by means of which the present time becomes absolute and forgetful 
of the anticipatory moment. Crisis explodes when the transcendence of facts is put vis-à-vis 
existence (MKZ V: 24). On the other hand, crisis also reflects the ‘myth consciousness’, when 
utopia becomes ideal eternity crystallizing the anticipatory moment. This definition of crisis is 
obviously a negative one. The difficulty is that without the mythos consciousness neither 
science nor philosophy, beholders of the ontic and ontological truths respectively, could have 
been born. So, where do we find the solution to the conundrum of reconciling myth, utopia 
and crisis? In the subsuming of the ontic and ontological truths thanks to dialectics. Only in 
this way could myth develop into its practical character and avoid the stasis of utopian 
thought.  
The time of crisis is often permeated by the feeling of angst. Miki interprets the 
Manchurian Incident as the one event which paved the way for this particular feeling to 
penetrate into Japanese society. It is very similar to what happened in France after WWI as it 
was portrayed in the works of André Gide and Michel Proust (MKZ X: 292).141 The main 
feature of this time is pathology or that mechanism by means of which the rationality of 
society is taken over by irrational feelings. Pathology is therefore the decisive factor in the 
creation of a society of escapism. As for the German case, Miki argues, the movement of the 
feeling of angst has been best narrated in the philosophies of Heidegger and Jaspers. Their 
ideas are representative of the intellectual climate where the individual, limited sphere has 
overcome the objective society. Nowadays, Miki says, fascism is the quintessential feature of 
these irrational tendencies (MKZ X: 301). The only solution Miki foresees as a gateway is the 
reformation of society from within the human being itself. It is the new ‘type’, that is the 
thrust of Miki’s later works on humanism. The type, Miki is keen to point out, is not the 
                                                 




proletariat. It is rather a renovated, born out of the subjective consciousness, and objectively 
given human being (MKZ X: 305-8). Most importantly: 
[…] It is created above the logos and the pathos consciousnesses. 
There, where the unity of objective reality and subjective truthfulness 
strengthen and reinforce each other mutually. More than anything else, 
the new type appears in front of us as a living thing that will console, 
encourage, deepen and provide a new and stronger force to our life 
      (MKZ X: 309) 
 
The new type is therefore not the embodiment of a new social class based on praxis 
and materialism. Neither it resembles the Dasein and its authenticity. Rather, the new type 
can be mostly characterized as a force coming from within society and its members, or a 
‘creation from nothingness’ as well. At this stage it is not possible to understand what Miki is 
effectively describing, besides the references he makes to the heroes of literature Don Quixote 
and Hamlet. His point is that, if in literature a new human being has been created, in 
philosophy this still needs to happen. Miki focuses on a renovation from within the human 
being, but how this would arise and under which social and historical conditions is not clear. 
Following Miki, if there needs to be a new society, the current one needs to be overcome. 
How can this take place? Perhaps by means of a revolution? Miki is specific on this point, he 
is not foreseeing a Communist revolution at all. It is more likely then the type would have the 
same characteristic of the Nietzschean Super-human (on this point see also Karaki 2002: 95).  
Miki’s new type is better explained in The Problem of Neo-Humanism and Literature 
(Neo-Humanizumu no mondai to bungaku, 1933), where he describes how a ‘revival’, in the 
sense of Renaissance, can achieve the restoration of humanity.142 The unity of objectivity and 
subjectivity, human being and society, can lead towards ‘neo-humanism’ (here in katakana), 
where a new kind of anthropology can overcome the binary ‘philosophy of life’-‘philosophy 
of reality’ where it has been trapped (MKZ XI: 220-5). It is here, in this article, that Miki 
finally delineates his guidelines of his ‘creation from nothingness’, which is directly linked to 
the concept of action. In fact, he uses the comparison of the ‘work of art’ to explain how the 
creation from nothingness works. Through the process of artistic creation, Miki says, art can 
change both the reality it is portraying and the human being as portrayer as well. The real 
meaning of the human being is thus represented in the ‘discovery’ (hakken) and in the 
                                                 




creation as action through the process of dialectics (MKZ XI: 232).143  The new type is logos 
and pathos united in the forms of logos and myth. Miki asserts: 
Today’s worldview needs to be constructed on the unity of logos and 
pathos, epistemology and creation, being and nothingness, subject and 
object 
       (MKZ XI: 234-5) 
 
The real meaning of ‘renovation’ has to be born from action, from the ‘being 
produced’ as an event grounded in fundamental history (MKZ XIII: 199). Acting and being 
acted bear the significance of being produced and producing history. The philosophy of Angst 
can only be overcome by the unity of space and time that starts the process of creation (but 
here Miki is keen to point out that it is not the Bergsonian creation). It is rather a Nietzschean, 
Heideggerian creation from nothingness.  
The human being expresses itself in being the ‘producer’ of goods, as 
it is possible for an artist as human being to be produced in the poiesis. 
This is the new philosophy of the human being 
       (MKZ XIII: 198) 
What will grant the unity of all these elements is the historicity of the human being 
that can overcome the Romantic view and go back to the classical idea of man. Society 
therefore constitutes one of the components that form this new human being, because it is in 
society that the human being is born, lives and dies (MKZ XI: 242-3).144 
In The Philosophical Foundation of Humanism Miki explains that the philosophical 
foundation of humanism has to be seen in ‘the position of the human being in its essence or 
the world’ (MKZ V: 162). World here does not refer to nature, but to society. In order for the 
subject and the object to reach unity, the body needs to be ‘related’ or ‘have an attitude’ 
towards the world. Yet again, thanks to the human action or techné, life as a Bildung is at the 
basis of the idea of humanism, where the creation of ourselves corresponds to the creation of 
the world (MKZ V: 175). ‘Humanism has to renovate the human being from its self-alienation 
produced by the objectification of life by culture’ (MKZ V: 176-7). In order for this to happen, 
there is the need for a new to society to be formed, which however will never completely set 
us free, since we are society ourselves. In this instance destiny becomes not only a necessity 
and a contingency for the individual, but the ‘destiny of the community’ which is historical 
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and placed in the world (MKZ V: 182).145 Society and the individual are in a dialectical, 
confrontational relation that could only be resolved through the evolution of society that frees 
the individual by transcending itself in its self-formation in the world (MKZ V: 186). 
The definition Miki provides of the ‘world’ and of ‘having an attitude’ could be well 
compared to Heidegger’s considerations on the same topics. ‘Being-affected’ by the world 
and ‘Being-thrown-in-the-world’ are the most fundamental questions Heidegger addresses in 
his Being and Time and they describe the situationality of the Dasein in relation to the rest of 
world as well as to the others. What Miki is trying to avoid here is to make his own human 
being as an individual detached from society. His human being is thrown into society but it 
also forms it, it is part of it. We have already seen before that the renovation of society has to 
come from the human being itself, here society goes one step further and becomes the world 
as its own self-formation and transcendence. Miki’s whole system of renovation is therefore 
based on a transcendence that encompasses every aspect of human existence, including 
existence itself.  
It is in the article On Shestov’s Angst (Shesutofuteki fuan ni tsuite, 1934) that Miki 
appears to have a change in direction in regard to his concept of nothingness and 
‘medianity’.146 As a matter of fact, they are described in more positive terms, as if Miki were 
still pondering how to solve the problem of human existence. Here everydayness embodies 
the ‘buried Angst’ of men, that can only be overcome by means of the ‘eccentricity’ 
(rishinsei) of the human being (MKZ XI: 401). The everyday is although fundamental 
because it provides the first encounter of the human being with its ‘curiosity’ as the most 
basic source of Angst. In Shestov, as in Heidegger, Miki argues, the difference is demarcated 
between the everyday and the non-everyday (Heidegger’s World). Shestov, therefore, offers 
the most quintessential example of the philosophy of tragedy. His eccentric man, that Miki 
adopts as his own as well, is the response to the utopian ‘type’, it is the man who can stand 
above the Angst in its Pascalian medianity. The distress is caused by the smashing of human 
hopes under the realization of the impossibility of fulfilling them or what Nietzsche called 
‘the pathos of distance’ (MKZ XI: 402-3). By re-appropriating its own destiny, by becoming 
aware of the dialectics between life and death, the human being can rise above Angst and 
complete its life. Eccentricity, on the other hand, also embeds the ‘reality’ of the unity 
between necessity and possibility that can then succeed in overstepping the condition of 
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‘flatness’ of the everyday (MKZ XI: 408). Akamatsu points out how Miki, although grasping 
Shestov’s fundamental ideas, does not share his pessimism, because he still leaves the door 
opened for human action to resuscitate the human being (Akamatsu 1994a: 210). The creation 
from nothingness here becomes the human hope, its own poverty in the moment the human 
being faces the outside world (Akamatsu 1994a: 210). Most importantly, the re-appropriation 
of its own destiny from the human being will become the appropriation of the destiny of a 
whole nation in the enterprise of its military expansion. 
Heidegger thought of the Dasein that its existence was unauthentic and that its only 
way to re-grasp its own potentiality was to become self-aware of its own death. Shestov took 
refuge into the eccentricity of the human being in order to rescue it from the flatness of the 
everyday life. Nietzsche created a super-human from nothingness. They exemplify the tragedy 
of human existence, the tragedy of their own destiny, of their own historical period. They are 
certainly inspirational figures for Miki, although he tries to find a way out of the negativity 
that they convey. Miki’s human being is a societal element, it is a human being that, even 
willingly, cannot be detached from the world he is clustered into. Marxism is not enough 
anymore and alienation is not embodied anymore in the objectivising of consciousness, 
although the burying of it is still present in his thoughts. Rather, a more substantial way to 
surpass this kind of alienation is to renovate the society in toto.  
The problem of this approach is multilayered. First of all, it runs the risk of totalizing 
society by subsuming the individual in it, as seen above. Secondly, by describing and 
depicting the destiny of the community as a ‘collective pathos’ Miki returns to his ideas of 
time and history, where destiny is tantamount to the negation of individual freedom. His 
human being is born out of pathos, although he claims that solely in the unity of pathos and 
logos that renovation can take place. I believe it is not at all a rational man Miki is trying to 
depict. On the contrary, it leads to a kind of a contradiction, because it implies that the total 
rationalization of society in a totalizing totality is based on fundamental irrationality of the 
individual. Pathos is not rational, it is a human feeling and it is ‘demonic’ (MKZ V: 171). 
How can then a society become rational if the community that constitutes it is led by a 
communal pathos? The answer is probably transcendence. Society transcends itself in the 
formation of the world which, in turn, affects the human being in its medianity. Here the 
eccentric can emerge as the creative artist that has the ability to mold reality from an idea, 
which is nothingness in this case. Whilst the artist creates, reality shapes it, becoming the 
producer and the produced at the same time. It is the same process that affects history. Human 




in Heideggerian terms. The question is here whether a producing, pathological society can 
take responsibility for its own actions, like in the invasion of China for example. Or whether 
the presenteness this society is formed and develops is another kind of escapism that Miki had 
so vehemently criticized.147 In the following chapters I will answer these questions through 
the analysis of Miki’s works on technology. There, Miki will establish a direct link between 
the pathos as a ‘demonic’ feeling and the attempt to rationalize it in the technological action. 
Unsatisfied with this concept of type, Miki will create the homo faber or the human being that 
is capable of merging the technological action with artistic creation.  
 Following Benjamin’s critique of historicism and the creation of a universal, 
homogenous and empty temporality, I argue that Miki was doing exactly what Benjamin was 
so wary of. In fact, Miki’s conception of history is the ‘time of the now’, because it is the 
kairos that gains supremacy over the teleology of history (Benjamin 1968: 263). Miki’s 
philosophy of history is fundamentally historicism, where the present as present-ness 
becomes the absolutization of universal history. Tosaka had already criticized Miki in this 
respect, when talking about Miki’s Marxism:  
Miki’s Marxist philosophy of that time was not a philosophy, it was 
nothing else than historical materialism (and therefore it continued 
negating the dialectics of nature). Moreover, that historical 
materialism, in reality, was not materialism, but only a philosophy of 
history 
        (TJZ V: 106) 
 
 This passage stands as a confirmation that the pervasion of ontological Angst and the 
underpinning of fundamental historicity are elements that fundamentally deny the possibility 
of teleology of history and the dialectical movement there entailed. Hence, Miki’s temporality 
could well stand as a kind of Blochian nonsynchronicity that embodies the relationship 
between an absolute, present and, as in an oxymoron, universal temporality together with the 







                                                 






Heidegger and the Faith of Philosophy perhaps represents Miki’s first political 
‘attempt’. In this piece, Miki ties Heidegger, Gide and Barth to their common denominator: 
Nietzsche. The underlying discontinuity between the French and the Swiss thinkers and the 
German, Miki says, is the fact that the former took up the Apollonian side of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, while the latter the Dionysian one. What Heidegger, and German contemporary 
philosophy, are lacking is the practical side of the super-human (MKZ X: 318). The accent 
that Heidegger poses on the love of destiny is a direct Nietzschean influence that arises after 
the death of God and the creation of different spiritual worlds for different people. The origin 
of the German Völk, Heidegger says, resides in the commonality of blood, land and pathos 
that together bridge the destiny of the community.148 Nevertheless, Miki highlights, this is not 
what Nietzsche foresaw for his super-human (MKZ X: 319-20). In fact, the super-human is 
born out of the unity between the knower and non-knower, of subject and object and not, as 
Heidegger stresses, out of an irrational force qua destiny. The irrationality of Heidegger’s 
ideas is the mirror of the Nazi ideology. Moreover, Miki argues, the idea of being ‘German’ is 
nothing else than a type born out of a utopian self-perception.149  
In 1935 Miki restates his opinions in an article that is more concerned with the 
situation in Japan as opposed to the German atmosphere. In The Turn towards Irrationalism 
(Higorishugiteki tenkō ni tsuite), Miki criticizes both the emergence of fascist irrational forces 
in Japan as well as the failure of Marxism to bring rationality into Japanese society.150 He 
describes fascism as ‘an irrational and non-cultural movement’ that abides to ‘a logic of 
totality’ (MKZ X: 400-2). The problem, Miki underlines, is not that irrational bourgeois 
forces have taken over, it is rather that even the Marxists are not capable of putting forward a 
model that could overcome rationality and irrationality all together in a dialectical movement 
(MKZ X: 392-3). The mistake resides in having confused the Geist with the Seele and to have 
divided logos and pathos. In order to reestablish the equilibrium, it would be necessary to get 
rid of all the Western influences in Japan, although Miki is keen to point out that this would 
be accompanied by further problems, such as a return to an unscientific and irrational society 
                                                 
148 Heidegger says: ‘And the spiritual world of a Volk is not its cultural superstructure, just as little as it is its 
arsenal of useful knowledge [Kenntnisse] and values; rather, it is the power that comes from preserving at the 
most profound level the forces that are rooted in the soil and the blood of a Volk, the power to arouse most 
inwardly and to shake the most extensively the Volk’s existence. A spiritual world alone will guarantee our Volk 
greatness’ (Heidegger 1993: 33-4; emphasis in the original). 
149 In The Repressive Culture of Nazism (Nachizu no bunka danatsu), originally published in the Hōchi Shinbun 
in May 1933. Now in MKZ XIX: 594-602. 




(MKZ X: 404-6). Miki considers therefore the ‘West’ as the engine behind Japan’s 
modernization and rationalization which is necessary for Japan’s development. Yet, it does 
not mean that Japan was completely irrational. On the contrary, Miki argues that it was 
already a ‘practical’ society but that, since nowadays it is completely Westernized, it is almost 
impossible to avoid those influences without endangering society as a whole. The solution lies 
in taking these forces and make them ‘contingent’ instead of necessary, therefore defeating 
the totalitarian and absolutist logic of fascist irrationality (MKZ X: 408). Here Miki resumes 
to the concept of techné in order to explain how the ‘intellect’ as a métier (notion taken from 
Alain) represents the only tool to understand the diversity of human phenomena. The concept 
of technology appears later in Miki’s Philosophy of Technology (1942), whereas now it is 
only mentioned as a possible solution to the return to rationality. 
As we have seen before, Miki claims that the renovation of the human being as a 
winner of irrational forces comes from within the human being itself. The ‘type’ he creates is 
exactly that utopian self-perception the Germans were criticized for. The temporalization of 
the present in the kairos qua event does nothing more that creating the exact same feeling of 
the particularity of a nation driven by destiny that, in those years, had started conquering parts 
of Asia. Miki’s renovation leaves a lot of room for criticism and perplexity on how it cannot 
be representative of a national time and national community. Miki seems to be unaware of the 
consequences of his own actions and ‘productions’, or, if he was aware of it, he highly 
disguised it under the curtain of the criticism of fascism. Certainly, this part of his career 
prepares the path for the dooming 1940s, where Miki will be personally involved in 















Watsuji’s Philosophy of History 
Watsuji’s postwar production presents some similarities with what he had written 
before 1945. There is a period of about four years after the end of the war when he did not 
publish anything. The second volume of his Study of Ethics appeared in 1949 and one of his 
masterpieces, Sakoku, only in 1950, although the genesis of this work has to be traced back to 
1945, before the end of the war (see Furukawa 1966: 564). In 1950 a short but poignant study 
of Vico and Herder was published for the first time. Watsuji had always been an admirer of 
Herder, from the time of Climate. In fact, as seen before, Herder was to Watsuji the only 
German philosopher who had recognized the importance of climate in the formation of a 
nation.151 Vico, instead, appealed to him for the accent he posed on the role men play in the 
writing of history.  
In Two Pioneers of Philosophy of History: Vico and Herder, Watsuji analyses the 
work of these two thinkers. This piece was actually started before the end of the war, in 1944, 
but abandoned for the writing of the second volume of Study of Ethics. In Vico and Herder, 
Watsuji is concerned with the rise of philosophy of history as a separate branch of philosophy 
in the 17th century, when Francis Bacon divided the historia naturalis from the historia 
moralis, basically separating the divine history from the human one (WTZ VI: 381-2). 
Nevertheless, Gianbattista Vico (1668-1744) was the first one to dedicate his attention to 
‘human things’. What Watsuji admires in Vico is the fact that the Italian philosopher 
recognized philology and philosophy as the quintessential expressions of humanity (WTZ VI: 
386). Nevertheless, Watsuji is not completely satisfied with Vico’s analysis, since his study is 
centred on the history of European peoples. Regarding this lacuna, Watsuji tries to justify it 
by saying that Vico might have used a code language to talk about the new philosophy of 
history on purpose, in order to avoid the censorship of the Catholic church (WTZ VI: 389). 
Yet, Watsuji is still concerned with the fact that Vico left the non-European to the level of the 
‘age of gods’ when he divided history into three, circular eras that end with the age of men.152 
Accordingly, he uses the same framework of Vico and tries to transpose the triads into 
Japanese history. He arrives at the conclusion that the age of heroes can be traced back to the 
Japan of the 18th century, which should be followed by the age of men.  
Vico’s ideas are though underpinned by the idea of ‘ Providence’ or an ideal of history 
that the history of mankind abides to. This represents also the relationship between men and 
God, where men’s history slowly develops toward the ideal God has set for us. Naturally, the 
                                                 
151 See Chap. 2. 




age of men can only correspond to the age of Christianity. Therefore there is no room left for 
peoples or societies which are not under this umbrella. This view of the supremacy of the 
Christian faith is something that Watsuji had struggled with since the time of Climate. If we 
have to draw a parallel between Vico and Herder and Watsuji’s first book we could see that 
the same kind of criticism had already been addressed to Hegel’s Weltanschauung. Although 
Watsuji’s assessment of the Italian philosopher is far more positive than the one dedicated to 
Hegel, the underlying motive appears to be the connubium Christian faith-modernity that 
relegates non-Christian or non-European peoples to an inferior status. Nevertheless, Vico’s 
ideas on philology and on the power of men to shape their history is a quality that Watsuji 
admires.  
In the second part of Vico and Herder, Watsuji takes into consideration the works of 
Herder. In fact, he affirms that there is a close influence between Vico and Herder, more than 
critics have ever recognized. Herded underlined how language was important in the shaping 
of social consciousness and in the formation of national identity, calling it the secret to 
understand the mystery of human life. In conveying the expressions of a whole community 
through the commonality of the language, Herder had recognized the deep link between the 
individual and the community and this factor is what made him capable of overcoming Kant 
(WTZ VI: 401-3). What Watsuji defines ningesei or ‘humanity’ in Japanese is in fact the 
Herderian Menschheit. Restating what he had already extensively argued in the prewar period, 
Watsuji concludes that Herder’s state is, in some ways, an anti-state because it is grounded in 
the unity of the community rather than on a bureaucratic state apparatus beholder of the legal 
system. Herder acknowledged that ‘every people [has] a particular form as an expression of 
the historical reality of humanity’ (WTZ VI: 408). Secondly, another pillar of philosophy of 
history is ‘tradition’, because the definite character of each people is transmitted through 
language and communication. The only question Watsuji asks is how Herder could have not 
recognized the link between the religiosity of ancient tribes and the modern state, something 
that he had already pointed out in the first volume of Study of Ethics, when he described how 
the Japanese emperor could have been compared to the religious tribe leaders whose powers 
were beyond the simple magical transmission (WTZ VI: 418).  
The particularity of every people or nation is still the point of departure for Watsuji’s 
analysis of history. As seen before, these remarks could have been well written in the first 
volume of Study of Ethics. The difference is the accent on the particular form of ‘historical 
reality of humanity’, which corresponds to Watsuji’s admiration for Herder’s Romantic idea 




he said that his idea of ‘Romantic’ had changed since it ‘has dismissed all heroic tendencies’, 
and Watsuji’s idea of Romantic that, instead, did not change from the 1920s onwards.153 
Could the reason be because Watsuji’s considerations on the problem of modernity 
completely overlooked the materialistic side of it? If the problem of capitalism is a global one, 
then certain specificities cannot be allowed. Instead, what brings Herder and, to some extent 
Vico, together with Watsuji is the particularity of nations that differentiates people from 
people. It follows that the modernity Japan acquired is also a specific one, probably different 
from the European model. Therefore, in this book it appears as if Watsuji was trying to 
include Japan and Japanese history into world history, something that European thinkers had 
failed to do in the past. If this small piece had been published before the end of the war, then 
it would have comprised all the nationalist, ideological theories of interwar Japan. Yet, since 
it was published in 1950, it conveys a new message. Probably Watsuji was attempting to put 
Japan back into the world scenario of post-WWII global history and to, perhaps, assign a new 
role to the defeated Japan. Iijima argues that, even in the postwar period, Watsuji’s ideas did 
not undergo a major shift (Iijima 2003b: 159). The influence of Herder becomes stronger, 
because it becomes the ‘unity of humanity’ rather than the unity of the state in the Hegelian 
sense that had pervaded Watsuji’s writings until 1945. Iijima defines it as ‘an interpretation 
that goes from a Hegelian linear theory of development to a Herderian multi-branched theory 
of development’ (Iijima 2003b: 160). He also argues that, in the postwar period, the 
particularity of Japan does not disappear from Watsuji’s thoughts, it is simply subsumed in a 
historical movement from the self-awareness of the community to the self-awareness of the 
exchange with other communities, meaning other states, which becomes clear in the following 
passages. 
In 1951 Watsuji publishes a volume with a collection of various pieces: The Buried 
Japan. One of them is entitled Our Standpoint and it shells some of the ideas that are also 
expressed in Sakoku and in the second volume of Study of Ethics. Here Watsuji explains that, 
five years after the end of the war, the global situation is not what Japan had hoped for.  
The Japanese people who drafted the pacifist constitution are 
witnessing the Korean war that reminds them of the Second World 
War. Furthermore, the Japanese are still under the ‘duty’ (gimu) of the 
Potsdam declaration 
        (WTZ III: 480) 
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Two issues are at stake here: first of all, the Japanese had accepted the pacifist 
constitution drafted by the Americans in 1947, which banned Japan from carrying an 
offensive military apparatus and to only have self-defense forces, in line with the Potsdam 
declaration of July 1945 that asked for the unconditional surrender of Japan. The Korean war 
certainly posited a dangerous threat to the stability of East Asia and it was the first war 
combated in the Cold War period. Having Japan fallen under the American influence and by 
still being occupied by the Americans, the war that was fought in Korea definitely did not 
embodied the principle of peace everybody had hoped for after WWII. Watsuji reprimands 
the international community for not having respected the peace agreements, according to 
which, Watsuji says ‘colonialism and oppression should have been erased’ (WTZ III: 481). 
To him it is almost outrageous that Japan had been asked to renounce to have an army, 
something that Japan did ‘according to its principles’, but that the other powers did not. The 
specter of Communism is still present, especially when ‘the Communist countries dictators 
are in power’ (WTZ III: 486-7). Therefore, the standpoint of Japan remains to deny the use of 
weapons in any situation, because only in this way Japan would remain the only country that 
abides to the principles and regulations of the postwar imagined pacifist world order.  
The question here is where Watsuji’s standpoint is. In the first part, he seems to be 
criticizing the Allied forces for having ordered Japan to renounce to the use of weapons. 
Nonetheless, in the second part the responsibility appears to be on the shoulders of the 
Communist countries and their ‘dictators’. Thus, it is not clear what Watsuji is arguing against 
or in favour of. In addition, Watsuji seems to be convinced that Japan had apologized enough 
for the atrocities committed in the conflict, especially when he argues: 
In the UN, the former imperial powers are still not raising their voices      
against oppression, exploitation and intolerance 
        (WTZ III: 484) 
 
Certainly this criticism does not include Japan, which is also the ‘forgotten’ former 
imperial power. I do not believe that Watsuji was taken into this kind of ‘collective amnesia’ 
in the postwar period. Nonetheless, he does not seem to think that Japan has to bear any 
responsibility for the atrocities committed in the Second World War. His idea is that Japan 
was a victim of the ‘victors’ justice’ and therefore its role had to be reestablished in a different 
context. Hence, the double tragedy of the Japanese situation in the postwar period seems to be 
supported both by the undergone defeat and from the presence of dictatorships. These two 




having their conditions accepted and respected. In order to find the reason for both, Watsuji 
turns to the Tokugawa period. 
In Study of Ethics there is an interesting part that deals with the problem of the 
‘popular ought to be’ (kokuminteki tōi, Germ. Sollen): 
First, we have to consider the problem of internal popular ought to be 
and, secondly, to examine the problem of ‘one world’ as a matter of 
the oughtness of the people in the relationship between different 
national people 
    (WTZ XI: 347, emphasis in the original) 
 
Watsuji defines the established, prescribed morality in the Sollen and he sees it as the 
universal, general morality of each people. The morality of Japan is based on the Edo period 
‘popular morality’ (kokumin dōtoku) which influenced the successive eras as well as changed 
completely the interpretation of the relationship between father and son (WTZ XI: 350). As 
explained already in the previous volume, the ‘ethics’ that pervades the family is mirrored in 
the different communities until the nation, with the emperor at its forefront. On the birth of 
the ‘collective morality’, Watsuji says: 
Besides permeating the behavior of people, the manners of social 
relations come into being in the common sense of the citizens, or what 
we call manners of social relations of the members of society. In other 
words, it is the birth of collective morality 
    (WTZ XI: 359, emphasis in the original) 
 
In a way, when the culture changes, the change affects the structure of the jinrin as 
well, as it is shown in the example of the geographical community, where the stability and the 
introduction of agriculture modified the social structures. It is the rise of capitalism, though, 
that Watsuji accuses for having jeopardizes the global order (WTZ XI: 370). In fact, the 
economic structure came to mediate with the structure of the mutual service through capital, 
leaving the oughtness aside. The criticism is here addressed to both the conservative and the 
progressive, who have failed to see the revolution that was going on in the decadence of 
society. The formers did not recognize the problem and the progressives assumed a 
confrontational and revolutionary attitude (WTZ XI: 371). The criticism is once again 
directed towards the social modifications capitalist modernity brought along. In his view, the 
period that best exemplifies the import of European culture and modernity is the Edo one, 




morality of Japan with the emergence of the chōnin culture.154 The solution Watsuji proposes 
is to therefore reform the society and to overcome and restore the popular unity through a 
concrete return to the service to the wellness of the totality (WTZ XI: 393-4). In order for this 
to happen, the emperor has to be seen now as the ‘expression’ of the national unity, because it 
would be uncritical and forgetful to deny the historical tradition of Japan which has always 
recognized in the emperor the symbol of the nation. The oughtness resides thus in this 
movement of the restoration of a limited imperial power, in line with the new constitution of 
Japan that described the emperor as the ‘symbol’, stripping him of all the military and 
government powers.155 In the same way as he had done in Climate, Watsuji declares: 
As we have learnt, we have to revive the national character. The only 
way to attain this is to fully understand the different particularities. If 
particularities are thought to be the limit, then the path to overcome 
them will never be opened 
    (WTZ XI: 400, emphasis in the original) 
 
The message Watsuji is trying to convey is the fact that each particularity as national 
character has to be respected and defined according to the single cultural and climatic 
differences. Solely when this will happen there could be a kind of internationalism capable of 
overcoming the imperialism of the Second World War. This is what Watsuji means when he 
talks about ‘one world’ (hitotsu no sekai) as ‘one world-state’ (WTZ XI: 401). If there will be 
a failure to acknowledge this, then there will be the loss of the ‘character’ and of each national 
identity.  
As we can see from here, Watsuji’s argument is not that different from what he had 
already pronounced in Our Standpoint or Vico and Herder. His argument is quite clearly 
drawn back to his prewar writings, such as Climate or Study of Ethics, where the climate and 
the culture were linked to the historicity of each people. Watsuji found Vico and Herder 
useful in his analysis, because one provided the ‘particularity’ of human history according to 
men as the main agent in the history writing. On the other hand, Herder, with his accent on 
language and climate could provide a backup for Watsuji’s idea of the correspondence 
between climatic characteristics and national character. As Iijima already pointed out, 
Watsuji’s formulation of the particularity subsumed in the totality is still present in his 
postwar writings. The difference is that this time he is in favour of internationalism, although 
based on the assumption that differences need to be preserved. It is also interesting to notice 
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how Watsuji judges history from this standpoint. As a matter of fact, the introduction of 
capitalism represents the factor that contributed to the ruining of Japanese society and its 
traditional morality. By shifting the focus from service and ethics to the economical exchange, 
it jeopardized the classical standard of living. Remembering what he had argued in his debate 
with Kawakami Hajime, it is clear here that his hatred towards Marxism is not directed to the 
theories per se, but rather to the explanation of capitalism and capitalist society that Marxism 
provides. Secondly, as seen in the previous chapter, Watsuji had theorized a return to the 
Gemeinschaft in order to restore the ethical and moral principles of Japan.156 He had argued 
that each individual spontaneously ‘feels’ that it has to return to the totality because this is the 
totality of ‘humanity’ (WTZBII: 141). Here the same argument is restated and reshaped with 
the help of philosophy of history. The key concept, I believe, is the one of tradition. Before 
Watsuji had criticized Marxism from what he considered the erroneous standpoint of ‘class’. 
Now, by subsuming these previous considerations with the element of philosophy of history 
and its accent on historicity and particularity of the Volksgeist, he finds another reason to 
justify the specificity of Japan. ‘Humanity’, which in theory is a global concept, finds its 
crystallization in the climate and the social systems typical of certain people. Capitalism, on 
the other hand, remains global and therefore derogative of any specific way of development. 
The Edo period, or Watsuji’s vision of the Edo period, embodies the social changes that 
brought to the disruption of Japanese traditional society. The past he wants to identify with, 
once again, is the ideal past of pre-modern Japan. It is here that our discourse can be linked to 






National Seclusion and National Particularity 
The Buried Japan and Sakoku both deal with the context of 17th century Japan, the 
Tokugawa period. The Buried Japan starts with the analysis of the Kirishitan period, when 
Christianity was first introduced in Japan in the 15th century to then continue until the sakoku 
period (WTZ III: 382-96). In this piece Watsuji argues that the problems of Japan start 
already in the Sengoku era under the ruling of Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582) a ruler Watsuji 
                                                 




harshly criticizes. He describes him as ‘surrounded by sycophants’, a coward and a person of 
low moral standards who let ‘brainless people’ colonize his court (WTZ III: 399-401). He did 
not embody the idea of the ‘strong daimyō’; on the contrary he was weak and powerless. His 
successor, Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616) was instead eager to crack down on Christianity 
and to substitute the Buddhist religion with Confucian morality. Watsuji sees him as the one 
who attempted to establish a personal cult parallel to the one of the emperor. The major figure 
that brought Japan to the ruin although is not Ieyasu, but rather his decision to be surrounded 
by Hayashi Razan and his peers, who firmly attacked Buddhism and any kind of 
‘untraditional’ way of thinking. Ieyasu, by allowing Hayashi Razan to push Japan back to 
traditionalism, is guilty of having prevented its intellectual and military development. Watsuji 
says: 
Whilst in that period, in Europe, Shakespeare and Bacon were 
completing their ‘modern’ works, [in Japan] the attempt to slowly 
return to the ancient Chinese way of thinking cannot but be criticized 
for being an anachronism (jidai sakugo)157 
       (WTZ III: 407) 
 
The most important point for Watsuji is the fact that the thinkers of the Tokugawa 
period were in fact valuable and original thinkers. What prevented them from developing a 
‘modern’ intellect was the ban on the exchange with foreign cultures imposed by Ieyasu. 
Again: 
I think that the fact that Hayashi Razan and others dictated over 
education is such a terrible thing that can be barely described. The 
greatest misfortune for Japan in the sakoku period is that free thinking 
was oppressed, and that a reactionary, conservative spirit presided 
[over Japan] 
    (WTZ III: 407, emphasis in the original) 
 
In Sakoku this argument reappears, only to begin with the European empires, the 
discovery of Asia by Marco Polo, the travels of Vasco de Gama and the conquest of Latin 
America by the Spanish and the Portuguese. Only the second part of the book is dedicated to 
the history of Japan. Watsuji’s argument is that, if the West was modernizing and expanding 
by the means of its colonies, Japan was not. Rather, Japan was going backward, returning to a 
traditional way of thinking that could not have competed with Europe’s strength. The 
structure of the book is clearly an attempt to, once again, repositioning Japan in the global 
context. One of the other issues with Sakoku is the fact that rest of Asia is completely missing. 
                                                 




The focus is the dichotomy Europe-Japan, forward-backward, scientific-irrational. Probably it 
was done on purpose, since the book is supposed to reflect on the postwar Japanese situation 
and to find the causes of the defeat.  
What is of most interest for us is although the continuity that Watsuji sees between the 
sakoku mentality and the mentality of the Japanese leaders that took Japan into the war in the 
20th century (see Yuasa 1981: 241). In the introduction of the book Watsuji says: 
After the defeat in the Pacific war, the Japanese people have revealed 
their miserable condition. I do not intend to emphasize the feeling of 
inferiority the Japanese people are now under. In the finitude of 
human existence there are both exceptional events as well as flaws 
and weaknesses. Pointing at those flaws has been necessary after 
people had portrayed with empty discourses the superiority of the 
Japanese people. […] In one word, that weakness has been the lack of 
the scientific spirit 
    (WTZ XV: 15, emphasis in the original) 
 
The scientific spirit is that thing that drove Europe  and America towards the conquest 
of the rest of the world and to their scientific and technological development that resulted in 
their military superiority in WWII.  
Many commentators, amongst which Furukawa, have underlined the common 
denominator between The Buried Japan, Sakoku and an article Watsuji wrote in 1937, titled 
The Standpoint of the Bearer of the Creation of Culture (Bunkateki sōzō ni tazusawaru mono 
no tachiba) (see Furukawa 1966: 497 ff).158 This piece was written after the Marco Polo 
Bridge incident of 1937 and it is a strong call for the particularity of Japan in the ‘world 
civilization’ (sekai bunmei) (WTZ XVII: 441). Watsuji here is even more explicit in his 
criticism of Europe and the United States, drawing the line between ‘white’ and ‘Asian’ 
people. Stunningly, Watsuji argues: 
The role prescribed to the Japanese is, essentially, to preserve the 
freedom of ten million Asians. Without this freedom, in its deepest 
meaning, it will not be possible to describe the culture of humanity 
       (WTZ XVII: 442) 
 
To him, the oppression Japan is under is due to the fact that the country is 
technologically progressing. The more it will progress, the more it will be oppressed. This 
represents the ‘pathetic but heroic destiny of Japan’ (hisō unmei) that his citizens have to 
abide to. At the same time, this is a great moment in Japanese history, Watsuji underlines, 
                                                 




when Japanese people have the chance to safeguard world history, although ‘the burden will 
be heavy’ (WTZ XVII: 444).  
The particularity of Japan is here reproposed, albeit in a different context. It seems that 
there is continuity in Watsuji’s thought from the prewar to the postwar period. The accent is 
always on the particularity of the Japanese character or nation in opposition to the other 
people. If internationalism in the prewar period was seen as a negative aspect of history, 
remembering how Watsuji harshly dismissed the League of Nations in the first volume of 
Study of Ethics, now it is reevaluated in positive terms. The question, as also specified above, 
is whether to posit the sakoku period and the Meiji one. Since the Edo era had been positively 
assessed, the Meiji and the Shōwa are although considered as dooming periods. The time 
Watsuji would like to return to is probably unattainable and born out of a utopian concept of 
the nation. The sakoku period prevented Japan to develop and display its force in the 17th 
century. Now, in the Shōwa period, the same kind of secluded mentality has prevented Japan 
from winning the war or, better, it has allowed for an unconditional surrender and defeat. 
LaFleur argues that Watsuji considered the sakoku mentality as an anomaly in Japanese 
history, since Japan had always been opened to other cultures (the jusōsei of Climate) 
(LaFleur 2001: 14). Nevertheless, I do not entirely agree with his argument that ‘wars and 
historical tragedies such as the ones known to the Japanese in the Twentieth century are not 
brought about by a constitutively flawed rationality’ (LaFleur 2001: 17). LaFleur is arguing 
from the standpoint of Weberian rationality and linking it to Watsuji’s personal interest in 
Bacon from the early 1940s onwards. The problem is that, by arguing solely on the ground of 
rationality, there is the possibility of losing contact with the most important issue: Watsuji’s 
particularism. His ideas about Japan and Asia do not lose power in the postwar period, they 
might have changed setting and makeup but they constitute a clear ideological argument on 
the basis of the superiority of one nation. 
The core question is how Watsuji defines modernity and what modernity means to him. 
On a first glance, Watsuji appears to blame the import of European culture and capitalism for 
the underdevelopment of Japan. Nevertheless, if his books are read carefully, they show that 
modernity was a ‘necessary evil’ to compete with the other superpowers. This argument 
might be similar to Miki’s, when he argues that, in the 1930s, it was impossible to get rid of 
all the Western influences in Japanese society without destroying that society as a whole. Yet, 
Watsuji writes from the standpoint of the late 1940s and early 1950s, where the problem of 
modernity is not linked anymore to a question of national identity, but rather it is constructed 




attempt to create another utopian type of Japanese people? Watsuji seems to be thinking so. 
His utopian type, if we had to describe it in Miki’s terms, is born out of an erroneous self-
perception developed in the 1930s and 1940s and stretched until the 1950s, where the 
reshaping of the Japanese role in the global scenario becomes a matter of alliance, rather than 
opposition, to the United States. By blaming capitalism for the defeat in the Second World 
War, Watsuji is attempting to establish a secure cause for the failure of the Japanese 
commanders to bring Japan to a victory. The problem is that, without that capitalism, the 
Japanese nation would have remained in a ‘backward’ state, as he described in Sakoku. Yuasa 
affirms that probably Watsuji was not aware of the fact that, by arguing that the position of 
Japan had been destroyed in the postwar period, his personal position had been destroyed as 
well (Yuasa 1981: 243). In fact, this is what happened indeed. Watsuji’s argument that Japan 
has been a victim of Western powers from the sakoku period on does not leave room for a 
positive assessment of his standpoint either. On the contrary, it seems to suggest that Watsuji 
was not capable of finding a safe ground where to put himself and, for this reason, he still 
could not find a reasonable cause and solution for the loss of his identity and the identity of 
the people he represented. 
According to him, Japan still needed to be seen as a particular nation to survive the 
defeat. Despite this, it does not allow for Watsuji to judge the standpoint of Japan being 







In this chapter we have seen how Miki and Watsuji approached the problem of 
philosophy of history from two different standpoints. Miki tried to solve the question of 
history and history writing by grounding a whole ‘society’ into a kind of nation-time. Watsuji 
attempted to solve the problem of the Japanese defeat by returning to an ideal past and time 
where the influence of Europe had not been experienced yet. He continued along the same 
lines of the prewar period, by judging the particularity of Japan as a source in the new postwar 
internationalism. He still poses the accent on the Japanese national character as a particular 




the end of the war. His ideal ‘type’ is as much utopian as Miki’s criticism of  the idea of being 
‘German’. On the other hand Miki developed his idea of the human being in the direction of a 
national community. If before the accent was on the societal component of human existence, 
here, by focusing on ‘time’ and ‘renovation’, he transformed this community into a nation. 
The eternal, over-encompassing present time is tightened to the formation of a new human 
being that will arise from within society. Miki criticized the direction German philosophy 
went after WWI and for having created a utopian self-perception. Yet, the crystallization of 
the national time is a potential preparatory stage for a similar ideological development. 
Furthermore, the basis for the unfolding of such a national, temporal definition is the creation 
from nothingness or of a new ‘type’ that could overcome the feeling of Angst. Miki’s Neo-
Humanism hence represents both the acknowledgement and the recognition of the climate of 
historical uncertainty on the one hand, and, on the other, it stands as a possible response to a 
society that needed to find its new position in the world. Miki’s idea of the human being is 
rooted in an absolute present that contributes to the creation of a utopian self-perception of an 
‘eccentric’ human being. The ‘eccentric’ is thus capable of standing above its own structural 
society and reform it from within. This, I believe, is tantamount to the idea of a nation that 
was trying to cope with the mutation of the international geo-political landscape and therefore 
to rise above it. From here to the Shōwa Research Association the path is short. Miki and 
Watsuji become now associated with the ideology of imperialism of wartime Japan. Despite 
the fact that Watsuji was writing in a different historical context, I still believe that his 
writings could be judge retroactively, because of the continuity between his ideas in 1930s 
and in the 1950s. The outcome is, for Watsuji, his re-positioning in a different global scenario 
by means of the reestablishment of the prewar ideology. Miki moved towards a more global 











V. NINGEN AND MODERNITY 
Before and After the War: the 1940s and the 1950s 
 
 
The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent 
the more technology threatens to slip from human 
control.159     
 
 
In July 1937 the hostilities between the Chinese army and the Japanese one exploded 
in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (Bix 2000: 317-23). Following the incident, the Japanese 
army marched to occupy Beijing and subsequently moved towards Southern China, 
occupying Shanghai and Nanjing and the cities in between. It was the start of the ‘holy war’ 
that aimed at subjugating the whole world under the imperial ruling (Bix 2000: 326-7). In 
September 1940 Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy and in December 
1941 Japanese planes bombarded the American base of Pearl Harbor, signing the official 
entry of Japan in the worldwide hostilities of WWII.  
The four years that elapsed between the start of the second phase of the war in China 
and the outburst of the total war were the period that saw Miki plunging into the militarist 
ideology of the Japanese regime that culminated with his official entry in the Shōwa Research 
Association in 1938. Despite the fact that Miki had previously condemned the emergence of 
‘irrational forces’ in Japan and that he had written against the seize of power of Nazism and 
fascism, in those four years he certainly became a state intellectual that actively supported the 
expansionist campaigns of his country.160 The works that he published, both under his name 
and under the seal of the Shōwa group, show a critical turn in his thinking that, nevertheless, 
still contains some of the main themes that had occupied his production from Pascal onwards. 
As a matter of fact, the idea of ningen as median and the problem of Angst still remain his 
foremost preoccupations and sources of continuous interrogations into the question of human 
existence. The main difference between this period and the previous ones is that his human 
being becomes de facto the Japanese nation in the quest for its own empire.  
The causes for his direct participation into the Japanese imperial project could be 
traced in his writings on the relationship between everydayness and world-history and in the 
theory of the kairos that had trapped Japan in a kind of fascist temporality. Secondly, in his 
Neo-Humanism that had already shown that the human being was part of the grand scheme of 
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the Japanese nation. Between 1937 and 1941 Miki’s ningen underwent a subsequent 
transformation that had its outcome in the creation of the homo faber underpinned by a new, 
technological society. In this later phase of his intellectual activity, technology stands as the 
core concept aimed at historically solve the overarching spirit of crisis and, philosophically, at 
molding a new human being capable of facing the challenges brought on by the war. Thus, in 
this context where Japan was moving towards a state of extended belligerence, Miki felt that a 
new period of Angst was approaching and therefore sought to overcome it by means of a 
newly renovated human being. Miki therefore used technology as a mean to reflect on the 
development of technological warfare and on the crisis of modernity. Medianity began to take 
a new shape. It retained its character of fundamental prescription of human existence, but it 
took the form of a ‘poietic subject’, a legacy from Philosophy of History, that 
‘technologically’ acts in Japanese society. Miki’s new theory was included in Philosophical 
Anthropology (Tetsugakuteki Ningengaku, 1933-37) and in Philosophy of Technology 
(Gijutsu no tetsugaku, 1942). 161  
In line with his new role of state intellectual, Miki devoted some of his attention to 
questions of intellectual agency in Addressing the Intellectuals (Chishiki kaikyū ni atau, 1938) 
and in Addressing Young Intellectuals, or on the National Sentiment and National Destiny, 
(Seinen chishikisō ni atau –Aikokushin to minzokuteki shimei ni tsuite, 1939), to the 
omnipresent spirit of crisis in The Understanding of Crisis (Kiki no haaku, 1941) and to mass 
culture in The Formation of Popular Culture (Kokumin bunka no keisei, 1940). 162 In addition, 
Miki started writing what should have been his masterpiece, a study of the concept of 
imagination in Kant, that nevertheless was never finished: Logic of Imagination (Kōsōryoku 
no ronri, 1937-1946).163 Since the following and last chapter of this thesis predominantly 
deals with Miki’s participation in the Shōwa Research Association, I will here address the 
issues that arose in last stages of Miki’s genealogy of ningen and highlight the path he 
followed before his official involvement with the government think tank.  
The 1940s were a period of personal travail for Watsuji as well. The outburst of the 
total war pushed Watsuji to reflect on the strength of Japanese tradition and on its ‘historical 
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mission’ in the world. In these years, Watsuji became a fervent supporter of the Japanese 
wartime regime and of its military enterprise in Asia. Nevertheless, the constant motive of his 
writings remains the human being in the form of the aidagara, albeit expressed in a different 
fashion. As a matter of fact, between 1944 and 1952 Watsuji’s core question was the 
‘reverence to the emperor’ (sonnō shin) and not, specifically, betweeness. Watsuji started 
investigating the reason behind the unconditional devotion that the Japanese subjects had 
always had towards the emperor and he found the answer in the idea of the reverence to the 
emperor that, he claimed, ran throughout the whole of Japanese history. To him, the reverence 
had been the foundational element that helped Japan overcoming the difficult historical 
periods that it had to face in the course of the centuries and, most importantly, it was the 
quintessential element that could have been used to contrast ‘Western’ modernity and its 
individualism.  
What is thus the relationship between the reverence and medianity? It should not be 
forgotten that to Watsuji betweeness was the prescriptive and normative structure of the 
human being and that was also at the basis of the ethical structure of society. In Study of 
Ethics Watsuji wrote that the emperor was the benevolent father and the benevolent ruler of 
the Japanese nation.164 Therefore, Japanese society was structured like a pyramid, with the 
emperor at the top and his subjects at the bottom. The Japanese subjects in their structural 
relationship with the emperor were naturally pushed towards him in the dialectical movement 
of negation. In 1944, the feeling of belonging to the Japanese state, thus, appeared to be 
dictated both by the ontological structure of the human being as aidagara and by the force 
that the emperor exercised in his embodiment of the supreme element of national awareness 
and national unity. In 1944 Watsuji seemed to have found the final push that Japan needed to 
win the war in the unconditional devotion that the Japanese people felt towards their ruler that, 
at the same time, brought them to endure unbearable sacrifices.165 
After 1945 Watsuji continued reflecting on this topic in an attempt to find a reason for 
the defeat in WWII.  He re-embarked in a journey of exploration of Japanese history and he 
gave the same answer. Most importantly, he restated the importance of the reverence in an 
written debate with the constitutionalist Sasaki Sōichi (1878-1965) that verged on the idea of 
the kokutai as expressed in the new Japanese Constitution of 1947. In the face of another 
crisis, the one of the tragic loss of WWII accompanied by the American occupation of Japan, 
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Watsuji did not change his ideas nor his framework. He saved the Japanese emperor and his 
role and he continued believing in the particularity and exceptionalism of Japan.  
In order to prove that Watsuji’s ideas did not undergo a major shift between the 
prewar and the postwar period, I will employ a transwar perspective. I will thus compare two 
pieces that deal with the subject of the reverence to the emperor. One, The Reverence to the 
Emperor and Its Tradition (Sonnō shisō to sono dentō) was published at the height of the war 
in 1944 and the other one, The Symbol of National Unity (Kokumin tōgō no shōchō) in 1948, 
at the end of WWII and after the promulgation of the new Japanese constitution. 166 
Nevertheless, there is another book that Watsuji wrote in two volumes in 1952, Japanese 
Ethical Thought (Nihon rinri shisōshi), where he dealt with the same subject.167 Scholars of 
Watsuji have pointed out how Ethical Thought stunningly resembles The Reverence, both in 
the chapter division as well as in the contents (see Yonetani 1990; Yonetani 1994a; Yonetani 
1994b; Akasaka 1989 and Furukawa 1966). Needless to say, Ethical Thought is an expanded, 
revised and edited version of his previous work. In order not to repeat the comparison that 
others have already undertaken, I will approach the topic from a different angle and I will 
specifically compare The Reverence to The Symbol. 
Thus Miki and Watsuji differently but similarly reacted to the historical crisis that was 
then unfolding. They both addressed the problem of ‘modernity’ by creating a new, bodily 
and national subject that could have faced the challenges and the internal contradictions that 
the war was starting to expose Japan to. Miki created a technological subject whilst Watsuji 
stuck his Japanese subject in the immobile body of the emperor. In the postwar period Watsuji 
remained faithful to this principle, as if he was facing the crisis of modernity once again.  
In the next chapter we will discuss Watsuji’s involvement with the committee who 
wrote the draft of the Kokutai no hongi together with his most political pieces and we will try 
to answer the question of how Watsuji, alongside Miki, remained caught up in the ideology of 
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1941) were two official documents drafted with the purpose of sanctioning the ideology of the Japanese ultra-
nationalist regime. Watsuji’s appears amongst those who drew up the first draft of the former document, 




The Road to Technology 
Miki intermittently wrote Philosophical Anthropology between 1933 and 1937, when 
he started writing The Logic of Imagination. These three hundred pages are the summa of 
Miki’s production. They contain all the main themes from Pascalian medianity, to Marxian 
praxis, to the Heideggerian idea of the World until technology as narrated in his subsequent 
Philosophy of Technology as well as the emergence of the concept of imagination. This all-
encompassing work represents a useful tool in understanding why he chose the human being 
and how he attempted to renovate it on a philosophical, political and historical level.  
The first two chapters reiterate the themes present in Philosophy of History, as well as 
in the other philosophy of history-oriented work Anthropology and Philosophy of History. 
Nevertheless, Philosophical Anthropology seems to conflate the different ideas expressed in 
his two previous books. In particular, Miki redefines ‘anthropology’ in terms of 
‘philosophical anthropology’. To Miki, philosophical anthropology now represents the only 
science that considers the human being in its subjective role (MKZ XVIII: 128). The ‘human 
self-awareness’ (ningen jikaku), that was before only reached through a comparison with 
other species and animals, overlooking the ‘subjective’ role the human being has in the 
environment, becomes the Pascalian awareness of the pathos (MKZ XVIII: 140). 
Anthropology is thus the science that is able to unify the ‘human intellect’ (ningen chi) with 
the ‘philosophy of life’ (jinseikan). Miki had previously described human existence as ‘the 
unity of a myriad of sounds’ which was not ‘a pleasant symphony’. 169 Now human existence 
is narrated in terms of contradictions that are nevertheless always rooted in the condition of 
medianity.  
Miki writes: 
‘The human being is not divine nor evil’, so Pascal said. The 
definition of the human being that I have so far provided, and there are 
many albeit not all concordant, is the one that prescribes the human 
being qua ‘chūkansha’ or medium. Even when Descartes conformed 
to the definition of the human being as a thinking animal, he still 
recognized it as ‘the medium between God and nothingness’. In truth, 
the human being as medium belongs to the basic experience (kiso 
keiken) of our real and everyday life, as discovered by many other 
philosophies. The difference is that these very same philosophies 
could not provide anything other than a theoretical interpretation of 
the different ways this basic experience is at work. Rather, if the 
concept of medium could be fundamentally defined as the human 
being, we would not be needing anymore all those numerous concepts 
to define what it is constituted of. Medium is not simply an amalgam 
                                                 




nor a mere quantitative middle (chūkan), and since it stands as the 
characterial and total definition of the human being, it follows that it 
must encompass all its internal contradictions and grasps them 
dialectically. The human being is an existence full of contradictions 
  (MKZ XVIII: 132; Latin in the original, emphasis added) 
 
In the brief passage above, Miki shows us the essence of his philosophical enterprise, 
which consisted in taking the condition of medianity as the fundamental prescription of 
human existence, linking it to basic experience as ‘negotiating experience’ of his Marxist 
period and having it underpinned by the condition of uncertainty described through the 
Pascalian comparison between man the reed. From here Miki moves towards the 
‘situatedness’ (jōjōsei) of human existence, where the eternal question of Angst permeates 
both the human being, the environment and the world.  
Here the environment is considered not as mere nature, but rather as the Welt, in the 
sense of Heidegger’s World that opens a certain amount of possibilities to the Dasein. The 
ningen needs to be ‘open’ (ningen wa sekai ni hirakaretewiru) to the world and being its 
ontological rather than ontic centre (MKZ XVIII: 266). This central position is not described 
in terms of Zentrum, but rather Mitte or milieu, a condition by means of which the human 
being becomes the median between subject and object as a form of action. As Miki underlines, 
on a theoretical level action signifies ‘taking a stand’ or ‘relate to’ the world (MKZ XVIII: 
268). The problem is that these forms of action are completely unconscious and dictated by 
our inner and subjective part of existence dominated by the Nietzschean pathos of distance or 
the Greek ubris. Medianity pushes the human being towards ‘eccentricity’, something that 
had already been pointed out in the Shestov piece, which eventually represents the only way 
out from apathy and insecurity. 
In Anthropology and Philosophy of History Miki discussed the idea of the creation 
from nothingness and the ‘rise above nothingness’ that the human being faces in its existence. 
This problem is approached a second time in Philosophical Anthropology but in a different 
fashion. On the one hand, the creation from nothingness remains a stable concept. On the 
other, it is here linked to the question of ‘solitude’, where our inner feeling becomes clear and 
apparent in boredom and ennuit. The resolving to the divertissement, the condemnation of 
human existence in Pascal, is compared to the ‘limit situation’ in Jaspers (Grenzsituationen; 
kyokugen jōjō) (MKZ XVIII: 280).170 In this respect, Miki seems to express his appreciation 
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for Heidegger’s finitude of the Dasein and its highest realization or wholeness in its Being-
towards-Death, although at the same time considering Jaspers’ Grenzsituationen as the 
necessity of our life in the world. The innovation he introduces is ‘nothingness’, which 
comparatively functions as Heidegger’s project of the Dasein and, at the same time, as the 
push for the human being to become self-aware of the limit situation as an a-priori and thus 
definitive prescription of human existence. Contrary to the negativity expressed in the two 
philosophers, Miki’s view seems to convey a positive message which reflects his ‘creation of 
nothingness’ qua work of art. Similarly to what Akamatsu noted in regards to the relationship 
between Miki and Shestov, the same could be said here.171 The nothingness the human being 
feels is certainly a void and the finitude of existence. The key is that Miki does foresee a new 
type of man that could overcome the solitude and the anxiety through eccentricity and through 
the awareness of the very same limitation. The downside, as explained elsewhere, is the 
envisioning of a pathological society derived from a ‘pathological and manic existence 
[caused by medianity]’ (MKZ XVIII: 270).  
Therefore, my interpretation of Miki’s concept of medianity differs from Miyakawa’s 
who, in his Miki Kiyoshi, links the ‘median’ to ‘self-interpretation’ (jiko kaishaku) (Miyakawa 
1976: 138). Miyakawa, referring to a piece from Tanikawa Tetsuzō, concludes that Miki’s 
overarching theme since his Marburg time had been the ‘self-interpretation’ of the human 
being qua anthropology.172 Employing psychology on the one hand and history on the other, 
Miyakawa determines that Miki’s self-interpretation became his central concern and that, 
therefore, he built a ‘combative humanism’ (sentōteki hyūmanizumu) born out of Taishō 
humanism and reinforced by Marxism (Miyakawa 1976: 155). Tsuda, on the other hand, 
argues that the process that led Miki to elaborate his concept of ‘true persona’ (shin no 
jinkaku) conflated the Taishō personalism with the Shōwa socialism inspired by Marxism 
(Tsuda in Kiyoshi et al. 2008: 169).  Despite the fact that I sympathize with these readings of 
Miki’s thought, I believe that Miki’s central concern was neither ‘self-interpretation’ nor 
‘personalism’, but rather medianity qua fundamental condition of human existence that 
needed to be overcome. His obsession with the taipu clearly reflects his intellectual struggle 
                                                                                                                                                        
frustrate our desire to see our finite situation as a whole, to ascertain the totality of the world and of life. Thus the 
limit situation of death contradicts life, chance contradicts necessity and meaning, war contradicts reciprocity, 
guilt contradicts innocence […] For the antinomic means destruction, which is always experienced in a co-
experience of the whole, of the unity which is somehow being broken ‘Contradictions remain as antinomies at 
the limit of our knowledge in the face of infinities’”. (Kiesel 1993: 140-1 and Jaspers quoted in Kiesel 1993: 
141).  
171 See Chapt. 4. 
172 The piece Miyakawa refers to is: Tanikawa Tetsuzō, ‘Tetsugakusha Miki Kiyoshi’, in Kaisō no Miki Kiyoshi, 




towards a renovation of society as a whole capable of going beyond the period of crisis the 
world was then facing. It is the midst of the apparent irrationality that permeates Miki’s 
thought that his idea of technology has to be considered. First of all we have to start from a 







The Acting Subject 
In 1933, Miki published a small piece called On Pathos (Patosu ni tsuite) in which he 
introduced the concept of shutai, or the ‘embodied subject’, in relation to feelings.173 His 
discussion was mainly concerned with Aristotle’s Ars Poietica, although it does lay the 
foundation for the development of his own idea of subject. Miki says that shutai is the only 
‘entity’ that is capable of describing the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’ human being in a 
movement of double transcendence (MKZ XIX: 582). Miki adds that the human being cannot 
be constituted merely of spirit, but that it is ‘bodily’ (shintaiteki) too (MKZ XIX: 582). 
Therefore: 
The consciousness of pathos is the one that is delimited by the shutai 
when it transcends consciousness in an inward direction. These are 
violence, emotions and passions. Pathos does not reproduce the shutai, 
it expresses it. This is the reason why I determined that the problem of 
pathos is a problem of creation 
       (MKZ XIX: 583) 
 
Creation is thus here related to poiesis, as in Philosophy of History, but at the same 
time it involves a new kind of poeitic subject whose consciousness is transcended from within 
and from outside. Conflating language, rhetoric, poiesis and theory of the subject Miki aims at 
overcoming the Diltheian Verstehen that, to him, disregards the importance of societal 
expression, because it considers society an external system (MKZ XVIII: 342). The shutai 
does not allow for an external object to interfere neither with the epistemological process nor 
with praxis. The artist is ‘expressed’ in the work of art as much as he ‘expresses’ it. Since 
pathos ‘expresses’ the subject: 
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Pathos is not simply the subject (shukan). On the contrary true pathos 
is what sets us free from its constrictions 
      (MKZ XVIII: 349) 
 
Expression, in the unity with technology, gives birth to rhetoric that, in return, reveals 
the true character of the human being (MKZ XVIII: 325).174 Rhetoric is societal because in 
the process of language there needs to be a speaker and an interlocutor that is at the basis of 
the social relationship between man and man. As in the work of art, in literature the writer 
expresses himself in his piece of literature and his own self qua writer spontaneously 
expresses itself in the vacuity. In this way, through communication and expression in the 
creation from nothingness, truth is revealed. In a highly complicated and circular reasoning 
that includes coining three different terms for ‘truth’, Miki concludes that the unity between 
truth and truthfulness is reached only in technology (MKZ XVIII: 345). Technology is 
consequently an active and poietic activity, where the first moment of the logos or the ‘idea’ 
is united with the second moment of the pathos, or the production from nothingness. Again, 
the subject-object unification does not leave room for something ‘external’, therefore the 
absolute ‘object’ or moteur behind it needs to be nothingness. Miki affirms that even world 
history is ‘expressional’ history, because it represents the two aspects of interiority and 
exteriority (MKZ XIX: 773).175 
Language, rhetoric and technology therefore establish the new role the subject covers 
in Miki’s philosophy. The shutai, to some extent, is the evolution of the ningen. If we had to 
use the language of Philosophy of History, the shutai could be defined as the unity of logos of 
pathos; in the Marxist period it would have instead represented the unity of theory and 
practice or anthropology and ideology in the praxis of the ningen-class. In the expression of 
the pathos the human being is set free from its constrictions precisely because it becomes the 
shutai that overcomes the epistemological difference between subject and object. In this 
instance, Miki’s theory of ‘expression’ is heavily influenced by Nishida’s. In 1936 Nishida 
had had argued that the historical world had become the dialectical world where the acting 
self self-expressed (Kosaka 1995: 80-1). Moreover, this world was one of poiesis. As it had 
happened with the universal and the particular in the locus of Nothingness, so the world 
expressed and limited itself in the self and the self in the world. To Nishida that human life 
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was historical, and not abstract as in Kant, and therefore action was ‘expression’ from its 
original Greek root which was poiesis (Nishida and Miki 2007: 58).  Action is expression and 
in Miki this discourse is re-interpreted in the discourse on technology, where technology 
becomes the ‘active and poietic activity’. 
This bodily subject had been pointed out and used by Watsuji as well. In his 1938 
Personality and Humanity (Jinkaku to jinruisei) Watsuji embarks in a critique of Kant’s 
concept of humanity as expressed in the Critic of Practical Reason and The Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals. Especially in the chapter titled ‘The problem of the body’, Watsuji 
contests to Kant that his division between internal sense and external sense, or time and space, 
is at the basis for the division of soul and body. In a reasoning that reminds us of Miki’s 
double transcendence and the internal-external human being, Watsuji declares that since the ‘I 
think’ is fundamentally a synthetic faculty, it must belong to a synthetic subject (WTZ IX: 
341 ff). The synthetic subject is nothing other than shutai, which can overcome the subject-
object division established by Descartes and then revised by Kant in his philosophical 
‘Copernican revolution’. According to Watsuji, the most important sense is space and not 
time. Space is where the human being qua shutai or embodied subject objectifies itself, 
notwithstanding that the transcendental apperception remains within itself. Possibly, the 
transcendental apperception becomes a subject constituted of body and soul. Again, to 
Watsuji what is most important is to grant the highest status to the aidagara, rather than to set 
consciousness as the ‘individual’ Subject. Watsuji’s bodily transcendental apperception 
objectifies itself in a material body that is a specific and fundamental part of the I-Thou 
relationship. As seen before, this relationship constitutes medianity and it is foundational as 
well as normative. Later, in the second volume of A Study of the Japanese Spirit (Zoku nihon 
seishinshi kenkyū) Watsuji defines the shutai as the ‘Japanese people’ (WTZ IV: 298).176 He 
restates that it is not possible to separate the spirit from the materia and that, therefore, the 
living totality of the Japanese people needs to be considered as a national and ‘bodily’ subject.  
Shutai qua embodied subject does not have to be seen as the ‘body’ in the sense of 
body-mind theories. Rather, both in Miki and in Watsuji the subject functions as an 
overcoming of the traditional epistemological subject on the one hand and, on the other, as the 
basis of the relationship between human beings that is the cornerstone of their thoughts.  
In Logic of Imagination Miki reshapes his concept of society in terms of the I-Thou 
relationship. Here Miki argues that society is the transcendental, creative subject thanks to the 
                                                 




fact that its root, the human being, is fore and foremost a discoverer and a creator (MKZ VIII: 
183-5). Once again, society comes to bear a position of supremacy but, differently from 
Watsuji, it does not come as a heavy burden for the individual. Miki tries to explain the value 
he gives to society in a historical sense. In his theorization, Miki indirectly criticizes Watsuji 
and his concept of betweeness. On the one hand, as Watsuji, Miki says that society represents 
the relationship between man and man and that, therefore, it takes the meaning of ‘World’ 
(MKZ XVIII: 374). Watsuji as well, in his Study of Ethics, described ningen as the ‘World’ 
(WTZ X: 16 ff). Secondly, Miki criticizes Heidegger’s idea of the Dasein, albeit in a different 
fashion if compared to Watsuji’s. If Watsuji had contested the idea of Dasein qua individual 
in Climate, Miki criticizes Heidegger’s division between the ordinary man (das Man) and the 
Dasein. Hence, for Miki, Heidegger’s abstraction of the human being is not strictly related to 
individualism but rather on having created two separate human beings, one authentic and the 
other one not. The critique of the German philosopher is here expanded as an indirect critique 
of Watsuji as well.   
Miki affirms that the ‘I and the Thou’ (watashi to kimi) is not society, but rather 
society is where this relationship is established (MKZ XVIII: 372-3). If we had to consider it 
as totality, then the differences between I, Thou, He and We would cease to exists and one of 
the elements would become preponderant. Watsuji, on the other hand, clustered society into 
the relationship itself. In other words, he absolutized the ‘I-Thou’ and equated it to society. 
Miki says that Heidegger’s ‘man’ is the ordinary one whilst, in the everydayness, the ningen 
is not simply a personage (kakujin) but a personality (jinkaku) (MKZ XVIII: 374). It does not 
‘play a role’ in the relationship between different personas, but it is rather the World.  
The value of our personality (jikaku) is not related to the value of the 
role we play. By considering the human being as merely comprised in 
aidagara, the significance of personality would be disregarded. 
Despite the fact that the concept of the I-Thou is more a concept of the 
human being qua aidagara or human being in his role, it shows even 
more distinctively the importance of the concept of personality  
       (MKZ XVIII: 376) 
 
Miki acknowledges, in his sources, that his reading of Heidegger was in fact inspired 
by Löwith’s critique of the German master, as it was for Watsuji. The main difference is that 
Watsuji did not considered his aidagara as an abstraction of the human being. On the contrary, 
he considered it a critique of Heidegger’s abstract individualism. Kosaka points out that 




to exist (Kosaka 1997: 258-9).177 The aidagara also embodies society, the relationship self-
grounds itself, although Watsuji insists that it is grounded in nothingness. Hattori even says 
that Watsuji’s aidagara absolutizes the feudal, social status based on relationality that 
hampers historical change (Hattori 2006: 86). The absolutizing of the aidagara does indeed 
result in the absolutization of the state and the emperor. Miki seems to be thinking along the 
lines of Kosaka and Hattori, despising the idea of an absolute society and trying to ‘construct’ 
it from a different perspective. The question remains around how this concept of personality 
can overcome the theoretical issues present in the I-Thou relationship and why Miki resumed 
to such a concept. Unfortunately, this chapter of Philosophical Anthropology is left unfinished. 
Therefore, we cannot know what kind of role personality would take up. The only important 
remark is that society needs to be seen as a technological, expressional subject that will 







Technology and Society 
Miki’s view of technology, as he himself admits, sparked out of the reading of, 
amongst others, Friedrich Dessauer’s Philosophy of Technology (1927), Oswald Spengler’s 
Men and Technics (1931) and Werner Sombart’s The Taming of Technics (1935). Together 
with Heidegger, these thinkers contributed, to various extents, to the germination and spread 
of the Nazi ideology.178 Leaving aside value judgments regarding their involvement, the fact 
that Miki reflected on their ideas of technology and technological development in that very 
same historical context cannot be overlooked. Miki heavily contributed to the creation of a 
‘technology of culture’ in Japan as his German counterparts did in Germany. 179 I will attempt 
here to explain how Miki arrived to such a conclusion.  
Miki describes technology as ‘the medium between the environment and the subject 
(shutai)’ that manifests its essence in the use of tools (MKZ VII: 202-3). The origin of 
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technology resides in its inherent possibility of ‘making’ things, in its active and producing 
characteristic that is guided, on the one hand, by the human intellect and, on the other, by the 
human body. Due to this, technology is ‘active, productive, but most of all, historical action’ 
(MKZ VII: 211). As other philosophers pointed out before him, in technology there needs to 
be a differentiation between ‘tools’ (dōgu) and ‘means’ (shudan). 180  Tools are, to Miki, 
practical means, or the way the systems of means make themselves apparent in the material 
production. The risk that the human being encounters in the process of production is for tools 
to become detached from it when they become machineries. In this respect, modern 
technology has completely parted from the ‘living organisms’ (MKZ VII: 321).181 In this 
respect, Miki is not that far apart from Sombart’s idea of the ‘mechanicization of the human 
being’. Nevertheless, Sombart described his contempt of the state of German society in the 
1930s and its capitalist tendencies as rooted in a ‘pervasive Jewish Geist’, that was embodied 
in the Marxist idea of ‘exchange value’, and that, in turn, was trying to destroy the Christian, 
German, positive ‘use value’ (Herf 1984: 130 ff).182 Sombart did not describe technology as 
inherently good or evil, but he did indeed called for a ‘technopolitics’ in which the state 
should have controlled the mechanization of technology in order for it to serve the common 
good (Herf 1984: 150).  
Miki agrees with the fact that technology has taken over humanity. Nevertheless, he 
strives to define it as a ‘medium’ between subject and object, between sciences and 
experience. Most interestingly, he proposes it as an antidote to ‘the poisoning of Japan by the 
theories of Japanese essentialism’ (MKZ VII: 302). He affirms: 
Nowadays, many people have expressed the necessity for a 
technological progress. In reality, that necessity has not been 
sufficiently emphasized. The development of technology is matter of 
great national urgency. Especially today, the question of technology is 
intimately linked to the question of Weltanshauung. Grasping this 
world-view problem means rooting it in a new technological Geist 
     (MKZ VII: 300; German added) 
 
Miki speaks of the new Geist as the newly renovated Japanese spirit by means of 
which Japan would have been able to rise on the world stage vis-à-vis the imperial powers. 
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182 Herf notices how the Marxist terminology is here used by Sombart in terms of nationality and race (Herf 
1984: 139). Compare to what Watsuji said about Marxism and the ‘good’ use value of pre-modern Japanese 




The development of technology is therefore inextricably linked to the crisis of modernity that 
is embodied in the technological development that Europe and America had successfully 
managed to achieve in comparison to Japan. By calling technology a ‘national urgency’, Miki 
underlines how important it was for his country to rapidly reach that stage, especially in the 
height of the war with China. Therefore, on the one hand technology has taken over 
‘humanity’ whilst, on the other, its driving force is still a necessary ‘evil’ in the time of war. 
Later, Miki will solve this apparent contradiction by affirming that, in order to create a new 
technological spirit, the ‘Western’ mechanical technology should have been merged with the 
‘Eastern’ moral spirit. Miki’s stress on the urgency of technological development, therefore, 
does not put him in an antagonistic position if compared to the one of the ‘theories of 
Japanese essentialism’. As a matter of fact, it compromises his political stance, since it is clear 
that the call for a new technological spirit is a call for national unity and national strength. 
Technology was speaking to a country that was already in the midst of its military expansion.  
Thus, Miki continues by saying that technology consists of a new form of action based 
on ‘invention’ (hatsumei), which stands as the basis of production (MKZ VII: 306-8; MKZ 
VIII: 239; MKZ XVIII: 302). 183  Invention refers to the invention of a new purpose for 
technology which is embodied in the unity of the objective moment of the machine together 
with the subjective moment of human skills. For this reason, technology cannot be an 
immediate process, but a mediated and mediating one. In addition, in all three books, Miki 
compares the subjective desire that guides the human intellect towards discovery and 
invention to the desire that drove Prometheus to steal the fire from Zeus. Technology is 
therefore demonic, but not in the neutral sense Jaspers saw it, but as a principally irrational 
‘pathos’ or ‘spirit of a warrior’ (senshi no kokoro) (MKZ VIII: 249). Yet again, Miki refers to 
it as the Nietzschean pathos of distance, the same one that helps the human being becoming 
aware of its finitude and to rise above nothingness.  
The positive attitude he has towards technology does reflect the work Dessauer had 
conducted in Germany slightly before him. 184 To Dessauer technology was not a ‘neutral’ 
element, rather it was deeply connected to the three Kantian realms of the natural, the 
categorical and the aesthetic (Dessauer 1972: 327). As a matter of fact, it had its own 
particular realm, called ‘the fourth realm’ that expresses the ‘possibility’ of creation. It is the 
‘profusion of power’ of the Ding an sich (Dessauer 1972: 330). In Dessauer’s words: 
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The technical or invented object which is perceived in the external 
world like a tree consequently implies an encounter of a different kind 
than the encounter with a natural thing. It is a re-seeing; and still more 
than that, a re-finding- of a third thing 
   (Dessauer 1972: 327; emphasis in the original) 
 
The re-seeing is what causes the ‘wonder’ regarding how the outside world works and 
how it is possible that the ‘machine’ that is now working in front of me ‘does not come from 
me nor it was in me’ (Dessauer 1972: 327). It is the power of the outside world, or the spirit 
of the inventor that still lingers in the mechanical process and that makes us wonder in our 
minds, producing new ideas. So technological improvements are passed down from 
generation to generation thanks to the power inherent in this third thing that fundamentally 
belongs to the fourth realm. As Tuchel notes, Dessauer’s aim was to establish a new 
philosophical foundation at the level of epistemology and for it to contribute to a modern 
worldview (Tuchel 1982: 270-2). The fundamental difference between Dessauer’s philosophy 
of technology contribution to a modern worldview and Miki’s is that Dessauer still saw his 
project of the fourth realm as belonging to God’s plan (Tuchel 1982: 271; Iwasaki 2000: 167). 
Since technology belongs to this a-priori realm, its manifestation into the empirical world 
happens in discovery (Mitcham and Mackey 1972: 23). Miki’s invention is not that far from 
Dessauer’s discovery. The striking difference is that Dessauer’s concept of technology, 
belonging to a fourth, a-priori and transcendental realm, thwarts the possibility of moral and 
ethical considerations regarding the most controversial aspects of modern technological 
development. On the other hand, Miki was aiming at demonstrating is that technology is 
inherently human freedom due to its historical and active character. Miki therefore attempted 
to transcend metaphysics, although he did not completely succeed in his enterprise.  
Miki’s attempt was to establish technology as the human faculty par excellence that 
could prove to be the solution to the problem of Angst. Born out of a demonic pathos, 
technology rationalizes the conflicting relationship between man and the environment. It 
domesticates nature, it shows the possibility of human intelligence and it synthesizes the 
dichotomy subject-object by transcending it in a ‘subject’ (shutai). Yet, Miki seems to be torn 
between the rationality and the subsequent alienation modern technology brings with 
machines. On the other hand, he attempts to provide a new definition of technology that, in 
his mind, should go beyond the philosophical borders set by previous philosophers who 
defined technology in neutral terms, or, instead, as a realm, a human faculty or an entity per 




other words, he wanted to purge technology from the alienation it brought along and, at the 
same time, he desired for it to set the human being free from the constraints of pre-modern 
irrationality. The only way to solve this conundrum was for Miki to underpin technology into 
society and history. Thus, he established ‘natural technology’ as the scientific kind whilst he 
defined ‘social technology’ as the one belonging to society and more strictly related to the 
human being. The two are, in some way, interconnected and cannot be fully divided from 
each other, given the structural historical character of technology. Hence, technology is 
historical as well as history is technological: it provides its form (MKZ VII: 314). 
‘Technology is societal. And philosophy of technology is the foundation of philosophy of 
history and vice-versa’ (MKZ VII: 315).  
On a political level, societal technology becomes the key to overcome both 
Communism and liberalism. In a brief passage in Freedom and Liberalism (Jiyū to jiyūshugi), 
Miki affirms: 
The concept of personality grants the destruction of very same idea of 
feudalism. The equality of all human beings as personality needs to be 
honored, when we think that freedom is the essence of personality 
       (MKZ VII: 469)185 
Again: 
Liberalism professes to honor personality, but instead it commodifies 
the human being and the very same things it produces end up 
becoming its constrictions 
       (MKZ VII: 478) 
 
If we had to compare it with what Miki argued above in his criticism of Watsuji, it is 
clear that personality is strictly related to the everydayness of the ningen. Personality is the 
World that opens us the possibility of authenticity that, in this instance, has become the 
liberation from the constrictions of any sort of political subjugation. In fact, Miki argues that 
both Communism and nationalism reflect this discourse on a political level. The former 
represses freedom in the name of the liberation from capital and the latter negates the very 
idea of freedom by becoming authoritarianism (MKZ VII: 479). In place of a solution, Miki 
specifies that the old form of humanism, which is the modern (technological) one needs to be 
combined with ‘todays’ humanism’ (kyō no hyūmanizumu) in order to create a new form 
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(MKZ V: 261).186 This new, third humanistic way would be able to effectively counteract the 
‘tendency towards the revival of the feudalistic, totalitarian culture’ (MKZ V: 262). By 
overcoming whilst maintaining the inheritance of modern humanism, it will be possible to 
create this new one. Thus, personality could be well described in terms of a third kind of 
humanism, which reminds us of his ‘Marxist third way’. Personality is freedom, neo or third 
humanism, and liberation. Arguably, Miki’s concern with ‘freedom’ might have constituted a 
reflection on the domestic and international situation of Japan of 1941. The main issue here is 
that, despite these concerns, the problem of the temporality of this new personality is still 
clustered in the eternal present of Philosophy of History. The key to understand this process is 
technology.  
Technology is production and it is related to the ‘means of production’, albeit it is not 
historical anymore. The societal technology that Miki defines as the third form of humanism 
is profoundly influenced by the kairos of Philosophy of History. Once again, Miki clusters his 
society into an immanent present that, in this case, was aimed at renovating a nation at war. 
The freedom Miki is talking about is the freedom from the ‘bad’ import of technology for 
which ‘Western’ modernity has to be blamed. For this reason, freedom will be attained only 
in the renovation of the old Gemeinshaft and the new Gesellschaft in the creation of a new 
national society capable of overcoming both. At this point, Miki’s ningen becomes the subject 
of this renovated, Japan society.  
In The Reason of History, Miki affirms that what ‘sets’ form free is nothingness: 
It is the form without a form (katachi naki katachi). In the East, 
‘nothingness’ has this meaning. Nothingness embraces all forms, it 
unifies them, it overcomes form by being without a form, it is a form 
without a form, it is the origin of form 
      (MKZ XIV: 262) 
 
Eastern nothingness, yet, is the one that will help creating a new society, the new 
Gemeinschaft. Watsuji and Miki come together here, to some extent. Miki describes the new 
Gemeinschaft as being born of the dialectical unity between the modern Gesellschaft and the 
old Gemeinschaft, in what he calls the unity between the Western technological spirit and 
Eastern morality. Watsuji, on the other hand, sees the Gesellschaft as the ultimate evil for the 
Japanese Gemeinschaft. In his Sakoku, Watsuji blamed this lack of scientific spirit in Japan as 
the reason for the defeat in the Second World War. Something that to him was inherently 
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dangerous, inherently Marxist and a threat to the status quo becomes the calling of his 
postwar period. In the interwar years Miki, fighting to establish a new society, saw the 
possibility of a dialectical unity grounded in nothingness that, as in Watsuji, unfortunately 
functioned as a totalizing element. What brings them together is the historical actuality of the 
presenteness, and what sets them apart is historical action. Watsuji never informed his system 
in terms of historical poieisis, albeit ‘producing’ real history with his totalizing state system. 
Miki strove for historical action and production, but in a sort of self-reproducing movement 
history kept repeating itself, preventing a real historical development. It is what Bloch called 
‘non-synchronicity’, or the time of fascism. And what Benjamin tried to counteract with his 
Messianic time. Miki and Watsuji’s poietic subjects, because shutai, in reality frustrate the 
possibility of progress because clustered in a logic of the present that is nothing else than the 
logic of imagination.187 This is the same problem Nishida encountered in his pure experience 
and the world of worlds, and the same one Heidegger created in the present of his Dasein that 
lives for the moment of death.  
The social technology Miki describes is very much informed by the discourse on 
Angst and renovation of the human being qua medium. Miki sees the new technological order 
brought about by the beginning of the war with the USA in 1941 as the fundamental reason 
for the establishment of New Order in Asia (MKZ VII: 317). The historical crisis that opens 
with the new phase of the total war is reflected in Miki’s take on technology and his need for 
a redefinition of historical substance per se as well as its narrative. In The Understanding of 
Crisis, written in December 1941, Miki says that, in the time of crisis, pessimism is what is 
perceived as endless, whilst ‘the instantness (shunkansei) of crisis requires resolution’(MKZ 
XIV: 561). Resolution is hence action in active reality. The solution does not come from 
simple activism but rather from the awareness of being producers of world history in its 
actuality. Only in this way, Miki says, the human being could be theoretical and practical at 
the same time, which, in turn, means combining technology and scientific spirit with a 
spiritual renovation (MKZ XIV: 564).  
Nevertheless Miki, probably reflecting on technological warfare, affirms that this kind 
of technology has become too mechanical and is now threatening spiritual culture. What he 
proposes is for Japan to undertake a ‘spiritual renovation’ at the level of social technology, 
where the Western mechanical inventions could be united with the Eastern spirit in a 
dialectical process (MKZ VII: 321-6). Since the spirit is what drives creation and, it could be 
                                                 




added, invention, society will be able to return to its living organism by being historicized in 
the process of unification of subjective means and objective tools. Miki adds that the 
historical world is the only objective-subjective thing. It is here that the creation of the work 
of art vehemently returns into Miki’s discussion. In fact, the artistic spin is what Miki believes 
would in fact make technology organic again, because technological production with the 
artistic spin is the only one capable of being ‘a form without a form’, to create from 
nothingness and to belong to the ‘anthropology of the homo faber’ (MKZ XIV: 258-62).188   
The new homo faber is simply another definition of the human being that clearly 
descends from the type of the Shestov’s period. The homo faber, according to Miki, embodies 
the renovation of society based on technology driving the scientific development and, on the 
other hand, the irrational spirit of the Eastern myth or morality. The sublation of the two, 
understood in terms of the reason of history qua subject-object, into a new, renovated society 
is what will give birth to a new ‘order in Asia’ (MKZ XIV: 268). The concept of the ‘New 
Order in Asia’ represents the last bit of Miki’s work and it is the one most ideologically 
charged. In fact, it is part of the production that appeared with the Shōwa Research 
Association and it defines the new Japanese imperialist order in East Asia. Since this topic 
will be further explored in the following chapter, it is here sufficient to say that, with 
Philosophy of Technology and Philosophical Anthropology Miki creates a new human being 






The Return of the Present  
In his discussion of the concept of imagination in Kant, Miki returns to the issue of the 
‘present time’. To Miki imagination is the production of the self and of history. In the chapter 
on ‘experience’ in Logic of Imagination, Miki argues that Kant’s anthropology has its roots in 
experience, because it unifies all the different elements of the faculties and bring them 
together in an act of creation. Experience thus become the form of reality together with the 
form of knowledge thanks to the principle of imagination (MKZ VIII: 276). 
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Heidegger had argued similarly in his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929). 
He said that Kant’s metaphysics was essentially the problem of the centrality of the Being 
(Heidegger 1962b: 16). Disclosing transcendence to him meant disclosing the subjectivity of 
the subject. Most importantly, and also central in Being and Time, was the question of the 
finitude of the Dasein with the impossibilities there present due to the essence of finitude of 
human knowledge. Therefore, Heidegger reduced intuition, deduction, reflection and 
recognition to the I-Think or transcendental apperception which, in se, was not such a 
distortion of Kant (Heidegger 1962b: 83-93). The distortion happened when Heidegger 
granted time as pure self-affection as the possibility of selfhood. Time became the ‘present’, 
because it was where the transcendental schematism belonged in light of the homogeneity of 
time. Heidegger says that: 
Time exists as a now-sequence precisely because, flowing across each 
now, it remains a now even while becoming another now. As the 
aspect of the permanent, it offers at the same time the image of pure 
change in permanence 




[…] The transcendental imagination as that which lets time as the -
now-sequence spring forth is- as the origin of the latter- primordial 
time 
      (Heidegger 1962b: 181) 
 
Kant had not prescribed the ‘present’ such a role. To him time was one of the two 
categories belonging to the subject and allowing knowledge of phenomena. In another 
distortion of Kant, Heidegger affirmed that ontological knowledge was the one that attained 
truth (cfr. Miki on truth) due to the fact that it was original truth already (Heidegger 1962b: 
128). To him, this was the reason why Kant labeled it ‘transcendental truth’, which in reality 
did not reflect Kant’s original idea. Basically Heidegger was interested in making 
transcendence into ontology and from there move to the existential analytic of the Dasein qua 
metaphysical discourse. Therefore, Miki’s centrality of imagination as philosophy of action 
and producer of history is highly similar to the one portrayed in the Dasein of Heidegger. 
Imagination is not related to the transcendental schema anymore, in both philosophers 
becomes an ontological element, which implies a different or human temporality not as an 
internal sense but as THE sense. Imagination becomes the ‘basic experience’ for Heidegger as 




Imagination, in Kant, is not so much an act of Ursprung, as much as it becomes in 
Heidegger. Maruyama says that Miki’s imagination is like Heidegger’s, a ‘practical’ one 
(jissenteki kōsōryoku) (Maruyama 1998: 186). Similarly, Uchida defines Miki’s standpoint as 
the one ‘the radicalism of imagination’ (kōsōryoku radikarizumu), where imagination 
becomes the structural and unifying faculty (Uchida 2004: 319). Iwasaki, on the other hand, 
underpins Miki’s imagination on the ground of technology and affirms that Miki 
technologized imagination (Iwasaki 2000: 174). Miki sees in the form that imagination 
provides the continuous movement in history of formation and destruction. Thanks to this 
faculty, history becomes the union between past and future, once again in an eternal present 
(MKZ VIII: 262 ff). Miki’s technological and historical poiesis hinders the Kantian categories 
as mere categories and, instead, ontologizes them in his shutai. The supremacy of the present 
tense embodied in the sense of temporality reflects Miki’s whole enterprise of historicizing 
the human being. Imagination, in his historical form, becomes the equivalent of the kairos. If 
technology stood as the ‘form without a form’ grounded in nothingness that could set the 
human being free, imagination becomes the materialization of history as ‘present’. Thus, the 
practical, poietic subject transforms itself into the producer of a national, crystallized time that 






Miki as the State Intellectual 
Uchida sees the issue of freedom and the relationship between necessity and 
contingency as the main themes in Miki’s production and that are possibly retraceable to his 
Marxist period. He argues that Miki’s labour theory runs from his philosophy of history to the 
one of technology and that the theory of technology underpins history (Uchida 2004: 101). He 
attempts to ground all of Miki production in his first major work, his graduation thesis on the 
autonomy of the individual. Uchida’s framework is the one of the development of the rentier-
state capitalism and the modernization of Japan and he attempts to trace the extent to which 
the historical development of capital influenced Miki’s work. Hence, he argues that in the 
period of Philosophy of Technology Miki somehow moved from Japanese ideology 




by capitalism that affected daily lives (Uchida 2004: 105-6). This shift is the one that pushed 
Miki towards culture and its renovation that, I believe, also brought Miki to affirm the need 
for a synthesis between Western technology and Eastern morality. Another kind of criticism 
comes from Arakawa Ikuo, who contends that Miki and other intellectuals of the interwar 
period became ‘technocrats’ when they equated the ‘industrial technique with the 
administrative technique of the specialist’ (sangyō gijustu= kanri gijutsu no senmonka) 
(Arakawa 1976: 744). Uchida contests this view, underlying that Miki envisioned his role as 
the one of the reformer of society that acts thanks to his ‘imagination’ that produces a ‘mass 
based’ (taishūteki kiban) theory of technology (Uchida 2004: 106-7). This attention to the 
masses on Miki’s side is reflected, to Uchida, in the expression: ‘responsibility towards 
society is, at the same time, responsibility towards the self’ (MKZ VII: 297-8; in Uchida 
2004: 167). 
This mass-based technology comes from the discourse around what I call ‘the 
massification of intellectuals’. Miki criticizes his contemporary intellectuals for ‘having 
detached from reality’, which to him signifies that intellectuals have detached from society 
and its national past (MKZ XV: 237-9). He proposes a sort of humanistic renovation of the 
intellectual class attained through the unity with the masses. Miki calls it ‘the reformation of 
intelligence’ (chisei no kaizō) (MKZ XV: 240). Masses represent to him the guardians of 
culture although, at the same time, they are the driving force behind innovation (MKZ XIV: 
338-9).189 The “‘massification’ (taishūka) of culture is crucial in the development of popular 
culture”, Miki says, nevertheless adding that this would not mean vulgarizing culture, but 
rather giving it new strength (MKZ XIV: 342). Through this process, intellectuals will be able 
to judge the past history and find the ‘reason of history’ or the ‘world meaning of the actions 
of Japan’ in its actuality in order to move on, towards the future, ‘where one nation will excel 
in its historical mission’ (MKZ XV: 243).190  
The sense of responsibility towards the self and society did not thwart Miki from 
joining the Shōwa Research Association. On the contrary, it is the reason why Miki joined it. 
Although it is correct to affirm that Miki’s societal technology became a ‘mass technology’ 
and that not every intellectual, in particular Miki, became a technocrat, the society he 
‘imagined’ was a society preponderantly within the national boundaries of Japan. Despite his 
criticism of Japanese essentialism, German Nazism and fascism in general, Miki could not 
                                                 
189 In The Formation of Popular Culture. 
190 Cfr. Heidegger’s Rectoral discourse: ‘A spiritual world alone will guarantee our Volk greatness. For it will 
make the constant decision between the will to greatness and the toleration of decline the law that establishes the 




prevent himself from becoming a state intellectual. The national society that he had created, 
crystallized in the omni-present Japanese national time, was indeed a matter of imagination.  
His considerations above confirm the view that Miki was moving towards his idea of 
cooperation that he explains in these words in 1939: 
Since patriotism is a feeling belonging to the original Gemeinschaft, it 
defends it against the oppressiveness of feudalism. Ergo, it is 
necessary for patriotism to awake the spirit of cooperationatism 
(kyōdōshugi) that dwells in itself and that reflects itself in being the 
virtue of the modern Gesellschaft. Presently, all the movements need 
to become patriotic movements, and each and every cooperativism is 
the true patriotic movement 
       (MKZ XV: 344)191 
 
 Although I agree with Goto-Jones when he says that Miki’s philosophy of the 1930s 
contained the seeds of his subsequent involvement with fascism, I cannot fully agree when he 
uses Tosaka’s critique of Miki’s liberalism to affirm that Miki’s liberal thought ‘could not 
defend itself against the manipulations of the Japanists’ (Goto-Jones 2006: 15).192 Miki’s 
thought was not manipulated; it was the trajectory of his philosophy that led him there. As 
Löwith said of the political implications of Heidegger’s philosophy: 
What is true or false on theory is also so in practice, above all when 
the theory itself originates in conscious fashion from a supreme fact –
historical existence- and when its path leads it towards the latter 
      (Löwith 1993: 169) 
 
Miki’s historical existence already showed the germination of his political philosophy. 
The very same fact that his ningen became first a negotiating relationship, therefore laying the 
foundation for a societal-class human being, and subsequently a historical ningen trapped in 
the morass of the crystallized everydayness of the Japanese nation did nothing more but to 
prepare the ground for the technological subject of the homo faber, mass intellectual and 
eventually ideologue. Theory and practice cannot be separated, even when attempting to 
rescue an intellectual from its own deeds, which represents another paradox in itself. Even 
Miki, in his Marxist period, declared that the human being as material and spiritual whole 
reached unity in theory and practice, albeit at that time the unity was acquired thanks to 
Marxist materialism. 193  Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Technology and Logic of 
Imagination are intimately bound through the concept of the poietic subject that, as Iwasaki 
                                                 
191 In Addressing Young Intellectuals, or on the National Sentiment and National Destiny. Again, compare to 
Heidegger’s Rectoral address.  
192 A quite contrasting and highly critical assessment of Miki is provided in Goto-Jones 2005a: 104-109. 




said, was a response to Japanese essentialism but, that, at the end, failed to provide a valuable 
alternative to it. On the contrary, Miki’s subject became the Japanese folk in a global, Asian 
context (Iwasaki 2000: 176). In Marcuse terms: 
[…] In existential anthropology the corresponding relation [between 
the existence of the forces of history and the theoretical and practical 
critique of these forces] is limited to one of accepting a ‘mandate’ 
issued to existence by the ‘folk’. […] Every folk receives its historical 
mandate as a ‘mission’ that is the first and last, the unrestricted 
obligation of existence 
       (Marcuse 1968: 35) 
 
It is precisely the ‘mission’ of the Japanese folk that Miki believed in that predestined 
his ningen to failure. In the next chapter we will see how history converged with philosophy 







Before the ‘Reverence’ 
Watsuji’s subject had always been the Japanese folk. His aidagara symbolized the 
particularity of Japan in the connubium history-climate and the state Watsuji envisioned for 
his country embodied the ethical structure of all ethical structures. In 1944, when Japan was at 
the peak of its war against the USA and had occupied most of South and East Asia, Watsuji 
began his search for the ‘real’ tradition that made its country unique. He found it in the 
concept of the ‘reverence to the emperor’. The awareness of the Japanese subjects of 
representing a nation was therefore underpinned by the sentiment of obligation and adoration 
that they felt towards their supreme ruler. The Japanese people thus were the ‘bodily’ subject 
characterized by a particular kind of history and climate and a tradition of reverence that was 
unfound in the rest of the world. The betweeness in which every social relation was grounded 
was the societal relations governed by ethics.  
In 1944 Watsuji published The Reverence of the Emperor and Its Tradition. In its 




reverence to the emperor’ (sonnō shisō) that embodies the Japanese ethical thought (WTZ 
XIV: 3). Nevertheless, his enterprise will be undertaken ‘historically’. He adds: 
The reverence has been the fundamental basis of our people’s life and 
its resonance never faded during the years. Even if the people who 
hold the power seem to have forgotten about this, the people have not. 
It is my hope that I will be able to urge the importance of this tradition 
      (WTZ XIV: 3) 
 
Watsuji had previously explored the ideas of ‘Japanese spirit’ and ‘popular morality’ 
in Climate and, especially, from the time of Ancient Japanese Culture. Between 1929 and 
1931, before writing The Reverence, Watsuji had prepared some memos on the concept of 
‘popular morality’ (Kokumin dōtokuron mēmo), part of which was subsequently included in 
the second volume of A Study of the Japanese Spirit. To Watsuji, the Japanese spirit had been 
the driving force behind the victory over Russia in the Russian-Japanese conflict of 1904-5, 
an event that had embodied the significance of Japan in world history. In these memos, 
Watsuji both attempted to provide a description of ‘popular morality’ and harshly criticized 
the chōnin culture for being the evident proof of the penetration of capitalism in Japan (WTZ 
IV: 463 ff). In a reasoning that could well remind us of his dialogue with Kawakami, Watsuji 
accused capitalism of having contaminated Japanese society and slowly transformed it into a 
Gesellschaft. He argued that the return to the original Gemeinschaft embodied in the Japanese 
spirit could only be acquired through a renovation of society that could go back, but at the 
same time overcome, the traditional way of thinking. As highlighted somewhere else in this 
work, this was the main point of Watsuji’s critique of ‘Western’ modernity. The return to this 
idyllic kind of society, purged of the contamination of capitalism, was realized in the state as 
the ‘way of ethics’ that respected the laws of humanity and fully realized the sacredness of the 
absolute totality (WTZ XI: 619).194 Needless to say, the only nation state that had been able to 
accomplish such a condition was the Japanese one.  
In his reasoning around the fulfillment of the ethical way, Watsuji conflated the 
concept of ethical thinking or ought to be with the political sentiment of loyalty to the 
emperor, something that derived from the neo-Confucian prescription that the ruler is the 
father of the nation in a game of mirrors between the family and the nation. Watsuji was able 
                                                 
194 This part belongs to the chapter ‘The State’ (Kokka) that was written twice, in 1937 and 1942. The revised 
edition belongs to the second volume of Study of Ethics but it is not strictly considered an extra volume. The text 
presents some seminal differences if compared to the first draft. The tone changes, becoming more and more 
nationalistic and the critique to the League of Nations and the Euro-American powers undergoes an almost 
complete revision (Cfr. WTZ X: 607-20 and WTZ XI: 412-33). Quotations are from the second draft, if 




to theorize in such fashion because his Sollen was inherent in the community, especially in the 
national one (like Japan). Thus, his idea of the human being as betweeness not only strangled 
the human being in the structure of the Absolute totality of the state, but it also made it the 
recipient of the idea of ought to be. In this way, Watsuji’s ningen is not only absorbed in an 
absolute state, but the inherent concept of freedom of rebellion against this state is denied on 
the basis of an ethical principle of harmony and collectivism. The idea of the reverence to the 
emperor makes this system even more immobile, since it traps it in the history of the Japanese 
nation that never teleological developed. In other words, the reverence to the emperor 
represents the last element that completes the transformation of the human being from ningen 
as it was to kokumin (people) and that aims for Japan to return to his pre-modern stage before 
‘Western’ modernity infected it.  
Amidst the fighting, Watsuji thought that the ‘Japanese’ idea of the emperor could 
have driven Japan to a victory. In this way, the everyday life of the Japanese subjects became 






Watsuji’s Mythicized Emperor 
In The Reverence Watsuji embarks in a journey that brings him back to the time of the 
Age of the Gods. It is not the first time that Watsuji traces the ethical way of thinking and the 
tradition of the imperial family to the birth of humanity. Nevertheless, the way he approaches 
these questions in 1944 presents some innovations. He bases his analysis on the two mythical 
texts of the Kokiji and the Nihon Shoki, highlighting the way the different Japanese deities 
were there portrayed. He argues that the concept of the matsurigoto, the term that identifies 
the divine affairs, finds its roots in the ‘nothingness’ typical of Japanese culture (WTZ XIV: 
38). Thanks to ‘nothingness’ and not to ‘essence’ that underpins monotheistic religions, the 
myriad gods present in the Japanese pantheon were able to be qualified as ‘revering’ (matsuru 
kami) and ‘revered’ (matsurareru kami) at the same time (WTZ XIV: 28).195 Thus, none of 
these gods could have possibly elevated him or herself to a position of supremacy over the 
                                                 
195 The division also includes ‘only revered gods’ (matsurareru nomi no kami) and ‘gods that are honoured 




others, because none of them could have qualified as ontological demiurges. In the movement 
of double negation rooted in vacuity Watsuji explains that deities are, in some way, empty 
and therefore able to be revered and revere at the same time. The emperor belongs to the 
former classification, the goddess Amaterasu to the latter. In their unity they form the 
matsurigoto (matsurigoto no tōitsu) or the human order by means of which the national 
awareness is prescribed (WTZ XIV: 39).  
If in Study of Ethics the origin of the modern political power was traced to the 
religious community that had a ‘sacred king’ as leader who held the two power spheres by 
means of his magical powers, in The Reverence these kind of communities reappear. Watsuji 
affirms that the awareness of belonging to different, sacred, blood communities is nothing 
else than the awareness of belonging to a ‘totality’. The accent posed on the importance of 
blood could be well interpreted in racial terms, and Watsuji does nothing to disguise his 
admiration for the exceptionalism of Japan when he affirms: 
The absolute (zentaisha) as the objectification of one god is nothing 
else than a limitation of the absolute itself. On the contrary, when the 
objectification of the absolute happens in a context of non-limitation, 
the docile, unconditional divine truth of the old faith appears in its 
greatness. Eventually, this is the way the exceptionality of our religion 
came to being as forbearing acceptance compared to the other world 
religions  
       (WTZ XIV: 38) 
 
The principle of the matsurigoto, therefore, is an ‘empty’ principle capable of 
unconditional tolerance, as it was the ‘stratification’ of Japanese culture in Climate and 
Restoring Idols. Nevertheless, Japan is the only country which was able to perpetuate the 
‘specialty’ of the imperial family throughout history, not like modern states who abandoned 
the divine power of their rulers (or established other forms of government). As explained in 
the mythical texts of the Age of Gods, the reverence to the emperor represents the unifying 
principle of this total and religious community. As in Study of Ethics, the ethical residue 
present in the intentionality of consciousness qua noesis is the ethical principle of the totality 
that pushes the people to be nationally aware of their dependence from the emperor (WTZ 
XIV: 44). ‘The emperor is the unifier of the matsurigoto’ (WTZ XIV: 44). The emperor is 
basically a form (katachi) that can be ‘filled’ with the sentiment of national awareness in light 
of its fundamental emptiness. 
The fundamental problem with Watsuji’s text are the sources that he uses to justify the 




Nihon Shoki, as mentioned above, are two mythical texts of dubious authorship. They 
describe the creation of Japan in a myth of ‘production’ and physical generation of a land, 
rather than divine creation as understood in Christian terms. The Nihon Shoki, moreover, is a 
chronological account of all the emperors of Japan and the divine descent of the Shōwa 
emperor from them. The temporal errors of this work were known even at the time of Watsuji, 
but the ideology of the time forbade to question their authenticity, granting them the status of 
historical truths. If Watsuji had really wanted to provide the genealogy of the idea of the 
reverence of the emperor, he should have certainly not based his studies on two mythical 
books. The question is whether Watsuji did it in the name of a certain political agenda and to 
which extent this agenda was modified in time. Watsuji’s emperor is a mythicized emperor, 
one that transcends any possible concrete realm of accountability and that can easily change 
from ruler to governor and vice-versa. The implication of this kind of assumption will be 
considered later in the chapter, nonetheless it is important to underline here how a vacuous 
religious principle can, in substance, change and be molded according the historical and 
ideological context.  
Yonetani notices how the concept of the imperial reverence slightly changes in 
Watsuji’s thought from Ancient Japanese Culture to The Reverence. Yonetani argues that in 
the 1920s Watsuji criticized Inoue Tetsujirō’s idea of popular morality as filial piety, because 
to him that signified the ‘naturalization’ (shizensei) of the myth (Yonetani 1994b: 109). To 
him, the popular morality descended from the Age of Gods in its ‘form’ rather than in its 
content. Stressing the naturality of the principle would have only granted the latter a position 
of superiority and, arguably, an immobilization in history. The reverence was thus based on 
the ‘form’ (keishiki) (Yonetani 1994b: 110). Instead, as seen above, in Study of Ethics, 
Japanese Ethical Thought and The Reverence Watsuji gives a contrasting definition of the 
reverence. It is still born in a mythical age, but in this case the emperor becomes a cultural 
ruler, where the totality and the popular morality indeed become something natural and 
identified in the filial piety. Yonetani argues that the loss of the origin of the imperial family 
as limited to the Age of Gods is a sign that the emperor comes into being as the ‘expression’ 
of the Japanese people (Yonetani 1994b: 112). The emperor qua ‘expression’ will later 




This shift evidently appears in The Reverence in regards to the Taika Reform. 196 
Watsuji argues that the Taika Reform had legally normativized the imperial sanctity, whereas 
the two mythical books had provided a political overview of the state qua unity of the people 
in the emperor (WTZ XIV: 67-79). The Taika Reform, it should be noted here, is of dubious 
authorship and validity and the fact that Watsuji regarded it as the legal document of the 
sacredness of the emperor should cast some doubts on the real intent of Watsuji’s work. In 
addition, Watsuji affirms: 
Our ancient people did not narrate the different gods to show the 
greatness that they believed in, they narrated the gods as foundations 
of the sanctity of the emperor (tennō no shinseisei), thus they narrated 
the ‘history of the age of Gods’ […] The examples of Alexander the 
Great and of the Roman emperors that scholars have provided are 
merely examples of individual myths, whereas a popular myth as the 
basis of the original faith of one people is a complete different matter 
    (WTZ XIV: 48; emphasis in the original) 
 
Whether it is an empty form or a natural principle the figure and the sanctity of the 
emperor are always granted. Watsuji underpins his ‘historical account’ of the reverence in a 
series of mythical books that, in the hands of the policy makers of the regime, became the 
official narrative of Japanese history. Thus, Watsuji not only does not question the master 
narrative, he reinforces it. Here Watsuji’s ideas and Japanese history merge together. This 
convergence reaches completion in the moment when Watsuji decides to marry the official 
historical line that the emperor was the supreme ruler and ‘empty form’ of the Japanese nation. 
This conclusion entails several and different problems related to sovereignty and political 
power that will remain unrsolved even in the postwar period. Watsuji’s faith in the emperor 
theory is the one that will result in his personal and intellectual defeat in 1945. This issue will 
be approached in the next chapter, it is here sufficient to say that the analysis of the tradition 
of the reverence to the emperor is the last and final stage of Watsuji’s enterprise, since after 
the publication of the works on the Japanese ethical thought and Sakoku Watsuji will dedicate 
his attention to Japanese performative arts.197 
Despite the alignment between Watsuji’s philosophy and the political power, in 1942 
the right-wing intellectual Yoshimura Teiji published an article titled Attacking Watsuji’s 
                                                 
196 The Taika Reform is an edict from 646. It set a centralized government and it strengthen the political role of 
the imperial family.  
197 See Study of Japanese Art History. Volume 1: Kabuki and Jōruri (Nihon geijutsu kenkyū. Dai ichi kan 
[Kabuki to jōruri]; 1955). Watsuji wanted to write a monumental work on the history of Japanese performative 
arts. Nevertheless, it remains unfinished due to Watsuji’s death in 1960. In the meantime, in 1956, he had also 





Disrespectful Thought, in which he attacked Watsuji for having ‘un-deified’ the emperor.198 
In particular, he picked two sentence from Ancient Japanese Culture, where Watsuji affirmed 
that the Japanese country had chosen its leader in light of the divine descent of its founder and 
that the emperor of Japan was of unbroken descent. Yoshimura accused Watsuji of having 
deified the people rather than the ruler, since it appeared that he had been appointed by means 
of a popular vote or agreement, as in totemic society the shaman or magical king were chosen. 
Most importantly, Yoshimura accused Watsuji of belonging to the ‘organ theory’ faction, 
because he had identified the kokoro of the emperor with the kokoro of the people, hence 
making the emperor a ‘symbol’ (Yoshimura 1943: 6).199 Regarding the second sentence in 
question, Yoshimura found the idea that the cult of the emperor only started in the 6th century, 
when people stopped worshipping natural phenomena and started worshipping the emperor, 
preposterous. To him that was a clear sign of the penetration of foreign, dangerous ideas into 
Watsuji’s books and his sympathy for Tsuda’s work on the studies of Japanese thought. In 
particular, he highlighted three major elements, that he labeled ‘the lies of Watsuji’s theories’ 
(Watsuji gakusetsu no gyōmosei): the use of archeological techniques, the misinterpretation of 
Asian texts and American rationalism (Yoshimura 1943: 18-23).  
Yoshimura here refers to the excavations that were then taking place in Japan and that 
were revealing that the chronology of the Nihon Shoki was completely inaccurate, thus 
undermining the imperial cult and its ‘unbroken descent’. This kind of studies were initiated 
by the historian Tsuda Sōkichi (1873-1961), who was attacked in 1939 by the right-wing 
party of the Genri Nihonsha and put on trial, together with his publisher Iwanami Shigeo of 
Iwanami Shoten, and sentenced to prison for lèse-majesté (Barshay 1988: 50).200 Watsuji was 
even called to take the stand during Tsuda’s trial, since he had publicly admitted his 
admiration for Tsuda’s work, and he defended Tsuda’s ideas (Minamoto 1995: 201). On the 
other hand, Yoshimura mentions the ‘organ theory’ which was elaborated by the 
constitutionalist Minobe Tatsukichi (1873-1948). He had stressed the importance of 
individual liberties in modern governance through the expansion of the political powers of the 
Diet (Barshay 1988: 40). As a consequence, he had denied that the kokutai was an immutable 
historical principle and, instead, he had affirmed that the emperor was an ‘organ’ at the top 
position of a constitutional monarchy. In 1935, the ‘Minobe incident’ brought Minobe to the 
stand and his books banned behind the machination of the extreme right-wing politicians such 
                                                 
198 Watsuji no fukei shisō wo utsu. Originally published in Kokumin Hyōron in October 1943. 
199 Kokoro is a Japanese word of difficult translation. It could mean ‘heart’, ‘spirit’, ‘soul’ and ‘mind’. I believe 
Yoshimura is here referring to the ‘spirit’ of the emperor as the symbol of the ‘spirit’ of the people.  




as the Baron Kikuchi Takeo (Bix 2000: 287-8). This is just a proof of the fact that, in the 
1930s and 1940s, right-wing political parties were gaining more and more power, influencing 
public policies at the top and constantly reporting ‘dissenting’ scholars. Although Watsuji 
could not be associated with such extreme positions, his message of uniqueness and 
particularity of the Japanese state and people did bear some nationalistic traits. The very fact 
that he believed that the emperor was of unbroken descent and that he believed that the 
Japanese state and nation were an exception in history allowed him to talk about ‘continuity’ 
of Japanese history, as if the Second World War had been just another ‘down’ in the circular 
temporality of a nation. The continuity is best exemplified in The Reverence where, from the 
Age of Gods onwards, the form of the imperial cult remained stable and always present in the 
national consciousness of the people. Whether in the Heian period with the supremacy of the 
Fujiwara family, or the Kamakura period when society started being shaped by the structure 
of the bushi or the period of the Nanboku-chō (Warrior states), throughout all these times the 
reverence for the emperor remained latent but present.  
Watsuji restates that Japanese history was a linear and unchanging type of history, 
where one continuous idea could move undisturbed without the possibility of developing. In 
the larger scheme of his vision of the Japanese nation, the myth of the divine descent of the 
emperor was mirrored in the myth of its history. The Japanese national consciousness and the 
national strength had to be found in this all-encompassing and immobile principle, where 
there was no room for any possible movement of change. Thus, the human being as 
betweeness finally became the human being as a primordial and divine people.  
Watsuji’s selection of sources serves the purpose of maintaining the status quo as it 
was and affirm the particularity of the Japanese people as embodied in the figure of the 
emperor. Even in the case of the Yoshino court, when the two courts were separated between 
North and South (Kyoto and Yoshino) governed by two separate emperors, one appointed by 
the Ashikaga shogunate and the other one by the deposed emperor Go-Daigo, Watsuji seems 
to support the theory that the ancestors of emperor Hirohito came from the South, which, 
instead, was the illegitimate court (WTZ XIV: 116).201 There is a complete mirroring between 
                                                 
201 Go-Daigo’s history was still debated at that time. Pre-Meiji and post-Meiji scholars gave different dates for 
his reign. Go-Daigo was considered a traitor of the Kyoto court until the Edo period, when his figure was 
rehabilitated in light of the movement behind the Meiji Restoration that sought to bring the emperor back to the 
throne. Since Go-Daigo had attempted twice to overthrown the Kamakura shogunate, succeeding the first time 
with the help of Ashikaga Takauji who betrayed his master, but failing the second time when Ashikaga became 
shogun, he was considered the first one who attempted to get the imperial power back. The war between the 
court of the North and the one in the South is called the Nanboku-chō period and the tales are narrated in the 




the popular morality and the popular thinking and the will of the emperor. As in Study of 
Ethics, in the moment of double negation between the general and particular the two should 
subsist together, although the general becomes the foundation of the particular. In history and 
politics, thanks to the apparent vacuity of the form of the reverence, the emperor negates itself 
to let the country emerge and vice-versa. Yet, there would not be any people without the 
divine emperor. In The Reverence the structure remains unchanged; simply the movement of 
double negation of this human being-nation remains silent or latent during certain periods of 
history to then reemerge at the end of the Edo period (bakumatsu), that Watsuji describes in 
these terms: 
[The pressure from foreign powers and the bakufu power] even these 
causes did not crash the national awareness of the Japanese people. 
The request for the national unity in the unity of the emperor followed 
naturally. That kind of request started becoming reality. We can 
recognize it in the different forms that the loyalty to the emperor 
theory (kinnōron) took  
    (WTZ XIV: 241; emphasis in the original)202 
 
As in the case of the Mito School, the reverence was strengthen and concretize vis-à-
vis the threat posed by foreign powers.203 Watsuji seems to think that the Mito School was 
right in finding a link between the abstraction of the latent idea of the reverence and its 
concretization when feudalism was overcome (WTZ XIV: 251). First, they coined the term jōi 
or ‘expel the barbarians’ and, secondly, they laid the foundations of the idea of kokutai with 
the studies of Aizawa Seishisai (WTZ XIV: 252-3). Despite the fact that Watsuji was highly 
critical of the writings of one of its members, Motoori Norinaga, he nevertheless admired 
their efforts in re-establishing the power of the emperor against the Tokugawa rulers.  
As Goto-Jones highlights, the Meiji Constitution (1890) and the Imperial Rescript on 
Education politically granted the divine descent of the emperor and even the descent of the 
people from previous imperial subject (Goto-Jones 2008b: 30). The work done by the Mito 
School in the bakumatsu period helped shaping the key concepts of the Meiji, Taishō and 
early Shōwa Japan. Furukawa thinks that the modern idea of kokutai came from the Neo-
Confucian idea of the five relations and filial piety that was then transformed into the 
reverence of the emperor qua relation between state and subjects (Furukawa 1966: 505). 
                                                 
202 The terms sonnō and kinnō are almost equivalent. The motto sonnō jōi (revere the emperor, expel the 
barbarians) was one of the slogans of the pre-Meiji Restoration period. 
203 The Mito School was a school of thought also called ‘nativism’. The writings of its members, such as Kamo 
no Mabuchi, Motoori Norinaga and Hirata Atsutane established the ideological and intellectual basis that 




Watsuji’s hatred for ‘Western’ modernity brought him to look into Japanese history in 
search for the intellectual figures or the texts that magnified the emperor as the sole and 
traditional beholder of power. In his view, the overcoming of feudalism is not seen as in Miki 
with the creation of a technological subject, but rather in the concretization of the idea of the 
reverence to the emperor. In this respect, the critique of modernity as unfolded in Miki and 
Watsuji subtlety differs. To Miki the critique of modernity was linked to the renovation of the 
technological spirit, to Watsuji it meant going backwards in Japanese history to establish the 
continuity between ‘pre-modern’ and ‘modern’. What Watsuji accomplished was to ditch the 
‘modern’ in toto in favor of the sacred and mythical ‘pre-modern’. Watsuji’s detachment from 
historical reality reaches the point where real history does not count anymore and where the 
crisis of the war makes him take refuge into an invented past. It is precisely this detachment 
from real history that will push him to strive for continuity even in the postwar period.  
The Reverence ends with the Meiji Restoration. The narration of the tradition of the 
imperial cult allowed Watsuji to write a history of an idea that nonetheless does not represent 
the history itself. By founding a concept in the nothingness and multiplicity of deities that 
culminated in the empty form of the emperor Watsuji affirmed and legitimized the existence 
of a totalizing figure. As in Study of Ethics, the peculiarity of Japan remains untouched and, 
even more, it is strengthen and glorified since the birth of humanity. The concept of form is 






The Symbol Emperor 
The Symbol of National Unity appeared in 1948 as a collection of five articles that 
Watsuji wrote between 1945 and 1948. All the pieces deal with the emperor qua ‘expression’ 
or ‘symbol’ of national unity. In particular, the two central pieces that are responses to the 
constitutionalist Sasaki are of the most interest to us. As in The Reverence and the other 
prewar pieces, in the postwar Watsuji does not change his mind regarding the role of the 
emperor. His technique is quite subtle nevertheless. As a matter of fact, Watsuji uses the same 
language as the one of new Japanese constitution of 1947 that defined the emperor as a 




therefore calls the postwar emperor ‘symbol’ and tries to circumvent the constitutional 
problems related to popular sovereignty and imperial sovereignty by using the expression 
‘sovereign will of the people’ (nihon kokumin shikō no sōi) (WTZ XIV: 336). In the second 
part of The Symbol, titled The Expresser of National Totality (Kokumin zentaisei no 
hyōgensha) and written in 1945, Watsuji restates some of the key concepts present in The 
Reverence. For example, the fact that the emperor is a ‘form’ that runs throughout Japanese 
history, that he is the ‘expression’ of the popular unity and that precisely this term 
‘expression’ is nothing else than ‘symbol’ (WTZ XIV: 330-6). Changing the terminology but 
not changing the substance, Watsuji resumes to the escamotage of differentiating between 
state and community, therefore allowing for the previous ‘subjects’ of the emperor to become 
‘citizens’ in the postwar period. The will of the people, as much as the reverence, is a feeling 
or a totality that underscores the whole Japanese history, from the old blood communities 
until the Gemeinschaft, transforming itself and finally finding its particular locus in the unity 
of community and history. Needless to say, the emperor is still the living, concrete and 
cultural symbol of this unification. How can Watsuji find a continuity of the imperial court 
even when the emperor had been stripped of all his powers? He resumes to the Muromachi 
period. He says that even then, when the emperor was subjugated by the shogunate, the will 
of people was expressed in his figure and role, despite that there was no law that sanctioned it 
(WTZ XIV: 344). He was already a symbol emperor without political powers. Thus, the 
postwar Japanese constitution does not undermine the principal role of the emperor which is 
to represent the will of the people and national unity.  
The main problem with The Symbol is certainly the way Watsuji approaches the 
problem of kokutai. In 1946, both Watsuji and Tsuda had argued that the emperor was the 
symbol of national and popular unity, accusing the army of having distorted this view in the 
prewar period (Akasaka 1989: 274). In 1947, responding to an article by Sasaki on this 
subject, Watsuji writes Seeking Elucidations from Sasaki on the Theory of the Changed 
Kokutai (Kokutai henkōron ni tsuite Sasaki hakushi no oshie wo kō) and On Sasaki’s 
Teachings (Sasaki hakushi no kyōji ni tsuite). In both pieces Watsuji states that he had so far 
avoided the subject of kokutai on purpose, but that he could not behold his thoughts anymore 
(WTZ XIV: 355). Previously, Sasaki had theorized that the kokutai, together with the bansei 
ikkei (the theory that affirmed the unbroken descent of the imperial family) had been the root 
of the authoritative and totalitarian sovereignty in Japan (Sasaki in Watsuji XIV: 356). To 
Sasaki, the emperor should have not represented the sovereignty of the people in the postwar 




Potsdam Declaration had not even questioned the problem of whether the kokutai should have 
been modified (Yuasa 1981: 210). In his role of constitutionalist, Sasaki wanted a change in 
the political and legal aspects of the concept (Yuasa 1981: 209).  
To Sasaki, the state in its political form had seen the kunigara become the kokutai.204 
Even on a daily life base, where the state emerged as the beholder of the ethical and spiritual 
form, the same had happen. Thus, Sasaki had exposed the complete overlapping between the 
political power of the emperor in his state function with his role of the ethical and spiritual 
leader of his subjects. It was, in Watsuji’s words, the idea of the matsurigoto, or the 
convergence between temporal and spiritual power that eventually found its blossoming in the 
absolute state he had theorized. In this way, the emperor had been able to control every aspect 
of the daily lives of his people and Sasaki warned against the fact that this could have been 
legally sanctioned even in the postwar period.  
Watsuji dismisses Sasaki’s differentiation as a ‘misunderstanding’. Instead, he argues 
that the kunigara as understood by Sasaki corresponds to the word seitai (body politic) and 
that Sasaki made the mistake of confusing ‘government’ with kokutai (WTZ XIV: 358-9). 
Watsuji attempts thus to separate the actual political power of the emperor, as expressed in the 
Hobbsian idea of body politic and that should be reflected in the executive power of the 
government, with the kokutai that to him, in this period, simply indicates a cultural and 
symbolic form of power.  Watsuji finds the justification of his distinction in the idea that the 
emperor was never an absolute ruler, unless for a very short period of time that, by chance, 
corresponds to the interwar years. What people have failed to recognize or have mistakenly 
recognized is the fact that the emperor was solely the expression of the national unity 
embodied in the concept of kokutai (WTZ XIV: 362-4). ‘That unity is not a political one, it is 
a cultural one’ (WTZ XIV: 367).  
I acknowledge the fact that the traditional sovereignty of the emperor 
played an important role in Japanese history. That sovereignty existed 
as the emperor being the expression of the totality of the people, but it 
was not legally prescribed until the national constitution 
    (WTZ XIV: 382, emphasis in the original) 
 
As a consequence, Watsuji seems to blame the Meiji period for having normativized 
the emperor as a political ruler in the Constitution of 1890 and having thus modified the 
essence of the concept of kokutai. Nevertheless, as Akasaka underlines, Watsuji was never 
able to completely formulate a brand new concept of the kokutai purged from its 
                                                 




ultranationalistic traits (Akasaka 1989: 280). Watsuji himself admits that, perhaps, the best 
way to do that would be to ‘get rid of the concept all together’ (mushiro sutesaru beki 
dewanai darō ka) (WTZ XIV: 368). Yuasa points at the fact that Watsuji probably conflated 
the legal definition that separates the ‘seat of sovereignty’ (tōchiken no jozai) with the ‘seat of 
power’ (kōshi)  in the concept of seitai (Yuasa 1981: 218).205 Contrary to what Sasaki had 
done, meaning to legally separate the two in ‘in principle’ and ‘in action’, Watsuji unified the 
two in the name of the cultural concept embodied in the emperor. It is for this reason that 
Yonetani affirms that the everyday life of the Japanese subjects became symbolized in the 
emperor (Yonetani 2002: 39). Even if Watsuji had shifted the sovereignty from real power to 
symbolic power, he nevertheless continued on his line that the emperor embodied the national 
unity of the Japanese people. The problem of where sovereignty actually resides is not solved 
even in Watsuji’s expression of the ‘sovereign will of the people’, since in the prewar period 
and in the postwar period he locates it in the emperor. Such continuity is made possible by the 
fact that the emperor had always been an ‘empty’ form that could be ‘filled in’ with any sort 
of legislative definition.  
Probably Watsuji had never completely understood the concept of sovereignty itself 
and, secondly, since his ought to be was the result of the conflation of popular morality with 
the totalitarian political power of the emperor. Thus, it did not allow for the spring of an 
independent popular morality from the ideology of the state. In this sense, the dictatorship of 
the emperor was seen as reflected in the willingness of the people to be subjugated. The same 
modus operandi is applied to sovereignty. There is no internal or external division, 
sovereignty lies in the hands of the emperor even in the ‘symbol’ phase. Therefore, even after 
1945, the structure of Japanese society does not change in Watsuji’s eyes. He ties the national 
subject to the reverence to the emperor and subsequently intertwines it to the idea of the 
modern state. The most outstanding difficulty of his reasoning is that the attempts to 
historically and legally prescribe the tradition of the imperial role. In this regard, Watsuji 
prevents the development of a possible national consciousness by underpinning it in the 
supreme ruler of the nation and not in the elected representatives. The structure of the human 
being as betweeness is therefore preserved in the symbol emperor, since the general will of 
the citizen still appears to belong to the imperial edicts or to the ‘word’ of the emperor. By 
affirming that the people, whether subjects or citizens, had always honored their sacred king, 
                                                 





Watsuji fundamentally sanctioned the continuity between the prewar idea of the ‘way of 
ethics’ and the postwar idea of ‘the expression of the totality of the people’. 
By conflating ethics with politics, Watsuji could not escape the conundrum that he had 
somehow helped to elaborate. Ethics is embodied in the structure of the nation, thanks to the 
double movement of negation rooted in nothingness, and cannot possibly stand as an 
independent social ethics. It is a political ethics. The theory and the practice, as in Miki, 
belong together in ‘cooperation’. As Tsuda points out, Watsuji’s attempts to overcome the 
Rescript on Education miserably failed, since the Rescript ratified feudalism and filial piety 
(Tsuda in Kiyoshi et al. 2008: 76). His attempt to create a new national subject as kokumin 
which, in the postwar period, becomes the beholder of the general will, was a response to the 
crisis WWII and the post-WWII occupation had plunged Japan into. It follows that Watsuji 
reacted to two periods of crisis with the same argumentation. It could be argued that he saw in 
the postwar period the reiteration of the prewar one, as if the influence of ‘Western’ 
modernity had never been purged and it had become so pervasive that there was no way out 
than to see it in a whole, continuous dialectical movement.   
Nevertheless, grounding the fundamental existence of the human being into a 
historical but de-historicized nation prevented Watsuji from accomplishing the popular 
renovation he was aiming at. Furthermore, it plunged his system into the faith in this all-








In this chapter we have seen how both Miki and Watsuji differently answered to the 
questions of the subject formation on a theoretical and political level. Miki introduced the 
concepts of technology and imagination to overcome the problem of historical creation that he 
had first developed in his Philosophy of History. By linking technology to history and 
creating an all-encompassing subject he laid the foundations for his subsequent idea of 
cooperation. Watsuji, on the other hand, first found the national subject in the reverence to the 
emperor and subsequently tied it to the modern, sovereign state. Tsuda argues that they both 




was not a critique in itself (Tsuda in Kiyoshi et al. 2008: 78). Their fundamental standpoint 
completely lacked ‘reality’. Instead they managed to conflate religion and culture that Tsuda 
defines being the essence of ‘cultivation’ (kyōiku) (Tsuda in Kiyoshi et al. 2008: 78).  
I agree with Tsuda interpretation of both thinkers, since I think that their failed subject 
was, on the one hand, a response to the crisis of the traditional subject and, on the other, it 
stood as a possible critique to it. Yet again, the missing point here is not simply ‘reality’, but 
‘historical reality’. You cannot transform a subject unless you transform it according to and 
within history. Their attempted historical or technological narratives of history completely 
overlooked the reality of the situation. The continuity in their thought, in particular the 
attachment to an idea of ningen that was elaborated years before, prevented them from 
develop it. It remained clustered into what it had always been, a de-historicized human being 
that now has technology and imagination qua tools. Watsuji’s ethics as well embodies this 
principle of immobility throughout history. From the Age of Gods to the postwar period the 
Japanese people have constantly recognized themselves in the figure and the role of the 
emperor, as if their impossibility to develop a national consciousness could not be achieved 
lest losing that very same identity. Both periods, the interwar and the postwar, created a 
vacuum both on a intellectual and political point of view. Probably, it is another sign the 





















VI. NINGEN AND IDEOLOGY 
The Escaton of the War and the Failure of a Destiny 
       
 
Ideology has no history.206   
 
The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the 
old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this 
interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms 
appear.207 
     
 
State of the Field 
This final chapter explores the relationship between the ideology of the Japanese 
wartime regime and the ‘ideas’ and ‘ideals’ of Miki and Watsuji. I will demonstrate that the 
failure of the Japanese empire and the loss of the Second World War coincided with the 
failure of Miki and Watsuji’s vision of Japan.  
As said, in this particular instance ideology will be employed within the boundaries of 
Gramsci’s hegemony and Althusser’s ideology. In these terms, the relationship between 
ideology and the philosophy of the ningen will be defined as the philosophy of the ningen 
belonging to the state apparatus that produces and reproduces knowledge. On the other hand, I 
consider the hegemony of the Japanese wartime regime as that form of power that won over 
its subjects by means of consent in its all different forms. Ideology therefore does not only 
represent false consciousness as it was in Marx and Engels but it includes a ‘human’ factor as 
well that, if somehow missing in Althusser, is certainly preponderant in Gramsci. As we shall 
see later, the ideology of Watsuji’s philosophy of ningen could be judged according to the 
Gramscian definition of hegemony. Watsuji supported the power of the Japanese wartime 
regime through his idea that the state should not be coercive but that its subjects should 
naturally converge towards it because of the control hegemony exercise on their 
consciousness. 
When dealing with ideology and intellectuals, it is often easy to vulgarize or to be 
apologetic of the production of certain authors, depending on the political orientation of the 
given scholar or the historical context. In particular, Miki and Watsuji have been respectively 
regarded as a Leftist pundit and a nationalist ideologue. As said in the introduction, in the case 
of Japanese commentators and critics, any discussion regarding Miki’s involvement with the 
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Shōwa Research Association was usually omitted or his role downplayed (Shimizu 1951; 
Kuno 1966; Arakawa 1968; Miyakawa 1970; Shimizu 1976; Uchida 2004). Only recently, 
Tsuda and Machiguchi have dealt with the problem of Miki’s intellectual contribution to the 
theory of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in the broader context of his 
philosophical production (Tsuda 2007; Machiguchi 2004). Shimizu notices that the first 
edition of Miki’s Collected Works (chosakushū), compiled between 1946 and 1952, excluded 
the documents that Miki drafted for the Shōwa Research Association (Shimizu 1976: 60). 
Only in 1968, when the Complete Works (zenshū) was first published, the editors eventually 
decided to include these controversial works (Shimizu 1976: 60). The reason behind this 
sudden turn has to be attributed to the change in the political context. As Shimizu argues, 
right after the end of WWII and during the American occupation the editors of the Collected 
Works possibly wanted to stress the role Miki had in the Left rather than his involvement with 
a nationalistic think-tank (Shimizu 1976: 60). On the other hand, at the end of the 1960s, 
Japan had become a global economic power and the works that were there emerging in regard 
to the history of the Second World War had started dealing with the painful issue of the 
Shōwa association (Shimizu 1976: 61). Therefore the pamphlets suddenly reappeared 
alongside Miki’s writings on Marxism and existentialism.  
In Europe and America, if compared to the scholarship on Nishida, Watsuji, Nishitani 
and other Kyōto School members, not many studies have been dedicated to Miki. Amongst 
the few published, Crowley and Fletcher have predominantly focused their attention to the 
role Miki played in the Shōwa Research Association (Crowley 1971; Fletcher 1979; Fletcher 
1982). Recently, Harootunian has attempted to contextualize Miki’s theory of the East Asian 
Cooperation in the bigger framework of his intellectual career (Harootunian 2000a: 293-357). 
These three scholars, to a greater or lesser extent, agree on the point that Miki was a 
nationalist ideologue. Goto-Jones, on the other hand, provides two contrasting assessments of 
Miki, first leaning more towards the collaborationist side and, later, affirming that Miki’s 
ideas had been manipulated by the Right (Goto-Jones 2005a: 104-9; Goto-Jones 2006). As it 
is clear from this brief account, the discrepancy in the treatment Miki received from Japanese, 
European and American scholars is a sign of the complexity of both Miki’s production and of 
his compromised political position. 
The state of the field of ‘Watsuji’s studies’ is somehow different. His book Climate 
was translated in English already in 1962 and the fact that Watsuji was not really purged in 
the aftermath of the Second World War gives some indication of the climate in which his 




Miki. In other words, critics are divided on the extent to which he actually contributed to the 
ideology of the wartime regime. Nobody denies that Watsuji was a conservative, but Japanese 
critics, such as Yuasa, Yoshizawa, Kōsaka, Nagami and Ichikura tend to be apologetic of the 
most ideological parts of Watsuji’s philosophy (Yuasa 1981; Yuasa 1987; Yoshizawa 1994; 
Kōsaka 1962; Nagami 1981; Ichikura 2005). In addition, they stress the ‘Buddhist’ elements 
present in Watsuji’s works, arguing that the principle of ‘emptiness’ (kū) eschews the 
possibility of the creation or envisioning of a totalitarian state. Other Japanese scholars, such 
as Furukawa, Kosaka and Mine, have tried to provide a more comprehensive assessment, 
highlighting the factors that might have pushed Watsuji to collaborate to the ideology of his 
time (Furukawa 1973; Kosaka 1997; Mine 1998; Mine 2002). The situation in Europe and 
America somehow mirrors the Japanese one. Some critics consider Watsuji a ‘full’ ideologue 
(Bellah 1965; Najita and Harootunian 1988: 711-74; Sakai 1997; Harootunian 2000a: 250-92), 
whilst others have strenuously tried to justify his political positions (Dilworth 1974; LaFleur 
1978; LaFleur 2001 and, to some extent, Arisaka 1996b).  
I have never denied the fact that Watsuji was a nationalist ideologue and I have not 
negated the impact of Miki’s Marxism on the Japanese Left of his time. Nevertheless, in this 
chapter I will show how Miki came to join the Shōwa Research Association in 1938 and the 
extent to which his previous production on ningen and technology contributed to the 
elaboration of the concept of the ‘East Asian Cooperative Body’ (tōa kyōdōtai). On the other 
hand, I will consider Watsuji’s most political works, The Way of the Japanese Subject (Nihon 
no shindō) and The American National Character (America no kokuminsei) and his 
participation in the committee that prepared the first draft of the Kokutai no hongi (Cardinal 
Principles of the National Entity of Japan). 208 These pieces function as a cluster for the ideas 









                                                 




Escaton and Destiny  
In the 1940s, the similarities between Miki and Watsuji become striking: their 
language coincides with the terminology of the political leaders, their rhetoric merge, the 
Japan they each envisioned becomes one Japan or, in Miki’s words ‘a Third Japan’ (Miki 
1938: 609). Both supported the establishment of a Greater East Asia that should have 
comprised most East and South-East Asia under the leadership of Japan and they both 
criticized American imperialism, Western capitalism and colonialism. De facto, it appears that 
they did not consider the Japanese invasion of China and of most of South-East Asia as 
another form of colonialism but, rather, as a ‘liberation’ from Western oppression and 
exploitation. Miki and Watsuji were not alone in supporting the political claims of the 
Japanese government; almost all the members of the Kyōto School shared their vision for a 
new Japan in one way or the other. What is of most interest to us here is the accent they pose 
on ‘destiny’.  
Destiny represents the key to understand this sudden intellectual convergence. The 
historical climate Miki, Watsuji and the other members of the Kyōto School lived in and in 
which they developed their ideas was one of Angst and uneasiness towards modernity. It 
appears that, from the Taishō period onwards, Japan had struggled to find a place in the world. 
As explained elsewhere, Watsuji protracted this way of thinking even in the postwar 
period. 209 If the discourse on medianity as the quintessential human condition is mainly 
concerned with society in the first period of Miki and Watsuji’s intellectual lives, in this stage 
medianity appears to have become the uncertain position that Japan had in the world. It is 
therefore of no surprise that in the late 1930s and early 1940s Miki and Watsuji, as well the 
other Kyōto School members, talked about the ‘world-historical mission’ or ‘world-historical 
place’ of Japan.210 Miki and Watsuji started their philosophical elaborations by posing the 
accent on the societal aspect of the human being rather than on its individuality. Their 
constant struggle to overcome the Cartesian duality of subject and object resulted in the 
creation of an absolute totality, or an Absolute Nothingness in Nishida’s terms, which, instead 
of freeing the individual it subjugated it to an immanent, higher authority. This negation of 
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interpreted as a sign of the involvement of the Kyōto School with the ultranationalist regime (see Minamoto 




freedom, which Uchida underlines as being the eternal struggle in Miki philosophy, 
predestined the human being towards a clear and defined path (Uchida 2004). The destiny of 
the human being hence becomes the destiny and the mission of a whole nation.  
Uhl has explored this quasi-religious dimension in Nishitani and Nishida, linking it to 
the concept of ‘self-realization’ or the ‘concern about the self’ that underpins the discourse on 
the moral and ethical renovation of Japan (Uhl 2008: 129; emphasis in the original). Despite 
the fact that I share some sympathy with this interpretation of some of the members of the 
Kyōto School’s ideas, I would like to push this discourse even further. I would argue that not 
only this renovation of the ningen takes place on a semi-religious platform, but that it is 
embodied in the escaton of the war.  
In this instance, the escaton needs to be considered in Paul’s and John’s terms, where 
the eschatology of history is inevitably related to the Apocalypse (Bultmann 1957: 38-55).211 
Dodd and Löwith stress the importance of the separation between God’s teleology of history 
and the teleology of human history (Dodd 1944: 89; Löwith 1949: 182-90). The coming of 
Christ is an unrepeatable, fulfilling, apocalyptic, now-time event. It allows for metaphysical 
history to enter into the realm of human history, it overthrows the power of evil, it fulfills 
historical destiny and it allows for man to experience eternal life (Dodd 1944: 86).  
Obviously, this kind of discourse cannot be fully applied to Miki and Watsuji that 
were not Jewish or Christian thinkers. In addition to this characteristic, Löwith denies that it is 
possible to transfer the Christian eschatology into a philosophical discourse, since in the 
Christian faith the goal is the redemption from sin and death (Löwith 1949: 189). 
Nevertheless, there is some room left for expanding this discourse on eschatology in the realm 
of ideas. If we link the kairos, the eternal and clustered present, to the escaton, then the idea 
of the fulfillment of the teleology of history could be realized in the historical mission of 
Japan. Hence, it should be possible to link the failed destiny of Japan to the failed destiny of 
intellectuals and ideas. Miki and Watsuji effectively created a ‘religion of the human being’ 
that, on the one hand, eschewed theology as we know it but, on the other, still maintained the 
religious trait of faith. Faith here is the faith in the end of the war, of the escaton of the war 
qua re-ordering of the world geo-political and cultural scenario. The Messiah Miki and 
Watsuji were waiting for was the end of and victory in the war that would have allowed Japan 
to elevate itself to a new position and that would have fulfilled its historical destiny. Along 
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these lines, the singularity of the Apocaliptic event is preserved, since the end of the war 
appeared in a catastrophic form. The escaton becomes a human escaton and not a 
metaphysical one.212 Ideas transform themselves into a vision for history, in a future that will 
finally bring peace to the anxiety of the past forty years.213  
The kairos that we have previously analyzed that does not allow for a teleology of 
history is the perfect example of the significance of the escaton.214  Discussing the failure of 
Miki’s thought in creating a link and equilibrium between everydayness and world historicity, 
we have demonstrated that Miki was not able to overcome the problem of the supremacy of 
world history. His ideas found their historical counterpart in the geo-political situation of the 
1930s, with Japan taking its first steps into imperialism and with basic freedoms being denied 
on a domestic level. In the 1940s, the world history linked to the kairos qua event becomes 
inevitably intertwined with the destiny and historical mission of Japan in Asia. Therefore, his 
vision finds life in historical reality. In this respect, the escaton works as this vision. With the 
defeat, despite the fact that Miki could not witness it since he died in prison in September 
1945, his vision of Japan and the longing for the Third Japan were crushed. For Watsuji, 
whose elaboration of time does not involve the kairos, the escaton is even more reflected in a 
pure and visionary state of victory. He, who survived 1945 and went on writing until 1960, 
felt that the loss of WWII was not only a national defeat but a personal one as well.215 The 
situation of Angst that Watsuji equated to the pervasive presence of capitalism, egotism and 
utilitarianism in Japan, did not disappear in the 1950s. His vision failed together with Japan’s 
mission and the historical destiny of the Japanese nation was not fulfilled. Watsuji thus 
becomes like a Christian, waiting for the second coming of Christ and longing for a renewed, 
worldly role for Japan. It is in this instance that the discourse on the sakoku period has to be 
considered, as the explanation of the reason why the escaton did not materialized in the way 
he had foreseen it.  
I believe that the atmosphere of Angst that pervaded Japan after 1945 and that I 
consider being expressed in the shutaisei debate and around the question of war-responsibility 
is nothing else than consequence of the failure of ideas and intellectuals in the previous years. 
For the Kyōto School, their historicized human being but de-historicized nation linked to the 
historicity of the human being qua nation did not fulfill its historical mission. The key is faith 
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and, as Löwith says: ‘the confidence in a theological escaton stands or fails with faith alone’ 
(Löwith 1949: 252). Not solely a failed theological escaton, I would argue, but a failed 
intellectual escaton as well.  
In political terms, the escaton that Miki envisioned and the one of Watsuji’s slightly 
differ in their origin but not in their outcome. Miki failed to recognize that the way he had 
characterized his human being was doomed from its start. His philosophy completely merged 
with ideology in the moment when Miki defined the human being as the Japanese nation 
attaining its moral destiny. Differently, Watsuji retained part of his faith in Japan after 1945. 
In this case, his attempt to reshape the destiny of the Japanese nation in the post-1945 world 
shows signs of continuity. Nevertheless, it is not a problem of ideas crushed by political 
power, otherwise the ‘ideologue’ theory could not be sustained. In his case, as well as in 
Tanabe and Nishitani’s, it is a problem of convergence between history and ideas.216 What is 
lost is the political faith in the escaton but not in the vision. Therefore, the failure is the 
sudden convergence between history and ideas on a political level but the continuation of the 
vision of a second escaton for Japan is matter of intellectual escaton. Power did not overthrow 
their philosophies, history did.  
Miki and Watsuji created a human being that was, in its existential and philosophical 
foundation, social, historical and national. The elaboration and subsequent renovation that 
followed did nothing more than strengthening the national traits of the ningen. Bound to a 
Japanese history, trapped into a historical present unable to fulfill its development towards 
historical completion and born out of faith, it could not exempt itself from being crushed 
together with historical reality. The condition of medianity doomed the human being from its 
early philosophical appearance. In this context, it is without doubt that questions related to 
Miki’s role as an ideologue of the interwar status quo or the extent to which Watsuji could be 
regarded a nationalist do not fully address the problem explained above. Miki and Watsuji 
contributed to the ideology of the Japanese empire, but how they did it and which destiny they 
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The Shōwa Research Association  
The Shōwa Research Association was informally set up in 1933 by Gotō Ryūnosuke 
together with the soon-to-be prime minister Prince Konoe Fumimaro (Shimizu 1976: 59; 
Sakai 1992: 16). This association was officially recognized in 1936 and it functioned as 
Konoe’s brain-trust. Several intellectuals, philosophers and economists were called to join the 
discussion groups with the main objective of advising Konoe on matters of foreign policy and 
economic planning (Shillony 1981: 111). In his book dedicated to the association, Sakai 
Saburō, a former member himself, lists thirteen different sub-groups the association was 
divided into, according to the political issues that needed to be addressed (Sakai 1992: 59-60). 
Miki joined the Shōwa Research Association in 1938 and, according to Shimizu Ikutarō’s 
personal account of the meetings, he worked closely with Shimizu, with the Marxist 
philosopher Funayama Shin’ichi, the historians of science Sugai Jun’ichi and Saigusa Hiroto 
and the two journalists from the Asahi Shinbun Ryū Shintarō and Sasa Hirō (Shimizu 1976: 
59). Other important members of the association were the professor of economics and chief 
strategist of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Rōyama Masamichi, the expert on China and 
Manchuria Taira Teizō, the sinologist Ozaki Hotsumi, the professor of economics Yabe Teiji, 
and Kazami Akira, who will subsequently occupy strategic positions in the first and second 
Konoe cabinets (1937-1939 and 1940-41) (Crowley 1971: 324). As it is clear from this list of 
names, the group was not composed solely by right-wing figures. On the contrary, it brought 
together people from different backgrounds and activities, who were supposed to provide a 
strong economical and theoretical underpinning to Konoe’s policies.217  
In November 1938, after the China incident, Konoe declared that China had been ‘the 
victim of the imperialistic ambitions and rivalries of the Occidental powers’ and that Japan 
had the mission to reestablish justice in East Asia (Konoe quoted in Crowley 1974: 279). It 
was the start of the New Order Movement that sought to subtract Western powers of their 
colonial territories and to subject them to Japanese ruling. The New Order was also deeply 
intertwined with the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (dai tōa kyōeiken) or 
simply ‘Greater East Asia’ (dai tōa). These slogans describe the different principles that 
Konoe wanted Japan to satisfy, which spanned from the construction of an East and South-
East Asian regional block in the name of the unity of the Asian race, the defeat of 
communism and capitalism and to put an end to the presence of Western powers in the block 
                                                 
217  Miyamoto affirms that the ultra-nationalist Minoda Muneki even wrote an article titled ‘The magical 
language of the Shōwa Research Association ’ (Shōwa Kenkyūkai no gengo majitsu) criticizing it for being ‘anti-




(Crowley 1974: 287). 218Despite the fact that the association ceased to exist in 1940 the 
ideology behind it did not die with it. 219 In December 1941 Japanese planes bombarded the 
American Naval base of Pearl Harbor and from then on the total war started.  
During the four years of its activity, the association produced a striking amount of 
documents and pamphlets on the problems of the invasion of China and Asia, domestic issues 
and economic reforms, and the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In this 
regard, it appears that Miki’s contribution was crucial in drafting two documents that set out 
the ideological and theoretical principles of Greater East Asia. The first one, The Intellectual 
Principles of the New Japan (Shin nihon shisō genri), appeared in January 1939 and the 
second one, The Intellectual Principles of the New Japan, Continuum. The Philosophical 
Bases of Cooperativism (Shin nihon shisō genri zokuhen. Kyōdōshugi no tetsugakuteki kiso) 
was published in September of the same year.220 Despite the fact that Shimizu admits that the 
second pamphlet might have been written by a different person (they are quite dissimilar in 
style and language), the themes present in both documents are very similar to the articles and 
pieces that Miki wrote in the mid-1930s, before formally joining the association (Shimizu 
1976: 62-3). From about 1935 onwards, Miki started being interested in the problem of the 
relationship between China and Japan and he wrote extensively on the cultural relations 
between the two countries and the position of Japan in world history.221 In the following 






                                                 
218 The idea of ‘Greater East Asia’ was not a novelty or an invention of the 1930s-1940s Japan. The difference is 
that, during those years, it stood as the intellectual and ideological backdrop of Japan imperialistic aims. 
219 In 1941, Ozaki, one of the members of the association, was found guilty of treason in connection to the Sorge 
Ring (Shillony 1981: 112). Richard Sorge was a Russian spy in Japan. In 1941, he and Ozaki were arrested and 
put in jail for treason under the Peace Preservation Law. They were both hanged in 1944. It appears that, despite 
his involvement in the Shōwa Kenkyukai and his proximity to Konoe, Ozaki secretly provided sensitive 
documents to Sorge and the Soviets. For a detailed account of the Sorge Ring, although to be carefully read, see 
Johnson 1990.  
220 Nowadays, they can be found in MKZ XVII: 507-533 and MKZ XVII: 534-588. 
221 From 1935 is The Problem of Sino-Japanese Thought (Nisshi shisō mondai) published in December in the 
Yomiuri Shinbun (now in MKZ XV: 28-35), from 1937 The Imperial Way of World History (Sekaishi no kōdō) 
and The Reality of Japan (Nihon no genjitsu) published, respectively, in July in Shinchō and in November in 
Chūōkōron (now in MKZ XIII: 402-407 and 438-463) and from 1938 The Significance of World History in 
Modern Japan (Gendai nihon ni okeru sekaishi no igi), 20th Century Thought (Nijū seki no shisō), The 
Foundation of the Greater East Asia Thought (Tōa shisō no konkyo) published respectively in June in Kaizō, in 




Towards the ‘Intellectual Principles of the New Japan’  
The goal of this section and of the following one will be to demonstrate that Miki’s 
system of the human being reached completion in the creation of the Japanese nation with a 
new mission in the world. As we shall see, the development of the ningen from a ningen-class 
of the Marxist period until the homo faber of Philosophy of Technology will finally 
materialize in the Japan of 1940s and its struggle to create a Japanese empire. I will thus argue 
that Miki’s statement that ‘attaining self-awareness of one’s own moral destiny is crucial’ is a 
proof that his human being had eventually merged with the Japanese nation and died with it.  
In the aftermath of the 1936 February incident, Miki wrote The Japanese Character 
and Fascism (Nihonteki seikaku to fashizumu), where he lamented the fact that Japan had 
been taken over by the fascist tendencies of ‘Japanism’ (MKZ XIII: 252).222 Miki interpreted 
the rebels’ attempt as a sign of the radicalization of the term ‘Japanese spirit’ (nihon no 
seishin) and he condemned the rebellion, although in implicit terms, for not having 
recognized that no pure Japan ever existed. Along the lines of Watsuji, Miki defined Japanese 
culture as ‘stratified’ (MKZ XIII: 258). As in his theory of the renovation of the human being, 
he states that fascism is nothing else than a mis-conception of the ‘Japanese character’, 
because, he argues, even this character that is a form without a form is subjected to change 
and continuous renovation (MKZ XIII: 260-3). He attributed the rise of fascism in Japan to 
the seclusion of the Tokugawa period that allowed for elements of feudalism to linger in 
Japanese society and that were never overcome (MKZ XIII: 250-1).223 
Miki never denied the great cultural debt that Japan owed to China in the creation of 
the ‘stratified’ culture of Japan, but he thought that it was time for Japan to lead China 
towards a path of modernization and political stability. In 1935, Miki wrote that China was in 
need of help in forming an alliance against Western modernity (MKZ XV: 32-4). He reaches 
the conclusion that, in this world of decline of Western thought, Japan has the chance of 
emerging and contributing to world history (MKZ XV: 34).  
This discourse on ‘help’ that China apparently needed is restated in a very short but 
significant piece from 1940. The article is the printed version of a dialogue between Miki and 
Zhou Fohai, who at the time was the second commander in chief of Wang Jingwei’s puppet 
                                                 
222 Originally published in Chūōkōron in August 1936. Now in MKZ XIII 241-267. During the February incident 
a group of army officers led an attempted coup d’etat in the name of the restoration of the political power of the 
emperor. The rebels were calling for a ‘Shōwa Restoration’ and the reinforcement of the imperial ruling and the 
doctrine of the kokutai (Bix 2000: 298). 
223 This discourse is very similar to the critique that the Second Soviet Comintern addressed to Japan in 1922. 
They, too, found that the feudal elements present in Japanese society were hampering the path to revolution. On 




government in Nanjing.224 Their main concern is ‘nationalism’ (minzokushugi) and the link 
between what they call ‘natural’ or ‘people’s nationalism’ (minzokushugi) and ‘state-
nationalism’ (kokkashugi), characterized by military strength (Miki et al. 1940: 83). Miki 
suggests to Wang that many countries have undergone the path of unifying these two sides of 
the same coin, including Japan, but that China might need some more time. As a solution, 
Miki proposes the Greater East Asia as symbol of the peaceful co-existence of different 
countries in one sphere, where each and every country is independent and ‘nationally’ free 
(Miki et al. 1940: 84-5).  
In 1937, in The Reality of Japan, Miki lays out some major themes that will then make 
up the kernel of the two Shōwa Kenkyūkai’s documents on the ‘new Japan’. This article, 
which nevertheless shows heavy signs of censorship, faces the philosophical background 
behind the phrases ‘Japanese spirit’ and ‘Chinese spirit’ (MKZ XIII: 445). Miki, noticing how 
the most recent intellectual and political discussions had shifted from ‘Japan’ to ‘Asia’, 
proposes to look at the situation by the standpoint of world-history. Comparing what was then 
only an idea of a Greater East Asia to the unifying role that the Roman empire or the Catholic 
Church had in European history, he argues that Buddhism could function as a principle of 
unity in East Asia (MKZ XIII: 450-4). Buddhism, as much as Christianity, retains its religious, 
transcendental character. Human existence, as seen in the previous chapters, is transcendental 
as well since its life in the world is characterized by the movement of transcendence from 
object to subject (MKZ XIII: 77-8). 225 Together, religion and existence share this common 
transcendental ground that allows for both to preserve their ‘world character’.  On the stage of 
world-history, Buddhism has now to allow for the Japanese character of ‘worldly-ness’ to 
emerge without losing its own in the process. Therefore, Buddhism as a religion needs to 
drive the political process behind the Japanese expansion in Asia, but not transform itself into 
politics otherwise it will lose its authority (MKZ XIII: 81). Nonetheless, Miki cannot solve 
the problem of the particularity of Buddhism, in the sense that Buddhism remained confined 
to the Asian continent, whilst he seems to imply that Christianity spread well beyond its birth 
boundaries. One of the most important issues here is that Miki does not seem to distinguish 
between the political role the Catholic Church qua establishment had and Christianity as a 
religion in general. There is a disparity between his treatment of Buddhism, that to him covers 
a cultural rather than a political role, and his treatment of the Catholic Church. The two things 
                                                 
224 The Problem of Nationalism (Minzoku no mondai).  Published in Chūōkōron in May 1940.  
225 In Religion as the Inspiring Force of the New Japan (Shin nihon no shidōryoku toshite no shūkyō). Originally 




somehow conflate when Miki affirms that some Christian countries are now witnessing a 
flourishing of totalitarianism and nationalism, as if Japan, by virtue of the Buddhist principle 
of ‘nothingness’, was immune from this threat.226 The most fundamental Buddhist principle, 
nothingness, thus transforms itself from a religious principle into a cultural and political factor. 
This consideration is very important, since it represents the basis of the Asian Cooperativism 
theory where the discourse around culture was used to disguise Japan’s real political 
ambitions.  
Facing the impossibility of resolving the question of the relationship between religion 
and politics, Miki introduces ‘science’. Miki argues that ‘tradition’ (dentō) could help in 
unifying Asia but that, at the same time, ‘science’ (or Watsuji’s ‘scientific spirit’) should go 
hand-in-hand with it (MKZ XIII: 462): 
There is no doubt that Eastern thought has been greatly limited by the 
underdevelopment of science that makes world universality possible 
       (MKZ XIII: 462) 
 
The world-character of a regional Buddhism and the scientific spirit of modernity 
should thus provide the fundamental bases for Japan to finally enter world-history. The 
sustainability of such a way of reasoning was nevertheless doubted by Miki himself only a 
couple of months before, in The 20th Century Thought, when he returned to the problem of 
Angst: 
What humanity experienced in the Great War was not the question of 
‘choice’ (sentaku) but rather of ‘a destiny difficult to escape from’ 
(nigere muzukashii unmei) and as Scheler said, instead of complete 
unity, the world was thrown into the midst of contrasting ideologies of 
an unprecedented scale […] The Second World War is now difficult 
to avoid, and through the general pessimism that has spread far more 
than imagined, rebuilding a unifying principle for the history of 
humanity has become perhaps an impossible task 
       (MKZ XIV: 155-6) 
 
The abstraction of nationalism and, most of all, internationalism, are the causes behind 
the impossibility of tracing a new ‘worldy-human’ historical principle. Similarly to Nishida, 
Watsuji and other Kyōto School members, Miki launches an implicit attack on the League of 
Nations, considering it only an association based on the ‘individuality’ of single countries 
(MKZ XIII: 405-6).227 Miki calls it ‘the abstraction’ of the ‘way’ (michi) that has pushed 
history and reality to part and that has given birth to this form of internationalism that is based 
                                                 
226 Miki seems to imply, throughout the whole article, that there was never a ‘Renaissance period’ in the East. As 
seen before, this is what made the renovation of the human being possible in Europe.  




solely on capitalist development (MKZ XIII: 406-7). Miki therefore considers capitalism as 
the root of this kind of wrong world-cooperation. In this instance, Miki brings about a similar 
critique of capitalism to the one Watsuji had put forward in his dialogues with Kawakami 
Hajime and later in his Study of Ethics.228  
Capitalism is the cause of the transformation of the traditional Gemeinschaft into the 
modern Gesellschaft, where the old principles that belonged to the community have been 
replaced by the capitalist spirit. To Miki, capitalist and liberalism have the same root, which is 
the abstraction of history from reality and he warns against constructing a new Asia on the 
basis of economic exchange and trade (MKZ XIV: 149).229 To him, establishing a cooperation 
of this sort will simply perpetuate the imperialism of Western powers. Instead, he affirms, 
‘the unity of Asia is a matter of true world history’ (MKZ XIV: 149). 
The motifs that underpin Miki’s vision for Japan are several and they all intertwined. 
On the one hand, the scientific spirit that the ‘East’ failed to appropriate in the past centuries 
could be seen as the continuation of his discourse on technology. Technology here is ‘social’ 
technology or the technology that in the East never developed into in the technology of things 
(MKZ XVII: 140-2).230 Buddhism, as explained above, functions as cultural glue, the element 
that, together with race, melds commonalities in the whole Asia.231 
In this convergence, Miki sees the chance for the ‘East’ to substitute Europe in leading 
world history and to create a new Greater East Asia not simply confined to geographical 
boundaries but pregnant with ‘world significance’ (sekaiteki igi) (MKZ XV: 309). 232 He 
explains that ‘Europeanism’ (Yōroppashugi), an expression borrowed from Ranke, has finally 
declined under the heavy hit of Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West (1918), Ernst 
Troeltsch’s Historism and Its Problems (1922) and Leopold von Ranke’s World History 
(1888) (MKZ XIV: 147-8).  
If the East Asia Cooperative Body (tōa kyōdōtai) has today to have 
world significance, it surely needs to be concretized in the 
particularity of East Asia. Nevertheless, particularity cannot be a mere 
particular, but a particular and a universal at the same time. In other 
words, it cannot be confined to geographical boundaries, it has to 
become the mark of the new world order 
                                                 
228 See Chap. 2 and Chap. 3. 
229 In The Significance of World History in Modern Japan. 
230 In The History of the Sino-Japanese Cultural Relationship (Nisshi bunka kankeishi), originally published in 
Taiheihō Mondai Shiryō in March 1940. Now in MKZ XVII: 126-85.  
231 In The Reality of Japan, Miki criticizes the discourse on the ‘common race’ (dōshū) that the most right-wing 
ideologues were putting forward (MKZ XIII: 447). For the history of the narrative of race in China and Japan see 
Karl 1998 and Duara 2001.  
232 In The Foundations of the Greater East Asia Thought. For a similar discourse on the position of Japan in 




                                                                                     (MKZ XV: 315) 
 
Again, the new Gemeinschaft that will be born from the new order in Asia will make 
each and every country there included self-aware of its particularity. At the same time, nations 
will accept the sense of belonging to this higher entity. Again: 
If the unity of the East is a matter of world history, so it has to be 
considered. In other words, it represents the solution of the problem of 
capitalism. In what ways we can overcome the contradictions 
immanent in capitalism is a matter of the great concern for world 
history today. Not confronting these issues would mean not facing the 
reality of the true, world-historical significance of the unity of the East 
       (MKZ XV: 324) 
 
Conflating Tönnies’ ideas of Gemeischaft and Gesellschaft with Bergon’s ‘open’ and 
‘closed’ societies, Miki tries to convince us that the closed societies inside an open structure 
would only correspond to a new capitalist alliance and not a cultural and historical one. Asian 
nations have to open to this new Japanese project, otherwise the ‘modern Gesellschaft’ would 
take over and this would be ‘unforgivable’ (yurusarenai).  
Uchida affirms that Miki’s idea of cooperativism is an act of resistance to Western 
imperialism (Uchida in Miki 2007: 243). Taking as a proof Miki’s statements that Japan was 
in need of a process of cultural self-criticism before going and occupy half of Asia and that 
feudalism was still present in the Asian spirit, he concludes that Miki brought forward this 
idea on the basis of the ‘pathos’ Japan shared with the other Asian peoples (Uchida in Miki 
2007: 249). Leaning towards a contemporary theory of post-colonialism that involves a 
critique of colonial modernity and capitalist development, Uchida transforms Miki into a 
contemporary intellectual of resistance. Very much alike Goto-Jones’ theory that Nishida was 
not effective in his ‘speaking the truth to power’, Uchida posits Miki’s problematic 
involvement with the regime in the context of Miki’s theory of the renovation of the human 
being and eventually attempts to find a positive assessment of this troubled period of his life.  
My disagreement with Uchida does not regard the context of his statements. It rather 
points at the fact that it is not possible to define Miki as a ‘post-colonial intellectual’ ante 
litteram. Miki’s vision of a new Asia, at this stage, has already taken the form of propaganda. 
His proximity to Konoe transformed his language into a political pamphlet. Far from arguing 
that it is solely a problem of language, I see this ultimate step in Miki’s philosophy as the 
completion of his system of creation of the national human being. From his early writings on 




basis for a direct link between the late 1920s and the late 1930s. If imperialism forms the 
alliance between mob and capital, overstepping the problem of class, then Miki had already 
created it in his creation of the ningen-class.233  
Miki’s mistake was precisely the overlooking of the internal mechanisms that regulate 
capitalism. If imperialism is the necessity of the capital of the nation state to channel the 
exchange-value and overpopulation, then the expansion of the nation state is inherently linked 
to the overflowing of capital. Miki never recognized this aspect of Marxist theory, and 
therefore created the form of imperialism typical of fascist ideologies. His critique of 
capitalism is the fascist one, not the one of a post-colonialist. His cultural and, I would argue, 
‘human’ imperialism rooted in his faith in a national and international awakening does not 
constitute an act of resistance. Rather, in its own right, it represents a philosophical discourse 
that blurred the boundaries between politics and culture, between intellectual and political 
activity. His vision of a common destiny for the whole Asia misses, or probably it is too close, 
the reality of the unfolding of history. The lucidity and objectivity that had characterized his 
previous writings, contrastingly charged with pathos and anxiety, loses its efficacy in the 
rhetoric of Japanese imperialism. That rhetoric was the one that Miki had defined as the true 
character of the human being. 
The question here is not whether Miki can be rescued from history or historical 







The Intellectual Principles of the New Japan appeared in January 1939 as a product of 
the Shōwa Research Association. In reality, most of the pamphlet was compiled by Miki. In 
November 1938, when Miki joined the association, he delivered a speech called The World-
Historical Significance of the China Incident (Shina jihen no sekaishiteki igi). This speech, 
together with The Reality of Japan, forms the backbone of the Principles. Repeating his 
                                                 
233 See Arendt 2004: 196-209. Following Arendt, if the imperialist expansion was a way to overcome the class 
divison and struggle in the formation of the paradoxical alliance beween mob capital then: ‘the aim of these 
movements was, so to speak, to imperialize the whole nation (and not only the ‘superfluous’ part of it), to 
combine domestic and foreign policy in such a way as to organize the nation for the looting of foreign territories 





previous arguments on the necessity of helping China in expelling foreign powers and 
combating Western imperialism, he gives a new interpretation of the China Incident 
according to the categories of space and time:  
Spatially, the world-historical meaning of the China Incident will 
make the unity of the world possible through the realization of an East 
Asian unity […] Temporally, the significance of the China Incident 
must bring an end the problems of capitalism […] There is a mutual 
relationship between these spatial and temporal problems and it will 
not be possible to create a real unity in East Asia unless the issues of 
capitalism have being solved 
       (MKZ XVII: 508-11) 
 
The pamphlet reaches its intellectual peak when Miki argues that the unity in Asia will 
represent a ‘new Renaissance’ such as the one that happened in Italy and sparked the 
emergence of national consciousness in Europe (MKZ XVII: 512). The leitmotif of the 
Renaissance, which always constituted Miki’s point of reference in the outline of the theory 
of human renovation, becomes a model also for his theory of the East Asian cooperation. This 
new kind of Asian Renaissance will be based on ‘Eastern humanism’ (tōyōteki 
hyūmanizumu): 
Against Western humanism (seyōteki hyūmanizumu) that is based on 
humanism (ningenshugi) and culturalism (bunkashugi), Eastern 
humanism represents the connubium between man and nature, 
between life-style and culture. Against the idea of ‘human species’ 
(jinrui) that is at the root of Western humanism, Eastern humanism is 
underpinned by concepts such as ‘nothingness’ (mu), ‘nature’ (shizen) 
and ‘heaven’ (ten). Again, Eastern humanism will accomplish the 
rational order of society by following the ethical way on which the 
cultivation of the self lies upon  
       (MKZ XVII: 514) 
 
The process of renovation does not only involve the solution of the contradictions 
immanent in capitalism and the creation of a new ‘Asian human being’, it involves a process 
of renovation of culture through sublation. Eastern culture, purged of its feudalistic elements, 
would elevate itself into a new Gemeinschaft. The human being, Miki adds in a Watsuji 
reminiscence, is born and lives within society, the society that will defeat the individualistic 
tendencies of utilitarian ones. Rationalism and irrationalism, nationalism and internationalism, 
familism and modernism, communism and liberalism, all these contradictory factors will be 





The creation of the East Asian Cooperative Body under the leadership 
of Japan will not only depend on the initiative of the Japanese people, 
it will based on the moral destiny of Japan in the face of the present 
incident. Attaining self-awareness of one’s own moral destiny is 
crucial 
     (MKZ XVII: 533; emphasis added) 
 
What are the philosophical principles that underpin this idea of the awareness of 
Japan’s destiny? They are the ‘practical’ principles of cooperativism.234 They are realized by 
a concrete and technological subject, the shutai, that abides to the social and practical 
standpoint of the present (MKZ XVII: 539-44). 
The development of history looks to the future and looking at things 
historically means looking at them in their unfolding. Praxis is not 
simply the past, it is also prescribed by the future. The historical 
present, past and future in which we act are, at the same time, present, 
temporal and eternal and the instant stands as the unity between time 
and eternity 
     (MKZ XVII: 545-6; emphasis added) 
 
Cooperativism therefore is based on the theory of the form without a form, that Miki 
had already outlined in his theory of technology, that will reach historical and practical form 
in the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.  
Assessing Miki’s involvement with the Japanese wartime establishment is an issue 
that has sparked quite some controversy in Japan. Yonetani, following some earlier 
assessments of Miki philosophy, agrees that Miki’s language sounds like the one of a 
tenkōsha or the intellectual who has abjured his faith to embrace the ideology of the Japanese 
nationalist regime (Yonetani 1998: 48). Sakai, on the other hand, treats Miki as a full member 
and enthusiastic participants of different governmental think-tanks, even before the Shōwa 
association (Sakai 1992: 157-63). Shiozaki, in direct antagonism to Sakai, explains that 
Miki’s situation has to be understood and interpreted according to the ‘logic of state of 
affairs’ (jimu no ronri), an expression that Miki himself used in one of his articles (Shiozaki 
1993: 18).235 Following Miki’s original, in which he equated the logic of the state of affairs 
with the logic of politics in Machiavellian terms, Shiozaki argues that Miki’s involvement 
                                                 
234 In The Intellectual Principles of New Japan. Continuum. The Philosophical Bases of Cooperationism.  
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‘principle of help’, a catholic principle behind solidarity (Shiozaki 1993: 28). In my personal view, this kind of 





was dictated by the raison d’état. Nevertheless, if we carefully look at Miki’s piece, the 
situation appears to be quite different. Miki refers to Machiavelli’s idea of logic of the affairs 
as a political and technological act (MKZ XIV: 299). Since Machiavelli, Miki continues, 
considered the logic of the affairs as based on an objective knowledge of history and reality, 
the raison d’état has to be the natural self-preservation of the state and the development of its 
vital force (MKZ XIV: 301-4). Thus, it is quite difficult to judge from this piece whether Miki 
thought that there was no other choice for him but to join the Shōwa association. Certainly, 
the raison d’état could be interpreted as Miki’s endorsement of the China Incident and the 
advance in North China. Therefore, both the idea of tenkō and of the submission to political 
and historical necessity do not appear to be very helpful in attempting to interpret the reason 
behind Miki support for the ideology of the Japanese status quo.  
Shimizu, despite his effort to rescue Miki from the judgment of history, argues that 
Miki never lost faith in the human being and that, in his deep love for Japan, he was trying to 
warn it against the fascist tendencies of the Right (Shimizu 1951: 10-4). Shimizu himself 
seems to be regretting having joined the Shōwa Research Association, especially when he 
read Miki’s pieces and he contextualized them in Miki’s theory of the human being. How to 
hence explain Miki’s continuous support for the Shōwa group and his proximity to Konoe? 
Shimizu is right when he affirms that Miki’s idea of ningen underpins even this part of his 
political and intellectual life. It is the ningen, but it is not the one of his Pascal period, it is the 
homo faber of technology. A homo faber that recognizes itself in the Japanese nation and in 
the creation of a sphere of influence aimed at overcoming liberalism and communism. It is the 
genealogy of the idea that, from its origins, dooms its outcome. In the realm of ideas, Miki 
himself affirms that ‘since military activities cannot be carried on permanently, Japan has to 
resort to the measure of influencing China by means of ideas’ (Miki 1938: 607). The Third 
Japan represents the force that should implement the change in its synthesis of Eastern and 
Western cultures and that is now: 
In the midst of the travails for its birth. We are certainly experiencing 
the period of “Sturm und Drang”. There might be certain overstepping 
and shortcomings, but the Third Japan is sure to be born 
       (Miki 1938: 609) 
 
The Sturm und Drang deeply reflects the period of uncertainty that pervaded the late 
1930s and the early 1940s. The idea of a Third Japan that should have been born right after 
the conquest of North China historically materialized in the Japanese empire. Nevertheless, if 




temporality of the kairos, which is the crystallized present. How could a temporal present that 
belongs to past, present and future be reconciled with the future birth of a renovated Japan is a 
problem of ideas. In this instance the kairos is deeply intertwined with the idea of the escaton. 
Miki’s vision of the Third Japan is born out of the technological subject and the political 
nation in an attempt of creating an entity capable of overcoming the problems of modernity, 
war, power and geo-political equilibrium. The intellectual escaton is therefore immersed in 
the faith in the attainment of one’s own moral destiny. The moral destiny of Japan is the 
creation of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and this specific, national destiny 
will be fulfilled only when the faith in a de-historicized historical present will meet the real, 
historical reality. In historical and historiographical terms, these two elements partially meet 
in the territorial expansion of the Japanese empire. In ideological terms, and not in the sense 
of ‘ideology’ but in the sense of ‘ideas’, these two elements create a fatal connubium that 
nevertheless is never fulfilled. It does not materialize because the escaton of the end of the 
war qua victory never arrives.  
Miki had complete faith in the human being, as Shimizu points out, but it is precisely 
this flaw in his thinking that helped him recreating the kairos of the supremacy of world 
history over everydayness. From Pascal onwards, the medianity that underpins his elaboration 
of ningen never reaches completion. The most basic problem here is that no matter whether 
Miki is considering Pascal, Marx, Lukács, Hegel, Kant, Dessauer, Heidegger, he needs to 
construct a system that is anthropological and, therefore, inherently median. On a world-scale, 
medianity is the situation Japan found itself into. The Angst remains pervasive, medianity 
remains the fundamental condition of a nation kept between totality and infinity (Miki’s 
eternity in the instant) that is: ‘un milieu entre rien et tout [..] également incapable de voir le 
neant d’où il est tiré, et l’infini où il est englouti’ (Pascal 72). This is the historical reality that 
Miki is missing out and that helps him building a system that is and will still remain detached 
from the reality of the human condition because based on faith in a particular idea of Japan. 
Analyzing Miki’s idea of cooperationism in the name of Derrida’s differance, as Machiguchi 
does, would naturally eschews any moral responsibility of Miki’s involvement with the 
imperialistic ideology (Machiguchi 2004: 234-7). Moreover, it would disregard ‘the structural 
differences between its own historical location and other histories, past and present’ (Dirlik 
1997: 10). Since Miki himself talked about moral destiny, that same moral destiny becomes 
his moral responsibility. The I-Thou relationship between the Japanese and the rest of Asia is 
not a question of identification after the old world order has been disrupted and therefore a 




iterate the same kind of colonial occupation that the European powers and America had 
previously perpetrated. 
Most probably, Miki’s overlooking of the economical side of Marxism, his fascination 
with Heidegger and the existentialists and his immersion in the technology discourse, all 
contributed to the caesura between Miki’s highly complex theoretical system and his political 
activity. Nonetheless, I cannot believe that ideas are not political. Thus, arguing that Miki had 
two sides, one good and one bad, or censoring his contribution to the Shōwa association or 
praising him only for his innovations in Marxist dialectics overlook the fact that Miki’s 
politics was born out of Miki philosophy. From a human being to a society and then a nation, 
this ningen never ceased to be medianity, uncertainty, collectivity and practice and its de-
historicization brings the nation towards an intellectual escaton that was predestined to fail 
from its seeds.  
Miki’s adventure with the Shōwa Research Association ends here. In January 1942, he 
was drafted by the ministry of propaganda and sent to Manila, in the Philippines, with other 
novelists and intellectuals. They were all called bunkajin or ‘men of culture’ and their mission 
was one of providing intellectual support to the government’s policy of completing ‘the 
emancipation of Asia’ (Taraiko in Kiyoshi et al. 2008: 311). Miki returned to Japan in 
December of the same year and in March 1945 he was arrested and incarcerated on suspicion 
of having given shelter to a member of the underground Japanese Communist Party. He died 








Watsuji and the Kokutai no Hongi 
The Kokutai no hongi was issued by the Ministry of Education in May 1937, as a 
response to the 1936 February incident. The document was primarily directed to education 
and it was supposed to be used in schools. Nationally, it sold more than two million copies 
(Bix 2000: 313). The Kokutai no hongi, as the title suggests, had the objective of reinforcing 




purity of Japan. It condemned European and American cultures and their rationalism and 
positivist ideologies that led to the rise of Nazism and fascism in Germany and Italy (Hall 
1949: 52-4). Moreover, it decreed that all Japanese subjects had to obey to emperor Hirohito, 
since: 
The Way of the subjects exists where the entire nation serves the 
Emperor united in mind in the very spirit in which many deities served 
at the time when the Imperial Grandchild, Ninidi no Mikoto, 
descended on earth. That is, we by nature serve the Emperor and walk 
the Way of the Empire, and it is perfectly natural that we subjects 
should possess this essential quality  
        (Hall 1949: 79) 
 
 
The Kokutai no hongi was clearly intended as a propaganda document and it was 
issued with the vision of strengthening the national support for the war in China. Watsuji 
appears in the list of names of intellectuals who wrote the first draft of the pamphlet, while it 
seems that he did not take part in the committee who prepared the final and published 
document. Indeed, some of the ideas that are present in the Kokutai no hongi can be retraced 
in Watsuji’s own books. For example, the condemnation of Western rationalism and 
utilitarianism that had contaminated Japanese culture and that, to him, is best represented in 
the ‘chōnin spirit’ (chōnin seishin) (WTZ IV: 463).236 Or the fact that the reverence to the 
emperor is a theme that runs throughout Japanese history and that guides the ethical and 
moral behavior of the Japanese people.237 
The expressions used in the Kokutai no hongi strongly match a discourse that Watsuji 
addressed to the Navy academy in 1943. This discourse, The Way of the Japanese Subject, 
was printed together with another lecture that he delivered, The American National Character, 
in 1944 for the ‘Wartime National Library’. The Ministry of Education distributed two 
million copies of this pamphlet (Bellah 1965: 579). Some scholars have tried to argue that 
Watsuji’s involvement with the Kokutai no Hongi committee has no political value and that it 
needs to be contextualized in the framework of his philosophical work. Even Bellah, who is 
quite critical of Watsuji, affirms that ‘Watsuji is a long way from the fanatic traditionalists’ 
(Bellah 1965: 589). Notwithstanding his distance from right-wing figures such as Minoda 
Muneki and the Genri Nihonsha, Watsuji’s opinion regarding the Japanese cultural and 
ethical uniqueness does compromise his position. Watsuji’s considerations on the Japanese 
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spirit and the greatness of Japanese ethics could be only limitedly justified. His participation 
in the committee should be considered in relation to the pamphlet and in relation to his work 
on the reverence to the emperor and the kokutai that thus reveal his political position. His 
vision of Japan, which is also re-stated in some of his wartime memos, was one of a country 
that morally stood on top of Asia and was destined to guide it towards a path of liberation 
from Western occupation. Different from Miki, Watsuji did see Buddhism as a cultural factor 
but he ditched it in favor of the Shinto deity Amaterasu, a symbol of his political support for 
State Shinto. Since to Watsuji there is no higher ethical entity than the state itself, as 
explained in Study of Ethics, religion cannot but be subordinated to the state’s sovereign 
power. Compared to Miki’s understanding of the role of Buddhism in politics, Watsuji 
considers politics above any category of human life. The moral destiny of Japan thus becomes, 
first of all, a political one and, secondly, a duty that needs to be carried out with the 
selflessness that he claimed characterized the bushi ethics from the Kamakura period onwards. 
Secondly, the moral destiny of Japan is embedded in the defeat of the American Gesellschaft 






The Way of the Japanese Subject  
In The Way of the Japanese Subject, Watsuji lectures the navy cadets on the ‘way of 
the Japanese subject’ as the ‘way of our ancestors’ (WTZ XIV: 297). The first part focuses on 
the question of whether the expressions ‘to happily die for the Emperor’ and, more 
significantly, ‘not to die until the enemy is defeated’ still retain the significance of being 
attached to one’s own life. Watsuji explains that, if this is the case, then the sacrifice would 
have no ethical value, since it would mean that there is still an attachment to the ego. Instead: 
This ‘ego’ (watakushi) needs to be destroyed as well, since sacrifice 
(sekinin) solely must remain […] This is the state that, I believe, the 
ancient referred to as ‘the standpoint that transcends life and death’ 
(shisei wo koeta tachiba)238 
       (WTZ XIV: 297) 
 
                                                 
238 Sekinin literally means ‘responsibility’. I decided to translate it as ‘sacrifice’ since it seems to convey more 




This standpoint is the one that apparently characterized the bushi ethics, when samurai 
dutifully died for their lord. Nevertheless, Watsuji argues that it later became a moral code 
indicating the Emperor, rather than the shogun or the feudal lord and that it deepened its 
significance through the contamination with Buddhism or Christianity or, later, Confucianism 
(WTZ XIV: 298-9). In order to better clarify the moral superiority of the Japanese people, 
Watsuji brings as an example Francisco Xavier, the Jesuit missionary who came from Macau 
to Japan before the persecutions against Christians started, who wrote that the Japanese had 
higher moral standards than European people (WTZ XIV: 303-4). The standpoint that 
transcends life and death is therefore that moral and ethical principle that pushed samurai and 
warriors to carry on with the ultimate sacrifice for the reverence to the lord and, then, to the 
emperor. It needs to be kept in mind that when Watsuji was pronouncing this discourse he 
was lecturing young Navy cadets that were about to be shipped off into combat zones. 
Therefore, this kind of affirmation has a great impact even on a ethical level, because, 
especially in 1944, in the name of the emperor many Japanese soldiers died as kamikaze.  
The absolute particularity of Japan is subsequently linked to the figure of Amaterasu 
and her being a ‘non-absolute’ deity. As we have seen in the two books dedicated to the 
reverence of the emperor, Amaterasu is considered to be only the most ‘revered’ in the Ise 
sanctuary and the one, who, at the same time, ‘was revering’ (WTZ XIV 27-37; WTZ XIV: 
307-8).239 This is her most quintessential characteristic: 
Because Amaterasu Ōmikami is not an absolute deity but an 
intermediate one, she expresses what means to be complete and non-
exclusive. She is the truthful expression of the absolute 
    (WTZ XIV: 308; emphasis in the original) 
 
The veneration of the emperor as a living god thus descends from this idea that the 
‘Way’ is more important than the deity itself. Whilst Judaism, Islam and Christianity venerate 
a God that is absolute and exclusive, the Japanese have always focused their attention on the 
Way of revering rather than what had to be exclusively revered. This absolute Way resembles 
the Absolute Totality that Watsuji described in his Study of Ethics. If there the famous 
‘noematic residue’ of the totality immanent in the individual pushed the human being to rejoin 
its structural, total basis, here the noematic residue is embodied in the ‘Way’ of the Japanese 
subjects: 
                                                 




The Way to which every absolute relates and that is the deepest 
foundation of man, every ethical structure, is truly concretized in the 
state (kokka)240 
       (WTZ XIV: 309)  
 
In this instance the totality pushes the human being to go beyond its attachment to the 
ego and ultimately sacrifice itself in the name of the divine emperor. In Watsuji’s view, the 
state, the highest of every ethical structure, should not even ask for that, since the human 
being is naturally pushed to obedience and negation of its freedom. Again, in his memo on 
what kind of popular leadership should have guided the Greater East Asia, Watsuji writes that 
the problem of the state is the most important issue to be addressed if Japan wants to lead the 
continent (WTZ BII: 454).241 Moreover, the moral aim of Japan would be to establish the 
Greater East Asia in order for Japanese history to enter world history (WTZ BII: 457).242 In 
this sense, even if contradictory, Watsuji’s human being comes very close to Heidegger’s 
Being-towards-Death. In Study of Ethics and Climate Watsuji had harshly criticized 
Heidegger’s idea that the true and authentic Dasein was represented in its awareness of the 
finitude of its existence. Here Watsuji pre-destines a whole nation of subjects to the 
authenticity of the Way which involves death.  
There is not much difference between Heidegger calling on his students to sacrifice 
themselves in the name of the greatness of the German Volk in his Rectoral Address and 
Watsuji calling on the cadets to die for the emperor. Sakai notices this shift in Watsuji’s 
thought and he also points out the fact that Watsuji and Heidegger reached the same kind of 
conclusion (Sakai 1997: 100). Sakai argues that it is due to the ‘appropriation of an 
individual’s death by the state’ that they come together (Sakai 1997: 100). Despite the 
similarities, I believe that Heidegger and Watsuji converged on this matter of the authenticity 
of life by means of death because of the principle of the escaton behind it. It is not because 
the state appropriates an individual’s death that the German Volk and the Japanese minzoku 
are asked to sacrifice themselves. It is because, for Heidegger, the principle of the Being-
towards-Death is inherently linked to the problem of the present time and the attainment of 
the authentic temporality in the ripened time. The state comes in second place. The escaton 
                                                 
240 Dilworth and Viglielmo translate kokka with ‘nation’ (Dilworth et al. 1998: 285). I believe that in this 
instance translating kokka with ‘state’ better fits into Watsuji’s own philosophical system, where the state is 
recognized as the highest structures of all.  
241 In (Autographed memo) What Kind of Education is needed for the Popular Leadership in Greater East Asia? 
(Jihitsu. Dai tōa no shidōteki kokumin taru ga tameni ware kokumin wo donna ni kyōiku subekika) 1942. Now in 
WTZ BII: 453-6. 
242 In My Impression on the Establishment of Greater East Asia (Dai tōa kensetsu ni kan suru iken), 1942. Now 




thus becomes a human vision that only later becomes the German state. In Watsuji the state is 
the highest ethical structure of all ethical structures and therefore can dictate the faith of its 
subjects. In this instance the escaton remains a human one but it is not linked to temporality 
or the ripened time, it is intertwined to the idea that daily life is permeated by the standpoint 
of transcendence of life and death. The cultural specificity of this affirmation is sanctioned by 
the fact that this standpoint could only be a characteristic of the Japanese people: 
The experience of transcending life and death in the sole moment of 
the fighting with the enemy is undoubtedly an honorable one. 
Nonetheless, when it saturates (shintō) every aspect of one’s own life 
and when it becomes the real ‘pure and clear heart’ (seimeishin) with 
one’s all might (kōshin), then it indeed is this absolute state of mind 
       (WTZ XIV: 312) 
 
Every aspect of the everyday life, therefore, has to be permeated by this spirit of 
transcendence of life and death. This passage is quite exemplary of the way the Japanese 
government was asking the whole country to sacrifice itself in order to win the war.  
If the ideological expressions of the Kokutai no hongi are compared to the language of 
the Way of the Japanese Subject the similarities are quite evident. The propaganda document 
distributed in the schools throughout the country had the objective of educating the population 
to the reverence of the emperor and to put their faith in his hands. The discourse Watsuji 
pronounces does the same, it calls for an ultimate sacrifice. In this instance, negating the fact 
that Watsuji supported the government ideology is quite unfruitful and eschews the possibility 
of comprehending the reason behind which Watsuji delivered such a perfect propaganda piece. 
In a much broader context, it appears that the critique of individualism that Watsuji directed 
towards Heidegger and that was subsequently replaced by the ethics of the national human 
being negates the possibility of freedom. Watsuji’s escaton is, more than Miki, based on the 
faith in the reverence of the emperor qua unique possibility for Japan to win the war. In this 
instance the establishment of the Greater East Asia appears more of a contingent consequence 
of the moral destiny of Japan. In fact, Watsuji says: 
[…] the establishment of Greater East Asia portrays the significance 
of the exceptional shift world history is undergoing. Regarding the 
accomplishment of this great enterprise unprecedented in world 
history, the Japanese people (nihon minzoku) have to take a firm and 
independent stance […] that should not simply be acquired through 
the defeat of the American way of thinking, but rather by sufficiently 
knowing it and therefore being able to transcend it 





 Watsuji’s consideration on Greater East Asia is more linked to the inherent moral 
direction Japan is following. In this sense, as the authors of the Kokutai no hongi, he does not 
deny that American culture has penetrated into Japan. What he is calling for is the 
overcoming of this individualistic tendencies in order to complete the mission Japan was 
‘chosen’ for. Recalling another piece that has been previously analyzed, The Standpoint of the 
Bearer of the Creation of Culture, it is clear that the discourse is almost the same.243 In 1937 
Watsuji wrote that ‘the role prescribed to the Japanese is essentially to preserve the freedom 
of ten million Asians’. Here Watsuji writes that the establishment of the Greater East Asia is 
an exceptional event that never before had materialized in world-history. Yet again, the 
‘pathetic but heroic destiny of Japan’ will be to create this geographical, cultural and political 
space where Japan could fulfill its historical destiny. Evidently, the mission of Japan is 
Watsuji’s escaton that is based solely on faith. Watsuji regards the creation of the Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere more as the ‘natural’ outcome of the particularity of Japan, 
rather than seeing it as the Sturm und Drang in Miki’s terms. In Watsuji, the escaton has a 
different origin. Nevertheless, the result is equal. The element that they have in common is the 
national human being, that whether is theorized on the level of culture and ‘ethics’ as in 
Watsuji, or theorized on a more philosophical level as in Miki, it always reaches its 
completion on a global scale. In other words, the human being qua medianity cannot be 
confined anymore to the national boundaries, it becomes the renovation of the whole Asia as 







The American National Character 
In The American National Character Watsuji launches a harsh attack on American and 
British culture. Delivered in 1943, this lecture was published together with The Way of the 
Japanese Subject and it functions as its mirror. As a matter of fact, if the first piece was an 
apology of the Japanese spirit, the second one reinforces the arguments there expressed 
through negation. What the American character represents is not what the Japanese spirit 
                                                 




stands for. Analyzing how Hobbes and Bacon influences those two cultures, he affirms that 
American civilization has now reached the stage of being a ‘machine civilization’ (kikai 
bunmei) because its morality was never a true morality, but one of self-interest (WTZ XVII: 
455-74). The ‘machine civilization’ is the one that slaughtered the Native Americans in the 
name of Jesus Christ, but that, in reality, did it for the control and expansion of their territory. 
The same happened with the enslavement of African-Americans who, on paper, had the same 
rights of the Anglo-Saxons but that had no basic rights in their daily lives (WTZ XVII: 469-
70). Watsuji attributes the ‘national character’ of the American people to two factors: the 
Hobbsian ‘law of nature’ (shizenhō) and the Baconian ‘logic of invention’ (hatusmei no ronri). 
To Watsuji, Hobbes’ theory of the state of nature is what drove the Anglo-Saxons to 
‘massacre the natives’ without any moral or ethical standard (WTZ XVII: 465). On the other 
hand, Bacon’s idea of the relationship between philosophy and science is what represents, to 
Watsuji, the foundation of the American Gesellschaft (WTZ XVII: 473-5). Despite the fact 
that Watsuji considers the mechanical technology (kikai gijustu) that the Anglo-Saxons 
reached in the 18th century subarashii (super), he also counterargues that this very same spirit 
is what started permeating society as well (WTZ XVII: 474 ff). In this respect, Watsuji seems 
to agree with Miki that ‘Western technology’ was the one of ‘things’ and that Eastern 
technology, or in this case the Japanese morality, remained on a ‘spiritual level’. Watsuji 
considers Americans as being a mere ‘material civilization’ by means of which no culture and, 
therefore, no ethical improvement was ever possible.  
To Watsuji, the event that best embodies the ‘uncivilization’ and the egotistic 
character of American culture was the arrival of Commodore Perry in the Uraga port in 1854. 
This historical fact, which triggered the Meiji restoration under the sonnō jōi slogan, explains 
more than anything else the American will of subjugating Japan to its own economical power. 
Watsuji says that this kind of society that masks itself under the declaration of the ‘pursuit of 
happiness’ is a society that does not have in its structure a ‘moral significance’ (jinriteki igi) 
(WTZ XVII: 480). 
In this sense, their defeat of the enemy is solely considered in 
utilitarian ends. Even more, their daily lives have lost moral 
significance. They need great excitement to be made to work and 
when they build machines they use that force to subjugate nature and 
human beings […] To them the most immediate meaning of 
enterprises is nothing different than the charm of gambling […] Under 
the influence of a civilized superstition they fight with all their force. 
But they are only awaiting for a nervous breakdown (nervous 




power of quantity but on its moral strength. Like a gambler who 
impatiently bets all he has, they will be suddenly crushed 
 (WTZ XVII: 480-1; emphasis and English in the original) 
Comparing this passage with what Watsuji had described as being the quintessential 
features of Japanese morality it is possible to see how the two parts of the pamphlet fit 
together. On the one hand, Americans’ daily lives are not permeated by the spirit of 
transcendence of life and death that is at the basis of Japanese people. This state of mind that 
Watsuji linked to the two expressions of ‘happily dying for the emperor’ and ‘not die until the 
enemy is defeated’ is in stark contrast to the way the Anglo-Saxon non-civilized civilization 
massacres other peoples only for utilitarian purposes. The moral stance of Japanese bushi and, 
in 1943, of Japanese soldiers, elevates itself upon the gambling spirit of the Americans that 
are waiting for a nervous breakdown to happen to them. Once again, the dichotomy 
Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft is used by Watsuji to re-state that the ethical exceptionalism of 
Japan should be the driving force behind the victory in the Second World War. Remembering 
Watsuji’s lament of the lack of scientific spirit that predestined Japan to lose WWII, there is a 
huge difference between what technology represented to him.  
Watsuji’s faith in the escaton of the war finds its most rampant expressions in the 
1944 pamphlet. His complete faith in Japanese morality pushed him to affirm that a new era 
in world-history had started. The defeat in 1945 triggered a mechanism of withdrawal into 
Japanese history to locate the causes of the failure of this escaton. His view that the kokutai 
should not be abolished, that the emperor still remained the symbol of national unity and that 
the sakoku period was uniquely to blame for the defeat seems to indicate that Watsuji was still 
hoping for a new role for Japan in world-history. The particularity of Japan that in 1951 
brought Watsuji to write that Japan was still a great nation with its pacifist constitution never 
disappeared from his philosophy. His conservatism, sometimes overlapping with the wartime 
ideology, brought him to the personal loss of his own ideas. LaFleur argues that Watsuji 
embraced the solution of religion in the name of Buddhist vacuity and he, together with other 
scholars, such as Berque, Arisaka, and most recently McCarthy, have argued that his 
aidagara or medianity represents a kind of benevolent principle that could be used in inter-
religious dialogue, or in a kind of post-colonial critique of Eurocentrism, or even in feminist 
theory (LaFleur 1978; Berque 1994; Arisaka 1996b; McCarthy 2008).  
I believe that the statement that Watsuji embraced the solution of religion is a correct 
one. Nevertheless, the religion that lies behind Watsuji’s theorization of the aidagara is not 




characterizes Watsuji’s system, that to him takes life in the aidagara, is still a product of 
Angst towards the future of Japan and Western modernity. The post-colonial critique of 
Eurocentrism that some have theorized for both Miki and Watsuji does not properly function 
here. As long as the critique of Eurocentrism will result in the perpetuation of imperialism in 
the name of racial superiority it will not be possible to consider it under a positive light. And 
if a transnational ethics of care implies the occupation of China and South-East Asia, as well 
as Korea and Taiwan, in the name of the I-Thou ethical relationship, then it will pose the basis 
for further imperialistic and colonial theories.  
Watsuji’s philosophy is tainted with the ideology of the Japanese wartime regime and 
it is very difficult to deny his political responsibility. His escaton did not materialize and his 
personal faith in the human being that constitutes the focus of his mediations and 
philosophical speculations crushed in August 1945. He is like a prophet who, in Dodd’s 
words: 
[…] a particular historical crisis, constituted by the ministry, the death, 
and the resurrection of Jesus Christ, is interpreted in terms of a 
mythological concept, which had been made by the prophets into a 
sublime symbol for the divine meaning and purpose of history in its 
fullness. The characteristics of the Day of the Lord as described in 
prophecy and apocalypse are boldly transferred to the historical crisis 
       (Dodd 1949: 85) 
 
Watsuji interpreted the historical crisis of his time in the name of the mythological 
concept of the reverence of the emperor that was symbolized in the sublime meaning of the 
death in the name of the emperor. The Day of the Lord, which must be imagined as victory in 
the Second World War, came in the apocalyptic event of two atomic bombs. The historical 














 The medianity that has been the kernel of this thesis for so many pages finds its end in 
the loss of the escaton. Miki and Watsuji, who firmly believed in a Japanese success in world-
history, saw their expectations bankrupted by the war. The ideological stains embedded in 
their philosophies remain testament of their collaboration with the wartime regime. 
Attempting to rescue the philosophy of the human being from the judgment of history and 
historiography seems to me a vane effort to deny what the essence of a philosophical 
discourse should be.  
The most fundamental question a philosophical discourse should thus attempt to 
answer is how to interpret the present in light of the past. Only by understanding the 
mechanisms that lay behind a given philosophical or historical discourse we could reconstruct 
the path certain ideas followed and, most importantly, how they unfolded. In the case of Miki 
and Watsuji, their communal, societal, national and imperialist ningen has proven to be a 
powerful concept that had inevitable consequences. The inherent flaw in its conceptualization, 
grounding medianity in the historical Angst, was exposed by their faith in the escaton. It is 
here that the historical context and the one of ideas come together.  
On the one hand, the prolonged crisis that started in the 1920s and continued until the 
1950s pushed Miki and Watsuji to reflect on the status of their ‘human being’. On the other, 
the direction they chose for it, the one of the national ningen, was a response to this crisis. 
The fact that they chose the ‘human being’ as the kernel of their philosophical speculations is 
symptomatic of how deep this historical and existential uncertainty was. They not only strove 
to reconceptualize epistemology, they wanted to redefine existentialism in the sense of 
‘human existence’. They sought a new element of specificity that could change the course of 
historical and philosophical events.  
It is in this context that the escaton functions at his best. By strongly believing in the 
Japanese nation and its moral destiny Miki and Watsuji showed complete faith in the Japan 
that they had themselves molded. It is for this reason that their ningen was predestined to fail 
from its genesis. By underpinning it in the specific character of medianity they trapped it in a 
condition that could not evolve if not in the limited space and time they had assigned to it. 
These space and time became the Japanese ones. The escaton charged their systems with great 
expectations for the future and, at the same time, it doomed them to bankruptcy. Miki and 
Watsuji chose not to stop and to continue on the path of medianity. This will probably go 







Three Reasons for Bankruptcy 
The years between the 1920s and 1950s were a period of political and intellectual 
turmoil. As we have seen, the crisis and the Angst that pervaded the historical condition of 
Japan led to a chain of events that brought unbearable destruction and suffering both 
domestically and abroad. Miki and Watsuji, although in their small realm of ideas, 
contributed to the ideological establishment of the Japanese empire by constructing a 
human being that was clustered in the immobility of the Japanese nation. Their philosophy 
became what Marcuse calls ‘the political form of existentialism’ where ‘a secularized 
theological image of history emerges’ (Marcuse 1968: 33-5). Whilst Marcuse’s poignant 
critique is mainly directed towards Heidegger, the same could be argued here. The 
envisioning of the escaton and the belief in the complete success of the moral destiny of 
Japan is what drove Miki and Watsuji’s human being to its doomed failure. Throughout 
this thesis, I have argued that the historicization of the ningen resulted in the de-
historicization of the Japanese nation, where a teleological view of history was remanded 
to an idealized and visionary future. It was precisely the detachment from ‘real history’ 
that triggered this ill-faith mechanism into the production of national and imperial human 
being. In Miki and Watsuji’s systems of thought, ‘a cognitive relation of existence to the 
forces of history’ that should be at the basis of historicity, never took place in a critical 
way.244 Miki and Watsuji uncritically subordinated their philosophy to the ideology of the 
government. The reason for this can be located in three fundamental and interlinked 
elements: first of all in the concept of medianity, secondly, in the interplay between 








                                                 





The medianity that ontologically structured the ningen is the element that 
predestined it to bankruptcy. In Miki’s case, the human being as a median between totality 
and infinity could not have moved in another direction than the one already set by its 
societal element. Even when dealing with Marxist materialism, Miki was not able to 
overcome the problem of the medianity of existence because his ‘ningen-class’ frustrated 
the concept of ‘class’ in its original definition. In Watsuji’s case, ‘the ethical structure of 
all ethical structures’, alias the state, crushed the freedom of the individual as well as the 
possibility of a ‘rebellion’ against its totalitarian power. Nevertheless, subordination 
neither implies subjugation from higher powers nor coercion. Despite the fact that Miki 
was imprisoned in 1930, his ideas did not fundamentally change. In other words, the shift 
from Marxism to philosophy of history took place before his arrest, because it was already 
an inherent trait of his philosophy. Thus, the passage from ‘community’ to ‘nation’ was not 
the outcome of coercion, but rather a necessary step in the development of an idea. Watsuji, 
on the other hand, did not encounter such an episode in his lifetime. The criticism that he 
received came from the far right-wing fringes of the political establishment, such as the 
Genri Nihonsha, on the basis that his elaboration of the ‘reverence to the emperor’ did not 
respect the principles of the kokutai. His ningen had always been the Japanese nation, since 
he had always considered it a particular and exceptional country. Thus, even in the postwar 
period Watsuji was not able to overcome the structure of his thought because he could not 
ditch betweeness. Since in Watsuji medianity functioned as an existential and normative 
element, it impeded the possibility of the renovation of his idea. 
To a larger extent medianity crystallized the human being and then a nation in a 
position of uncertainty. Temporally, medianity appeared to be stuck in an immobile present 
that denied the possibility of evolution. In this respect, Miki’s kairos subordinated 
everydayness to world-history as if the historical mission of Japan had already been 
present in his thought. Watsuji’s betweeness clustered his human being in a position of 
subordination to the power of the emperor and the state. Both Miki and Watsuji, by 









The interplay between historical context and ideas is another factor that, to some 
extent, helped the concept of medianity being shaped in this fashion. Miki keenly 
described the period he was living in as one of Angst. His readings reflected his feelings. 
As a matter of fact, Pascal, Gide, Heidegger, Shestov, Jaspers, Sorel, Nietzsche, who were 
the main European sources of influence for Miki, are all philosophers who lived in 
historical periods of spiritual and political travail. It probably should not be underestimated 
that they were all ‘existentialist’ thinkers whose efforts were directed to the analysis and 
interpretation of human existence in the world. As Miki himself acknowledged, during his 
sojourn in Germany he realized that students were not interested anymore in the rational 
logic of Neo-Kantianism, but they were turning to Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and 
Dostoyevsky (MKZ I: 437). He blamed it on the period of uncertainty that Germany was 
undergoing after the loss of WWI and that mirrored, with similar characteristics, the one 
that Japan faced in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Miki thought that this milieu was the 
one that permitted the rise of ‘irrational forces’ that took Japan over and that he attempted 
to confront with his concept of the renovation of the human being as ‘type’ from a human, 
cultural and intellectual standpoint. Nevertheless, his technological homo faber could not 
be effective in the critique of totalitarianism, since its characteristic were the ones of the 
Japanese folk. Yet again, the historical context and the idea of the ningen that then 
emerged appear to be deeply related. The combination of the uncertainty of the present 
with the longing for an immediate, future solution are two historical elements that 
contributed to Miki’s underpinning of his entire system in the existential Angst of the 
human being. Since the historical context, in this case, reflected the one of ideas, it is easy 
to conclude that they both failed in finding a solution for the renovation of Japan. Instead, 
they opted for a resolution of war and for the imperialist enterprise in East Asia. 
Watsuji did not consider the period he was living in as explicitly one of angst. 
Nonetheless, he effortlessly proposed his betweneess and human being as the Japanese 
alternative to Western modernity, Western capitalism, Western ‘profit society’ and 
Western colonialism. It is difficult to see how such a theorization could have been 
generated had it not been for the historical crisis in which Japan found itself. From the very 
beginning of his career he constructed a model of existence that was particular, harmonious, 
overshadowed by the presence of an absolute state and absolute ruler, and whose ethics 
was distinctively Japanese. As an interpreter of his time, Watsuji thought that the only 




the Japanese past and find the elements that set it apart from the rest of the world. 
Unfortunately, the crisis ended with another crisis in August 1945. In the second part of his 
life Watsuji strenuously searched for the reason why his model failed together with his 
country. He was only able to blame it on the period of national seclusion of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, where, yet again, Japanese technological process had been 
prevented by the short-sightedness of its rulers. Thus, Watsuji did not re-discuss his own 
system of thought based on betweeness, he re-discussed Japanese history.  
The second period of Angst that came alongside the American occupation of Japan 
pushed Watsuji to revisit his idea regarding the role of the emperor, albeit not to change it. 
He could not accept the fact that the emperor had been stripped of his powers and he 
affirmed that throughout Japanese history, whether the emperor had retained the political 
power or not, his subjects had always felt the ‘reverence’ for him. The betweeness that had 
seen the emperor being the good, totalitarian ruler in a dialectical relationship with his 
subjects had become the good, symbolic ruler of his citizens. The Japanese ethical thought 
was preserved in its crystallized and immobile structure, the revisiting of the past did not 
resulted in a critical understanding of it and Watsuji’s human being remained clustered in 
the Japanese particularity. The only solution Watsuji could come up with was to ‘get rid of 








The Religion of the Human Being 
Miki and Watsuji certainly bore on their shoulders the burden of having been the 
prophets of their own national history. Their systems, based on the idea that the ningen was 
the origin and the future of Japan, were based on the faith that the escaton of the war 
would have materialized in a Japanese victory. The escaton always presupposes an 
expectation towards the historical fulfillment that will come with the Day of the Lord. At 
the same time, the element of predestination plays a key role in this sense. Miki and 




suggested that the renovation of the human being should have come after the end of the 
‘world’, in a re-shuffling and re-balancing of the global powers. Their religious thought 
was underpinned by the idea that the escaton could have not but appeared in this way. Miki 
and Watsuji’s ningen was predestined to become a society, a nation and then an empire 
because of its immanent ontological structure on the one hand, and because Miki and 
Watsuji trusted the escaton on the other. The historical fulfillment of the destiny of Japan 
not only should have brushed away any doubts regarding the technological superiority and 
‘modernity’ of Japan, but it would have finally seen the new ‘type’ appear in the form of 
the ‘Eastern’ human being or the Japanese Gemeinschaft. Eventually, the cardcastle 
collapsed both politically as well as idea-logically. Japan lost the war and had to endure the 
tragedy of two atomic bombs, the Eastern human being died with Miki in a prison cell 
forgotten by the Americans and Watsuji’s Gemeinschaft took the oxymoronic form of a 
brand new postwar society grounded in the old and defeated prewar one.  
The idea of ningen as Miki and Watsuji built it was a ‘vision’ completely detached 
from historical reality. In the face of a crisis they were not capable of coming to terms with 
reality in a critical way. The national, uncertain, median human being that they constructed 
could not but fail in its internal renovation since spatially and temporally it was crystallized 
a specific location and history. The escaton simply contributed to expose the flaws their 
philosophy had kept hidden for so long. The war bankrupted their ideas and they chose to 







In this thesis I have attempted to answer the questions of how Miki and Watsuji 
created a concept of the human being that could not but eventually collapse into the 
Japanese empire, and also to what extent the historical period and the intellectual milieu of 
their time contributed to this vision. Yet, I have tried to demonstrate that a clear line 
between philosophy and politics cannot be drawn. As long as ideas are not considered as 
being the combined expression of a philosophical exercise, its historical context and its 




given fashion. Judging Miki and Watsuji solely for their political choices would not do 
justice to the essence of their work. Refraining from exploring these very same choices, on 
the other hand, would have identical results. Contextualizing their political expressions in 
the framework of their overall production could help in casting more lights on the reasons 
that pushed them to support a totalitarian regime. 
In my work I have reached the conclusion that Miki and Watsuji’s ningen did not 
have a choice but to follow this path. What was negated to their human being was the 
possibility of evolving following the progress of history. Medianity prevented development, 
the Angst located it in a position of uncertainty and the religious thought based on the 
belief in the moral destiny of Japan made into a predestined ideal. Such a theorization 
indeed endangers the possibility of change and to swiftly turn into another direction. This 
problem does not entail that Miki and Watsuji did not bear any responsibility for their 
political involvement with the regime. On the contrary, they chose to subordinate their 
ideas to the one of the government by opting not to modify the vision they had themselves 
helped to carve.  
Further thoughts come to mind. For example, is the fact that Miki created a 
‘ningen-class’, without following the concept of class as explained in Marxist philosophy, 
the result of the idea of ‘harmony’ (wa) that many have recognized to be an ‘invented 
tradition’? If this was the case, then it would mean that Miki’s society was indeed a society 
where class struggle would have only disrupted the order imposed from above and it would 
put Miki in the same position as the one of Watsuji. Secondly, is the fact that Watsuji 
refused to change his idea of betweeness not a symptom of a greater malaise that pervaded 
the Japanese intellectual milieu in the 1950s and 1960s? In other words, is the refusal of 
dealing with the war and its subsequent loss a proof that a whole intellectual community 
took refuge into what Hannah Arendt called ‘the nostalgia for a still intact past’? Thirdly, 
could the failure of the escaton be the reason behind Tanabe Hajime and Nishitani Keiji’s 
turn towards philosophy of religion in the postwar period? Lastly, could the framework of 
the escaton be employed in other historical or ideological locations to possibly attempt to 
explain the involvement of a great number of intellectuals with the totalitarian regimes of 
the past century? 
 Perhaps this is a small piece of the puzzle of why intellectuals got involved and 
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Aan het begin van dit proefschrift stond een onderzoek naar de manier waarop en de 
mate waarin twee twintigste-eeuwse Japanse filosofen, Miki Kiyoshi (1897-1945) and 
Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960), hebben bijgedragen aan de ideologie van het Japanse 
oorlogsregime. Hun achtergrond was zeer verschillend; Miki was een intellectueel die een 
deel van zijn leven wijdde aan de studie van het Marxisme en die de concepten ‘dialectiek’ en 
‘klasse’ vanuit een zeer vernieuwend perspectief benaderde. Watsuji was een conservatieve 
intellectueel die de vorming van een nieuw nationaal karakter nastreefde ten aanzien van de 
crisis, die in zijn optiek door de ‘Westerse moderniteit’ naar Japan was gebracht. Een 
plotselinge omslag in hun ideeën in de jaren veertig van de twintigste eeuw bracht de 
filosofische systemen van Miki en Watsuji uiteindelijk samen, toen zij er beiden toe 
overgingen de expansiepolitiek van Japan te ondersteunen. De hoofdvragen waren daarom 
hoe twee zozeer verschillende standpunten zowel filosofisch als politiek konden versmelten, 
en in hoeverre zij hun waarde verloren toen Japan werd verslagen in 1945. Op 
methodologisch niveau werd dit vraagstuk gereflecteerd in de kwestie of de relatie tussen 
filosofie en intellectuele geschiedenis zo zwak was dat het onmogelijk was om deze twee te 
scheiden, of dat, anderzijds, een nieuw methodologisch instrument nodig was om een brug 
tussen de twee te slaan. 
Mijn stelling is daarom dat het antwoord op deze vragen moet worden gezocht in de 
manier waarop Miki en Watsuji het concept ‘mens’ (ningen) gedurende hun carrière 
theoretisch hebben vorm gegeven en verder hebben ontwikkeld. Ook ben ik van mening dat 
hun idee van ‘medianity’, dat hun uitwerking van ningen onderbouwt, de meest diepgaande 
en fundamentele fout was waardoor hun systemen in 1945, samen met het regime, ten onder 
gingen. Ik toon aan dat de overwinning er niet alleen in militair en historisch opzicht niet in 
slaagde tastbaar te worden, maar ook op filosofisch vlak. Het ‘geloof’ in de morele 
bestemming van Japan waar Miki en Watsuji blijk van gaven en dat werd belichaamd door 
het idee van het escaton wat betreft de overwinning in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, werd niet 
verwezenlijkt op de manier die zij zich hadden voorgesteld. Zo waren hun filosofische 
systemen gedoemd te mislukken om twee redenen: de mens die zij vormgaven was een 
weergave van de betekenis die de Japanse staat voor hen had, en hij was bovendien in ruimte 
en tijd gebaseerd op een Japanse locus die was gericht op een denkbeeldige toekomstige 
overwinning. De Tweede Wereldoorlog, met de crisissfeer die deze met zich mee bracht, 




Op politiek vlak werd deze Japanse mens weerspiegeld in de expansiepolitiek van 
Japan, en, in het geval van Watsuji, zelfs in het politieke klimaat van de naoorlogse periode. 
Ondanks de persoonlijke en intellectuele verschillen tussen Miki en Watsuji vonden zij elkaar 
in politiek opzicht in hun theorievorming van ningen, hun vertrouwen in het escaton en hun 
idee van ‘medianity’. Ik zal laten zien dat wat zij verzuimden te doen was ervoor te waken dat 
hun systemen afgleden tot ultranationalisme en imperialisme. In plaats daarvan gingen zij er 
gewoon in mee.  
Om mijn hypothese methodologisch te ondersteunen maak ik gebruik van zowel 
intellectuele geschiedenis als filosofie, en breng deze onder bij filosofiegeschiedenis. In feite 
bleek noch intellectuele geschiedenis noch filosofie alomvattend genoeg om te bepleiten dat 
ideeën en geschiedenis gezamenlijk kunnen instorten. Enerzijds kan intellectuele geschiedenis, 
met haar gerichtheid op de contextualisering van de productie van een bepaalde auteur, niet 
volledig antwoord geven op de vraag of de auteur en zijn productie een heimelijke 
verstandhouding kunnen hebben met de historische realiteit. Anderzijds omvat het bereik van 
de filosofie niet noodzakelijkerwijs het historisch milieu of de historische impact die bepaalde 
ideeën hadden. Door de historische en intellectuele ontwikkeling van het idee van ningen bij 
Miki en Watsuji te schetsen, probeer ik daarom de kwestie te behandelen van een mogelijke 
oplossing voor het probleem van de verhouding tussen filosofie en geschiedenis. Met het oog 
op de specifieke historische omstandigheden van de Tweede Wereldoorlog is deze kwestie 
nog prangender wanneer we de manier willen begrijpen waarop intellectuelen actief 
deelnamen aan het ontstaan van de ‘banaliteit van het kwaad’ van deze oorlog. 
In de tweede plaats ben ik van mening dat er een belangrijk probleem is in de wijze 
waarop men de filosofie van de ‘Kyōto School’ tot nu toe heeft benaderd. Alle studies die tot 
op heden zijn verschenen richten zich hoofdzakelijk op de vraag naar collaboratie. De 
verhouding tussen intellectuele geschiedenis, filosofie en de productie van ideeën moet echter 
nog degelijk worden geproblematiseerd. Daarom moet, in het bijzonder in het geval van deze 
twee denkers, de kwestie niet blijven steken bij hun vermeende collaboratie, hun vermeende 
tenkō (afzwering) of hun vermeende politieke onschuld (en, zo zou ik willen bepleiten, 
naïviteit). Eerder zou de kwestie moeten zijn op welke manier zij allebei opschoven in de 
richting waar de Japanse regering op aanstuurde. De ‘kloof tussen intellectuele historici en 
godsdienstfilosofen’ zal nooit worden overbrugd als het onderzoek niet ophoudt hardnekkig 
vast te houden aan deze twee polariserende posities. Wanneer bovendien de fundamentele 
vraag achterwege wordt gelaten hoe een bepaald idee in een bepaald filosofisch systeem kan 




intellectuelen hadden in de totstandkoming van de ultranationalistische ideologieën van de 
afgelopen eeuw, met hun naargeestige politieke en historische gevolgen. Om deze kwestie op 
te lossen heb ik ervoor gekozen om het onderzoek naar het concept van de mens bij Miki en 
Watsuji zowel vanuit het perspectief van de intellectuele geschiedenis als dat van de filosofie 
te benaderen. Door de interne ontwikkeling na te gaan van drie fundamentele elementen die 
de theoretische basis vormen van het concept ningen, te weten ‘medianity’, Angst en religie, 
laat ik zien dat mijn benadering nauwer verwant is met filosofiegeschiedenis dan met 
intellectuele geschiedenis of filosofie.  
Voor Miki en Watsuji geeft ‘medianity’ zowel de ontologische als de historische  
positie van de mens weer, waar de ningen zichzelf geplaatst ziet tussen totaliteit en 
oneindigheid bij Miki, en totaliteit en bijzonderheid bij Watsuji. De theorievorming van een 
alomvattend menselijk wezen als ‘median’ die de eenheid van subject en object weergeeft, 
van logos en pathos, van lichaam en geest was erop gericht het epistemologisch onderscheid 
tussen ‘subject’ en ‘object’ op te heffen. Deze mens had als bijzondere eigenschap dat hij bij 
Miki zijn onderbouwing vond in geschiedenis en praxis (vervolgens poiesis), en bij Watsuji in 
geschiedenis en klimaat. Precies echter het feit dat deze mens de specifieke geschiedenis van 
Japan grondvestte, en dat in een specifiek Japans klimaat, maakte dat hij geen complete 
vernieuwing kon ondergaan die in staat was zich te ontwikkelen tot een ander soort potentiële 
‘geschiedenis’ dan die welke de Japanse natie heeft ondergaan.  
Ten tweede ontwikkelden Miki en Watsuji ‘medianity’ als een antwoord op de 
intellectuele en spirituele crisis die zij als alomtegenwoordig ervoeren in de Japanse 
maatschappij tussen de jaren twintig en de jaren vijftig van de twintigste eeuw. De historische 
crisis was aangewakkerd door de onzekere politieke stemming die volgde op de Eerste 
Wereldoorlog, en die de weg vrij maakte voor de opkomst van het ultranationalisme in Japan. 
Miki zag dit weerspiegeld in de ‘irrationele krachten’  die de overhand kregen in de vorm van 
fascisme (MKZ X: 400-2). Watsuji beschouwde dit in termen van de gevaren die de 
‘Westerse moderniteit’ en het ‘Westerse’ kapitalisme vormden voor de pure en ‘traditionele’ 
Japanse cultuur. Verder werd hij dit opnieuw gewaar in de Japanse nederlaag in 1945 en in de 
Amerikaanse bezetting die hierop volgde en die aanhield tot 1952. Het was hierom dat beide 
denkers de crisis (of crises) van hun tijd interpreteerden als een teken van de diepgaande 
historische verandering die zich in die periode meester maakte van Japan. ‘Medianity’ kwam 
dus niet alleen op als een middel voor vernieuwing op filosofisch niveau, maar ook als een 
product van en een poging tot een oplossing voor de historische context waarin het was 




sterft en het nieuwe nog niet kan worden geboren’, en dat ‘in dit interregnum een enorme 
verscheidenheid aan morbide symptomen opkomt’, dan wordt duidelijk dat het wel eens zo 
zou kunnen zijn dat ‘medianity’ zich geen machtig instrument betoont om 
ultranationalistische tendensen te contrasteren (Gramsci 1971: 276). In feite is het mogelijk 
om ‘medianity’ te beschouwen als een ‘morbide symptoom’ van het ophanden zijnde rijk.  
In de derde en belangrijkste plaats is er het element religie dat behoorlijk sterk naar 
voren komt in de systemen van Miki en Watsuji. Beiden geloofden dat de Japanse 
overwinning in de Tweede Wereldoorlog zich zou hebben gerealiseerd in de vorm van een 
intellectueel escaton. Aan het einde van de oorlog zou een nieuwe, vernieuwde Japanse 
ningen leiding hebben gegeven aan heel Azië, tegenover de Europese en Amerikaanse mens. 
Het geloof in hun land dat zij aan de dag legden, en hun overtuiging dat dit de bestemming 
was waar Japan moreel recht op had, zijn er nu juist de oorzaak van geweest dat hun opvatting 
van de mens een noodlottige slag kreeg toegebracht door de loop van de geschiedenis. In de 
kern is het een probleem van godsdienstig geloof, zij het dan niet in de zin van theologie, 
maar meer in de zin dat Miki en Watsuji geloofden in een religie van de mens, met alle 
implicaties van dien, predestinatie incluis. Toch verschillen het escaton van Miki en dat van 
Watsuji enigszins van elkaar in hun historische realisatie. Miki overleed in september 1945 en 
zou de Amerikaanse bezetting van Japan en de intellectuele en fysieke reconstructie van zijn 
land niet meer meemaken. Zo stierf zijn idee van de vernieuwde mens met hem, en bleef deze 
idee kenmerkend een religieus escaton. Watsuji daarentegen overleefde de oorlog en bleef 
schrijven tot aan zijn dood in 1960. Omdat zijn idealen samen met Japan waren verslagen in 
augustus 1945, moest hij een ander model van ningen voorstellen, dat de nieuwe uitdagingen 
van de naoorlogse periode tegemoet kon treden. Daarom besloot hij om de idee van 
‘betweeness’ te omarmen. De mislukking van zijn escaton in 1945 deed vervolgens een 
nieuwe vorm van escaton ontstaan die erop gericht was dat Japan zich zou verheffen in het 
nieuwe geopolitieke klimaat van de Koude Oorlog. Het escaton van Watsuji nam zowel een 
politieke als een religieuze vorm aan en belemmerde de mogelijkheid om fouten uit het 
verleden toe te geven nog meer.  
Deze drie elementen vormen de essentie van de filosofische innovaties van Miki en 
Watsuji, en gezamenlijk hebben zij hun systemen naar de ondergang geleid. Van daar toon ik 
aan hoe de filosofische ondernemingen van Miki en Watsuji als geheel gedoemd waren te 
mislukken door een combinatie van de interne wisselwerking van genoemde elementen en de 
externe kracht van de historische context. Op deze manier probeer ik te laten zien dat 
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